

Negative Social Tipping Dynamics Resulting from and Reinforcing Earth System Destabilisation

Viktoria Spaiser¹, Sirkku Juhola², Sara M. Constantino³, Weisi Guo⁴, Tabitha Watson⁵, Jana Sillmann⁶, Alessandro Craparo⁷, Ashleigh Basel⁸, John T. Bruun⁹, Krishna Krishnamurthy¹⁰, Jürgen Scheffran¹¹, Patricia Pinho¹², Uche T. Okpara¹³, Jonathan F. Donges^{14,22}, Avit Bhowmik¹⁵, Taha Yasseri^{16,23}, Ricardo Safrá de Campos⁵, Graeme S. Cumming¹⁷, Hugues Chenet¹⁸, Florian Krampe¹⁹, Jesse F. Abrams⁵, James G. Dyke⁵, Stefanie Rynders²⁰, Yevgeny Aksenov²⁰, Bryan M. Spears²¹

¹ School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, United Kingdom

² Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 00790, Finland

³ Doerr School of Sustainability, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, 94305, United States

⁴ Centre for Autonomous and Cyberphysical Systems, Cranfield University, London, MK43 0AL, United Kingdom

⁵ Global Systems Institute, University of Exeter, Exeter, EX4 4QE, United Kingdom

⁶ Cluster of Excellence Climate, Climatic Change, and Society, Hamburg University, Hamburg, 20146, Germany

⁷ International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), Recta Cali-Palmira, Valle del Cauca, Colombia

⁸ Alliance Biodiversity-CIAT, Cape Town, 7600, South Africa

⁹ Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy, University of Exeter, Exeter, EX4 4QE, United Kingdom

¹⁰ Meru Labs, Panama City, 0700, Panama

¹¹ Institute of Geography, Research Group Climate Change and Security, Hamburg University, Hamburg, 20144, Germany

¹² Amazon Environmental Research Institute, Altamira, 68373-100, Brazil

¹³ Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, Kent, ME4 4TB, United Kingdom

¹⁴ Earth Resilience Science Unit, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Member of the Leibniz Association, Potsdam, 14473, Germany

¹⁵ Risk and Environmental Studies, Karlstad University, Karlstad, 65188, Sweden

¹⁶ School of Sociology, University College Dublin, Dublin, 8Q4G 8Q, Ireland

¹⁷ Oceans Institute, University of Western Australia, Perth WA 6009, Australia

¹⁸ IESEG School of Management, Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 9221 - LEM - Lille Economie Management, F-59000 Lille, France

¹⁹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, 169 72, Sweden

²⁰ National Oceanography Centre, Southampton, SO14 3ZH, United Kingdom

²¹ UK Centre for Ecology & Hydrology, Edinburgh, EH26 0QB, United Kingdom

²² Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Stockholm, 10691, Sweden

²³ Geary Institute for Public Policy, University College Dublin, Dublin, D04 N9Y1, Ireland

Correspondence to: Viktoria Spaiser (v.spaiser@leeds.ac.uk)

Abstract. In recent years research on normatively positive social tipping dynamics in response to the climate crisis has produced invaluable insights. In contrast, relatively little attention has been given to the potentially negative social tipping processes that might unfold due to an increasingly destabilised Earth system, and how they might in turn reinforce social and ecological destabilisation dynamics and/or impede positive social change. In this paper, we discuss selected potential negative social tipping processes (anomie, radicalisation and polarisation, displacement, conflict and financial destabilisation), linked to Earth system destabilisation. We draw on related research to understand the drivers and likelihood of these negative tipping dynamics, their potential effects on human societies and the Earth system, and the potential for cascading interactions (e.g. food insecurity and displacement), contributing to systemic risks. This first attempt to provide an explorative conceptualisation and empirical account of potential negative social tipping dynamics linked to Earth system destabilisation is intended to motivate further research into an under-studied area that is nonetheless crucial for our ability to respond to the climate crisis and for ensuring that positive social tipping dynamics are not averted by negative ones.

