the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
The role of climate-society impacts in an Integrated Assessment Model: feedbacks, cascades and interdependencies
Abstract. Conventional Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), including those used in Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP) projections, often represent climate damages with limited cross-sectoral coupling, potentially missing system–wide and nonlinear risks. Policy approaches that assume gradual, reversible, and predictable change are therefore likely to underestimate both the risks of delayed action and the benefits of early, coordinated intervention. These limitations highlight the need for IAMs to incorporate increasingly comprehensive representations of climate–society feedbacks in order to better characterize climate risks under real-world conditions.
To address this gap, this study investigates how explicit climate–society feedbacks alter long-term projections in a coupled human–Earth system. We use the Feedback-based knowledge Repository for Integrated Assessments version 2.1 (FRIDA v2.1), a global IAM designed to capture bidirectional feedbacks between climate and multiple socio-economic modules—Energy, Finance, Demography, Human Behaviour, Land Use, and Resource Infrastructure—via 19 climate impact channels grouped into 9 broader categories.
We compare a counterfactual simulation ensemble without climate-society impacts (NoImpacts) to a fully coupled experiment with all of the impact channels (AllImpacts), and to experiments where impact channels are activated individually. Across these experiments, we find that explicit climate feedbacks fundamentally alter socioeconomic trajectories, with the AllImpacts case exhibiting substantially lower economic growth than the NoImpacts case due to cascading feedback loops that propagate through financial, energy, demographic, and resource systems. Indirect economic channels—particularly climate-induced changes in investment and bank assets—emerge as the dominant drivers of system-wide outcomes, while other impacts remain largely sector-specific. These cascading mechanisms imply a growth-damage rather than a level-damage representation of climate impacts relative to canonical IAMs (e.g., DICE), resulting in substantially larger economic losses.
The analysis reveals strongly nonlinear climate-society interactions driven by cross-sectoral feedbacks, state-dependent responses, and regime-switching dynamics. Nonlinearities are particularly pronounced in food demand, crop yield, agricultural water use, and surface temperature anomaly, reflecting heterogeneous response mechanisms across coupled biophysical and socio-economic systems. These results demonstrate that tightly coupled human-Earth systems can generate non-linear system-wide changes even in the absence of explicit tipping elements.
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Status: open (until 14 Oct 2026)
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CC1: 'Comment on egusphere-2026-3072', Sally Dacie, 16 Jul 2026
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It's nice to see some more analysis coming out of the FRIDA model. To me, GDP/cap growth in the counterfactual looks quite optimistic. How does it compare to other estimates that exclude climate damages? At the same time, the FRoL experiment shows an excessively large climate impact from loan failures and changing bank lending standards during the historical period. Have you found any observational evidence for >10% decrease in global GDP from lending standards evolving due to physical climate risk by 2020? Given that the magnitude of this channel was not based on literature data, but model calibration, I suspect the calibration has exaggerated the effect of this channel in the historical period to counteract the large GDP growth we see in the counterfactual scenario. Unfortunately, with (in my opinion) neither a believable counterfactual scenario nor a reasonable explanation of present-day physical climate damages, it is hard for me to take this study's key findings seriously. It's a shame, because the model concept is very nice.ReplyCitation: https://doi.org/
10.5194/egusphere-2026-3072-CC1 -
CC2: 'Reply on CC1', Muralidhar Adakudlu, 05 Aug 2026
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We thank the reviewer for the thoughtful assessment and for recognizing the potential of the modeling framework. We appreciate the opportunity to clarify the design of the NoImpacts counterfactual and the FRoL experiment, which are central to the interpretation of the study’s findings.
The counterfactual simulation designed for this paper follows the same conceptual assumption as the baseline socioeconomic trajectories used in the SSP framework, that climate damages do not feed back onto socioeconomic development (Riahi et al., 2017; O'Neill et al., 2016). The uncertainty bounds of the counterfactual GDP per capita in FRIDA v2.1 encompass the baseline projections of SSP1, SSP2, and SSP5 (not shown in the paper), indicating that the simulated economic development lies within the range represented by these widely used reference scenarios. The counterfactual therefore provides a suitable reference simulation for isolating the effect of climate damages rather than representing an implausible unconstrained growth trajectory.
