Humans are a representing species: we construct conceptual, numerical and material models that represent the world in certain respects. However, how scientists communicate about how their models represent the world, sometimes reflects that it is unclear by what virtue models can represent and can be used to make claims about the world. This becomes most apparent and problematic when models are used to make claims about a target system in communications between scientists, the public, and consultants.</p> <p>After introducing four example models of different kinds from one geoscientific discipline, recent accounts of model representation from philosophy of science will be summarized and exemplified. Some of these centralize the representational relation between models and their target phenomena, whereas others centralize the role of the modellers in the process of using the model as representation for the target. The latter group of accounts convincingly demonstrate the role of the scientist, their skills and their background knowledge in the representation. This works in both ways: the modellers and other experts put trust in their models, not because the models are perfect, but because they have background knowledge and experience. However, the receiver, with different expertise, does not have this.</p> <p>Following examples from the geoscientific literature, suggestions emerge how more nuanced claims can be made with models, and which background assumptions on both the modelling and the target systems, and the role of required skills, need to be explicated. While scientists may worry that putting a scientist in the picture could reduce the trust in their model, for effective communication the target audiences need understanding at a level that links to their background and training to be able to evaluate the model results and integrate these with their own experience and knowledge.