1 Introduction

Recent advances in research on Earth system tipping points (ESTPs) (e.g. Armstrong McKay et al., 2022), paint an increasingly alarming picture of the state of our planetary system. Understanding tipping points and other forms of non-linear change is now widely recognised as critical to managing and responding to change in complex systems (Scheffer, 2009). We define

49 social tipping points on the basis of mathematics of dynamical systems (Strogatz, 2000). Specifically, tipping points in
50 dynamical social systems are critical thresholds where a small change in a variable describing the state of the social system or
51 in a parameter capturing external influences leads to an often abrupt qualitative change of the dynamical social system, i.e. the
52 social dynamical system undergoes a phase transition from one state to another (Winkelmann et al 2022). Tipping occurs
53 because positive feedback mechanisms create self-reinforcing loops, where a small change in one component of the system
54 triggers changes that further reinforce the initial change. Tipping is further enabled by weak negative feedback mechanisms
55 that tend to stabilise a dynamical system. Tipping is usually difficult to reverse due to hysteresis that locks the system within
56 the new state or within the trajectory to a new state, even if the original drivers for the change are removed (Wiedermann et
57 al., 2020, Winkelmann et al., 2022). Normatively speaking, social tipping points can be both positive (predominantly beneficial
58 to humans and the natural systems) or negative if they result in catastrophic consequences for human societies and ecological
59 systems (IPCC, 2022; Lenton et al., 2023).

60 Increasing attention is also being paid to cascade effects that connect different systems, implying that a change in one system
61 may trigger further change in another system (Liu et al., 2023). Here, we consider a tipping cascade to take place when one
62 tipping point triggers the crossing of another tipping point (Klose et al., 2021). We focus here moreover on negative social
63 tipping processes that have the potential to feed back to the Earth system, further destabilising it, i.e. we are interested in
64 processes where the Earth system destabilisation contributes to social system destabilisation, which then further destabilises
65 the Earth system (e.g. due to lack of cooperation), creating a potential feedback loop. We note that this paper focuses on climate
66 ESTPs, but the same rationale can be broadly generalised to other Earth systems.

67 Although research on the potential for positive social tipping dynamics in various systems (e.g. food, energy, transportation,
68 financial, behavioural etc.) has started to emerge (Tàbara et al., 2018; Otto et al., 2020; Lenton 2020; Lenton et al., 2022;
69 Winkelmann et al., 2022; Milkoreit, 2023), there has been limited research on negative social tipping dynamics that might be
70 triggered by climate change (Laybourn et al., 2023). This is noteworthy, not least because early research on tipping points in
71 the social sciences was mostly concerned with undesirable social processes, such as rapid and non-linear patterns of urban
72 racial segregation in the United States (Schelling, 1978). More recently, researchers have used dynamical systems analyses to
73 empirically study tipping points in school segregation (Spaiser et al., 2018), political instability of countries (Grimm &
74 Schneider, 2011), and rapid proliferation of misinformation (Törnberg, 2018).

75 We argue that studying negative social tipping points in the context of Earth system destabilisation is important because it
76 highlights the risks generated by overshooting temperature thresholds such as 1.5°C (Bustamante et al., 2024). While indeed
77 every tenth of a degree of temperature increase matters, framing around climate policy is moving in the direction of making
78 overshoot socially acceptable. Overshoots are presented as temporary, with the deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR)
79 being able to recover temperatures back into the ‘safe zone’ by the end of the century. The risks of ESTPs however make
80 overshooting very dangerous, as overshooting may trigger ESTPs, which then cannot be reversed even if we return to lower
81 global warming after the overshoot period. Triggering ESTPs on the other hand poses the risk of escalating climate change
82 impacts (Wunderling et al., 2024). Moreover, overshooting would lead to further ecological destabilisation (Singh et al., 2023),
83 which might be reversible in terms of returning to lower global warming; but in the meantime, ecological destabilisation could
84 trigger negative social tipping points described here, and these negative social tipping points could feedback to the Earth
85 system, further destabilising it, potentially leading to ESTPs being triggered. We believe that understanding these potential
86 complex interactions is important, because humans have agency and can make decisions trying to prevent such escalating
87 processes. None of the scenarios described here is inevitable and although many dynamics are already unfolding today, we
88 have not reached a point of no return.