Secondly, the FRoL experiment does not represent an estimate of the observed historical GDP losses attributable solely to climate-induced changes in loan failures or lending standards. Rather, it isolates a single endogenous climate-impact pathway within the coupled system to examine how climate-related financial constraints propagate through the economy over long time scales. The implementation of this pathway and its integration into the coupled climate–economy model are described by Wells et al. (2026), while its economy-wide propagation emerges through the endogenous structural framework described by Grimeland et al. (2026). Consequently, the differences between the FRoL experiment and the NoImpacts counterfactual should not be interpreted as implying unusually large annual GDP losses arising from climate damages. Instead, they reflect the cumulative influence of this modeled feedback over more than a century. Because GDP accumulates through compounding effects, even relatively modest differences in annual economic growth translates into substantial differences in GDP levels over longer time horizons.
Citation: https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-2026-3072-CC2 -
CC3: 'Reply on CC2', Sally Dacie, 06 Aug 2026
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Thank you for taking the time to write a long reply. Perhaps I didn't state my critique clearly enough. I find the difference between the FRoL and NoImpacts implausible during the historical period.
For context, I used to work in financial data services. The company I worked for (the ICE) had no climate risk offering at all until the acquisition of risQ in 2021, which provided physical climate risk data for US municipal bonds and US based mortgage-backed securities. I would therefore assume a lot of lending before 2020 as well as afterwards, particularly to other sectors and/or in other geographies did not (and likely still does not) consider physical climate risk. Of course this is just one example, and other data providers were earlier to engage on these topics, and some banks had in-house teams working on this. However ~10% difference in global GDP by 2020 is huge, particularly when we consider which sectors have seen changes in lending. Mortgages are unlikely to have large knock-on impacts on economic productivity. The agricultural sector, which has also seen some changes in lending due to physical climate risk, receives relatively little bank credit and only makes up a small portion of global GDP.
I am open to being proved wrong with data of actual changes in bank lending standards and back-of-the-envelope calculations of their propagation through the economy. I am not convinced by a model calibration using an optimistic counterfactual GDP growth path, that also doesn't include other reasons for lower observed economic growth in the years since the development of the SSP scenarios.
Citation: https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-2026-3072-CC3 -
CC4: 'Reply on CC3', Muralidhar Adakudlu, 17 Aug 2026
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Thank you for the clarification. Your observation that banks historically did not incorporate physical climate risk into lending decisions is, in fact, consistent with the mechanism represented in FRIDA. Physical climate shocks are outside the control of banks and can generate financial and credit-market effects through multiple channels, including reductions in lending and loan losses, with these effects potentially propagating beyond the directly affected sectors and regions (Brei et al., 2024; Ivanov et al., 2022).
The FRoL channel represents loan failures arising from such climate-induced effects. Thus, the process should not be interpreted simply as banks identifying climate risk → changing lending standards → lower GDP. Rather, it represents a much broader mechanism initiated by climate-induced loan failures, which can arise whether or not banks have identified or explicitly priced the underlying physical climate risk. The resulting financial losses influence lending conditions, investment and other economic activity, generating an endogenous feedback through the economy in FRIDA (Grimeland et al., 2026). Conceptually, this involves cascading effects such as: climate impacts → increased loan/investment failures → tighter financial constraints and defaults → reduced lending and investment → slower economic activity → further climate–economy feedbacks.
The ~10% difference in GDP levels during the historical period should therefore not be interpreted as a contemporaneous 10% GDP loss attributable to certain climate-related changes in lending standards. Rather, it is the accumulated difference between the FRoL and NoImpacts trajectories resulting from the compounding and cascading effects of this system-wide feedback over the simulation period.
Citation: https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-2026-3072-CC4 -
CC5: 'Reply on CC4', Sally Dacie, 21 Aug 2026
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Thank you for writing a second reply and for the comprehensive response. I think we are close to understanding each other's perspectives. Relating to the historical GDP damages from the bank lending channel, I will summarise your arguments here.