89 Negative and potentially catastrophic consequences are unequally distributed, both internationally and within individual
90 societies (Pereira et al., 2024). Research has emphasised that low-income countries that have often contributed least to the
91 destabilisation of the Earth system will bear the brunt of the climate change impacts (IPCC, 2022; Lenton et al., 2023).
92 Moreover, within each society, it is the most vulnerable groups, such as children (Thiery et al., 2021; UNICEF, 2021), women
93 (Denton, 2002), minority groups (Berberian et al., 2022, Donaghy et al., 2023) and generally the less affluent (Thomas et al.,
94 2019), who will be most affected by climate change impacts. Triggering negative social tipping points will have considerable
95 consequences for these vulnerable groups, further amplifying their vulnerability and stressing the need for climate justice
96 (Newell et al., 2021).

97 In this perspective, we pose the following questions: (1) What are the potential negative social tipping points that the
98 destabilisation of the Earth system could trigger? (2) To what extent could the triggering of negative social tipping points
99 further destabilise the Earth system? (3) How do these negative tipping elements interact and what cascades could these
100 interactions cause? (4) What research and modelling approaches are suitable for studying negative social tipping points and
101 cascades? And (5) what intervention options are available to prevent negative social tipping points and cascades?

102 **2 Mapping out Negative Social Tipping**

103 We identify five negative social tipping processes that according to some existing evidence could be triggered by Earth system
104 destabilisation (see Figure 1). The part or subsystem of a larger system that can pass a tipping point is referred to as the tipping
105 element. Drawing on the positive social tipping element framework developed by Otto et al. (2020), we identify four social
106 tipping elements (TE) that have the potential for negative tipping processes (TP): socio-psychological systems (TE1), political
107 systems (TE2), human settlements (TE3) and financial markets (TE4). Figure 1 provides an overview of these tipping elements
108 and the tipping that could be triggered within these tipping elements: Anomie (TP1.1), Radicalisation & Polarisation
109 (TP1.2), Displacement (TP2.1), Conflict (TP3.1) and Financial Destabilisation (TP4.1). All these processes can unfold across
110 different levels of social structure on different time- and spatial scales. Specifically, tipping can occur as rapidly as hours,
111 triggered by a major shock event or unfold more slowly (years) over cascading pathways as the effects of ESTPs accumulate.
112 Tipping can also occur only locally, affecting a specific community or spread across a nation or the globe. The figure also
113 indicates the potential for interactions between various negative tipping elements. The interactions between different TEs
114 indicate different possible destabilisation pathways that could lead to the crossing of negative tipping points across scales. This
115 illustrative selection is based on evidence for tipping processes in these subsystems and evidence that Earth system
116 destabilisation has a direct effect on these subsystems.

117 [FIGURE 1 HERE]

118 **2.1 Anomie**

119 The concept of anomie, which was introduced by Durkheim (1893, 1897) to describe the breakdown of norms and social order
120 and its relationship to suicide patterns in societies, has evolved over decades of social research (Abrutyn, 2019; Twyman-
121 Ghoshal, 2021). We define anomie as a state of a society or community that is characterised by a breakdown of social norms,
122 social trust, social ties, and social reality, resulting in social disorder and disorganisation, disorientation, and disconnection.
123 These syndromes manifest on the individual level through mental health deterioration, increased suicide rates, and/or increased
124 deviant behaviour (Brown, 2022; Teymoori et al., 2017). Although this is a relatively new area of research, there is increasing
125 evidence to suggest that changes in the Earth system can contribute to anomie. For instance, anomie has been observed in the
126 aftermath of natural disasters, made more likely by climate change (Miller, 2016) and it has been suggested that Earth system
127 destabilisation may result in a new form of anomie, called environmental anomie (Brown, 2022), where sudden changes to the

128 physical landscape can upend the established social order and undermine people's ability to comprehend, relate to, and function
129 within their environment. For instance, people from Paradise (California, US) who survived the devastating Camp Fire in 2018
130 reported how the wildfire event undermined their ability to comprehend the world around them, because their familiar
131 environment became unintelligible (e.g. they struggled to determine wind direction), they were no longer able to relate to and
132 function within their environment. This resulted in a breakdown of self-efficacy, with a sense of unreality taking hold (e.g.
133 burning tree branches falling from the sky). This experience of environmental anomie was further exacerbated when the
134 affected individuals witnessed that traditional authorities were overwhelmed and unable to respond to the physical chaos,
135 which undermined confidence and led to an individuation of suffering and feelings of social isolation, i.e. experience of general
136 anomie. With the breakdown of social order people were forced to fend for themselves and rules (e.g. regulating traffic) were
137 no longer observed (Brown, 2022).

138 Beyond anomie resulting from extreme weather events caused by escalating climate change, there is also evidence for a rise
139 in anomic experiences, particularly by young people and children around the world, contributing to a mental health crisis. In
140 a first comprehensive study, surveying 10,000 children and young people (aged 16-25 years) in 10 countries (Australia, Brazil,
141 Finland, France, India, Nigeria, Philippines, Portugal, UK and USA) Hickman et al. (2021) found that more than 45% said
142 their feelings about climate change negatively affected their daily life and functioning, 75% reported that they find the future
143 frightening, and 83% said they think people (adults) have failed to take care of the planet. But it is not just the young
144 experiencing the effects of climate change on mental health – it is negatively affecting the mental health and emotional
145 wellbeing of people of all ages globally, but more profoundly of poor and vulnerable populations (Lawrence et al., 2021;
146 Clayton et al., 2017), as well as women and Indigenous people (IPCC, 2022; Sultana, 2022). For a summary of other studies,
147 see Figure 2.

148 [FIGURE 2 HERE]

149 The extent of tipping dynamics in anomie have not yet been studied directly, but some studies have demonstrated tipping
150 dynamics in phenomena that can serve as proxies for the anomic state of a society or community. Specifically, (complex)
151 contagion processes (see Table 1) have been observed for mental disorders and distress, including suicide (Scatà et al., 2018;
152 Paz, 2022), for deviant behaviours (Busching and Krahe, 2018), and for distrust (Ross et al., 2022). Societies or communities
153 that are already in a zone of social instability (e.g. high rates of anti-social behaviour, increasing deviant behaviour such as
154 crime or substance abuse, high rates of mental health problems) due to other factors, such as poverty, rising inequality and
155 failing institution (Burns, 2015) or because of a gradual erosion of social norms that can affect affluent communities too (Pfiff
156 et al., 2012; Bursztyn et al., 2020), are particular at risk to tip into an anomic state, when additionally being faced with
157 ecological destabilisation (cf. Douglas et al., 2016). Anomie tipping can also result from a single extreme event, for instance,
158 triggered by an ESTP being breached. Such an event can instantly disintegrate whole communities, scattering members of the
159 community in the aftermath (i.e., interaction with displacement), leaving them with depleted social and mental resources
160 (Miller, 2016) and establishing the perception that society as a whole is failing (Teymoori et al., 2017). Tipping in this case
161 can be described using Logistic Map models (Bruun et al., 2017), which can model how coupled systems can tumble towards
162 chaotic system behaviour (see Table 1). Natural and human-caused disasters can bring communities together and strengthen
163 cooperation, however research suggests that when the experience of solidarity and unity in the disaster aftermath starts to
164 wane, communities can experience increasing disillusionment and depression, followed by social disintegration (i.e. anomie),
165 if they are left without adequate, long-term support (Townshend et al., 2015).