- You take SSP1, 2 and 5 as the best estimate of counterfactual (no climate damage) GDP growth. You assume that differences to observed historical GDP growth in the last two decades come entirely from climate damages (and their propagation through the economy, accumulated over time).
- Most climate damage channels in the model are constrained by literature values and do not explain the large difference in historical GDP. Your calibration therefore assigns a large role to the bank lending channel.
- This is larger than would be expected from banks having actively priced physical climate risk into their lending standards. You assume that banks have changed their lending standards because the model produced an increase in bad loans related to climate change (which is difficult to find data on to verify).
As I wrote before, I am not convinced, and I have issues with all three of the above points. If one day you are open to changing these assumptions, I would be happy to collaborate. Feel free to reach out by email; Chris Smith has my contact details.
Citation: https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-2026-3072-CC5 -
CC6: 'Reply on CC5', Billy Schoenberg, 25 Aug 2026
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Thank you for engaging with this work. I think there is some misunderstanding about the role of FRoL and I thought it would be wise for me to step in and attempt to clarify the issue, and more clearly define the mechansim, its underlying theory, and provide evidence for its inclusion in FRIDA. You can see the full explanation in the supplment to this comment.
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CC7: 'Reply on CC6', Sally Dacie, 26 Aug 2026
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Thank you for engaging with my criticism. To clarify, I did not mean to suggest that the bank lending channel is unimportant. Nor did I mean to suggest that there is no evidence of loans failing due to climate disasters. I only wanted to say that this is hard to quantify at the global level for the purpose of comparing with your model results.
I wonder if, rather than assuming that I haven't understood your model, you could instead consider the possibility that I have understood it and nevertheless have the above criticism. Of course, some of my points are somewhat subjective: we do not have a counterfactual world to compare modelled numbers with for the historical period, so there is surely room for disagreement on what we consider plausible.
Citation: https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-2026-3072-CC7 -
CC8: 'Reply on CC7', Billy Schoenberg, 26 Aug 2026
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I apologize for misinterpreting your perspective in the prior response; I didn't mean to suggest these concerns are due to a misunderstanding on your part. I think we agree on the key points: 1) that there is lack of empirical data to constrain or validate the specific magnitude of this mechanism at the global level; and 2) that it would be preferable to disaggregate this damage channel in the hopes that more empirical evidence can then be applied to constrain the range of the plausible magnitudes for each individual impact. These shared points have fed into our method for producing and presenting results using FRIDA (see Section 4 of https://gmd.copernicus.org/articles/18/8047/2025/gmd-18-8047-2025.html), and the method by which we perform a large global sensitivity analysis across a wide range of values for all parameters, including those which condition the failure rate of loans mechanism. Disaggregating of this damage function is intended to be a key channel of future development of FRIDA, something we have alluded to, but not head on documented yet in the literature. Given that, and this conversation, we will further clarify this point in revision of both this paper and others in draft. I’m more than happy to connect outside of the comments channel here to discuss further if you’d like to collaborate on this, or any other point. I am reachable via the e-mail address on the "An Overview of FRIDA..." paper linked above.
Citation: https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-2026-3072-CC8
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CC8: 'Reply on CC7', Billy Schoenberg, 26 Aug 2026
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CC7: 'Reply on CC6', Sally Dacie, 26 Aug 2026
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CC5: 'Reply on CC4', Sally Dacie, 21 Aug 2026
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CC4: 'Reply on CC3', Muralidhar Adakudlu, 17 Aug 2026
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CC3: 'Reply on CC2', Sally Dacie, 06 Aug 2026
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CC2: 'Reply on CC1', Muralidhar Adakudlu, 05 Aug 2026
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Data sets
Codes and data for producing the figures in Adakudlu et al (2026) Adakudlu Muralidhar https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20417832
Model code and software
Codes and data for producing the figures in Adakudlu et al (2026) Adakudlu Muralidhar https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20417832
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