166 Anomie can have feedback effects on the Earth system, further destabilising it through various pathways. When social norms
167 disintegrate, certain pro-social behaviours and collective actions that are necessary to slow down the climate crisis may

168 diminish (Constantino et al., 2022; Schneider and van der Linden, 2023; Lettinga et al., 2020). Without strong social norms
169 and social ties supporting collective action and fostering reciprocity, trust, and cooperation, it becomes increasingly
170 challenging to implement effective measures to address accelerating Earth system destabilisation, hence increasing the
171 likelihood for Earth system tipping (Fehr et al., 2002; Thøgersen, 2008; Malerba, 2022). Moreover, mental health problems
172 weaken people’s capacity to seek solutions, fostering collective inertia and increasing susceptibility to conspiracy theories,
173 potentially further undermining trust and cooperation to prevent further Earth destabilisation (Burden et al, 2017; de la
174 Sablonnière & Taylor 2020; Green et al., 2023).

175 **2.2 Radicalisation & Polarization**

176 Radicalisation can be a reaction to perceived external threats, including ecological threats. Research suggests that people can
177 respond to climate change and other ecological threats by becoming more authoritarian and derogative against outgroups
178 (Fritsche et al., 2012; Jackson et al., 2019; Taylor, 2019; Russo et al., 2020; Uenal et al., 2021; Spaiser et al., 2024). This effect
179 can be further exacerbated by the well documented effect of heat on aggressive behaviours, including online hate speech
180 (Stechemesser et al., 2022). Current trends seem to suggest increasing polarisation (Dunlap et al., 2016; Vihma et al., 2021;
181 Cole et al., 2023; Smith et al., 2024), i.e. a rise of the political right, which is increasingly attracting the political centre
182 (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Halikiopoulou, 2018; Layton et al. 2021), obstructing climate action and increasingly diverging
183 from the political left/centre-left, which is demanding climate action (Aasen, 2017; Lockwood, 2018; Gustafson et al., 2019).
184 This polarisation is driven indirectly by Earth destabilisation too, as it is at least partly a response to climate mitigation policies
185 that are perceived as a threat to the existing socio-economic system, status and identity (Dunlap et al., 2016; Hoffarth and
186 Hodson, 2016; Daggett, 2018; Clarke et al., 2019; Benegal and Homan, 2021; Ehret et al., 2022; Brännlund and Peterson, 2024)
187 and can be further exacerbated by inequality and general economic decline (Winkler, 2019; Stewart et al., 2020; Hübscher et
188 al., 2023), which again can be partly linked to Earth destabilisation at least in some parts of the world (Méjean et al., 2024;
189 Dietz et al, 2021). However, as climate change progresses and becomes a more concrete existential threat throughout the world
190 (Huggel et al., 2022), we may see even socially liberal individuals developing increasingly authoritarian and reactionary views
191 (Gadarian, 2010; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011; Huddy and Feldmann, 2011; Hirsch, 2022). At that stage we may see
192 radicalisation taking a different direction, with currently fringe political ideologies such as ecofascism taking hold. Ecofascism
193 reinterprets white supremacy ideology in the context of climate/ecological crisis with the goal to defend habitable areas for the
194 white race and decrease world population (Taylor, 2019). Already, a couple of recent right-wing terrorists have self-identified
195 as ecofascists, such as Brenton Tarrant, who killed 51 people during a terror attack on a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand
196 in 2019. A few months later Patrick Wood Crusius killed 23 people in El Paso, United States, legitimising his actions again
197 with ecofascist ideologies (Achenbach, 2019). Certain ecofascist themes seem to also appear increasingly in public debates
198 (Thomas and Gosink, 2021).

199 Radicalisation can exhibit tipping dynamics. Research has described radicalisation, e.g., the spread of right-wing ideology
200 (Youngblood, 2020), through complex contagion processes (see Table 1). Similarly, the spreading of extremist content on
201 social media has been observed to follow complex contagion processes (Ferrara, 2017). Indeed, polarisation and radicalisation
202 around climate change has been observed to be on the rise online (Weber et al., 2020; Teen et al., 2020; Falkenberg et al.
203 2022), at times displaying non-linear, accelerating diffusion dynamics (Centre for Countering Digital Hate, 2023) and fuelled
204 by corporate funding (Farrell, 2016; Teen et al., 2020). Moreover, processes of “cross-pollination”, the merging or previously
205 separate radical clusters facilitating further contagion, have been documented (Kimmel, 2018; Baele et al., 2023), including
206 for climate denial (Agius et al., 2020). Polarization has also been observed to follow tipping dynamics. Leonard et al. (2021)
207 describe for instance for the US how subtle public opinion shifts from left and right can have a differential effect on the self-
208 reinforcing processes of elites, causing Republicans to polarize more quickly than Democrats. As self-reinforcement pushes

209 societies toward the critical threshold, polarisation speeds up. Political polarisation tipping, often accompanying radicalisation
210 of certain segments of the population, has been found to be difficult to reverse due to asymmetric self-perpetuating trajectories
211 (Macy et al., 2021).

212 Radicalisation and polarisation can have feedback effects on the Earth's system, destabilising it further. According to research
213 (Stanley et al., 2017; Stanley and Wilson, 2019; Julhä and Hellmer, 2020), authoritarian and social dominance attitudes are
214 negatively related to environmental attitudes and support for environmental/climate change policies. Indeed, right-wing
215 ideology has been repeatedly correlated with climate change denial (Hornsey et.al, 2016; Hoffarth and Hodson, 2016; Czarnek
216 et al., 2020; Julhä and Hellmer, 2020). When climate change is denied, no attempts are made to mitigate climate change, on
217 the contrary, decisions may be taken to further prop up high-emitting industries (Ekberg et al., 2023; Darian-Smith, 2023).
218 There is however increasingly a retreat of pure climate denial (primary climate obstruction), instead we see a rise in secondary
219 and tertiary climate obstruction, which can include deliberate polarisation of societies on the issue (Kousser and Trantr, 2018;
220 Goldberg and Vandenberg, 2019; Lamb et al., 2020; Mann, 2021; Flores et al., 2022; Ekberg et al., 2023; Burgess et al., 2024).
221 Research moreover demonstrates that the increasing success of the radical right influences also the policies of mainstream
222 parties (Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2020), i.e. even if radical parties are not in government, they still can undermine climate
223 policies.

224 **2.3 Displacement**

225 Acute and slow-onset environmental pressures, such as heatwaves, long-term temperature and humidity changes, extreme
226 weather events and sea level rise (e.g. due to the melting of Greenland glaciers, and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet), are likely
227 to impact the migration (voluntary) and displacement (forced, involuntary) circumstances of a large proportion of the global
228 population (Mastorillo et al., 2016; Berlemann et al., 2020; Hauer et al., 2020; Hoffmann et al., 2020; Lu and Romps, 2023).
229 In the context of ESTPs, sea-level rise is projected to be one of the most costly and irreversible consequences of climate change
230 (Hauer et al., 2020, McLeman, 2018, Kaczan & Orgill-Meyer, 2020; Armstrong McKay et al., 2022). Another rapid-onset
231 hazard is land degradation due to permafrost melt, both in coastal areas and inland (Irrgang et al., 2022; Streletskiy et al.,
232 2023). Accelerated Polar warming or Arctic Amplification warms Arctic surface temperatures by a factor two-to-four times
233 faster than the rest of the globe (Rantanen et al., 2022), which - in addition to the direct impact on permafrost thawing - results
234 in the loss of protective sea ice and, consequently, rapidly increasing coastal erosion (Casas-Prat and Wang 2020; Nielsen et
235 al., 2022; Wunderling et al., 2024). As the proportion of the global population living in coastal regions continues to grow,
236 likely surpassing one billion people this century, this will have profound implications for both individuals and societies (Hauer
237 et al., 2020, McLeman, 2018, Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020). However, sea level rise is not the only driver of adaptive
238 mobility (Gioli et al., 2016). Even if international efforts towards mitigating climate change are successful (RCP 4.5 – low
239 emissions scenario), models have projected drought-induced international displacement to increase substantially by the end of
240 the 21st Century. High emissions scenarios (e.g. RCP 8.5) would push the number of displaced due to droughts even further
241 up (Smirnov et al., 2023).

242 Displacement can happen suddenly and amplifying or positive feedbacks can increase or maintain the dislocation of
243 populations even after the extreme weather event or initial shock has passed. This can create a cycle that reinforces, extends,
244 or renders the displacement permanent. Displaced populations must grapple with the loss of their livelihoods, often by
245 identifying new temporary sources of income that can become permanent due to the challenges of returning to origin
246 communities (Young and Jacobsen, 2013; Wilson, 2020). The displacement is often linked with turning away from traditional
247 ways of life and economical support, e.g. in the cases of Arctic Inuit population fishing, hunting, and trapping (Ford et al.,
248 2023; Streletskiy et al., 2023), and the movement away from traditional agricultural and pastoralist livelihoods in areas of
249 Central and Southwest Africa (Akinbami, 2021; Thorn et al., 2023). This can result in cultural heritage loss (Pearson, 2023).

250 These compounding and reinforcing effects can exacerbate pre-existing social inequities and determine the pattern of
251 displacement (e.g. short or long-term/permanent) among different populations (Lama, 2021; Boas et al, 2022). Additionally,
252 with slow-onset events, decisions to migrate can be driven by social networks and connections; when members of a community
253 migrate, others may make the decision to follow (Manchin and Orazbayev, 2018; Thorn et al., 2023; Tubi and Israeli, 2023).
254 This can, in and of itself, be subject to tipping dynamics; when a certain percentage of a community has left, this has been
255 observed to negatively impact those left behind, potentially triggering subsequent outmigration (Rai, 2022).

256 In the absence of appropriate governance mechanisms and protocols for how and where to relocate displaced communities,
257 negative feedback consequences for the Earth systems are possible (Islam et al., 2021; Thorn et al., 2023). Hosting
258 communities may face strains on their natural resources and/or sinks to meet the additional needs of the displaced. For example,
259 Tafere (2018) identified environmental degradation resulting from the influx of displaced populations in East Africa, often in
260 environmentally sensitive (e.g. protected forests) or already strained regions (e.g. arid or semi-arid areas). Such straining of
261 ecological systems to accommodate increased ecoservices demand due to forced migration could contribute to accelerating at
262 the very least regional ecological destabilisation.

263 **2.4 Conflict**

264 Despite growing concerns about conflict, the causal link between climate change and conflicts as well as their underlying
265 dynamics remain debated (Burke et al., 2009; Buhaug, 2010; Buhaug et al., 2014; Solow, 2013, Kelley et al., 2015; Selby et
266 al., 2017). While statistical models inferred either significant coincidences of particular civil conflict events with concurrent
267 climate extreme events or significant associations of warming and drought trends with civil conflict trends, many qualitative
268 in-depth assessments of the particular civil conflict events and their underlying mechanisms dismiss such coincidences and
269 associations (e.g. Buhaug, 2010; Selby et al., 2017). Though not the only cause (Sakaguchi et al., 2017; Mach et al., 2019;
270 Scartozzi, 2020; Ge et al., 2022), climate change undermines human livelihoods and security, because it increases the
271 vulnerability of populations (e.g. to extreme events, food/water scarcity), grievances, and political tensions through an array
272 of indirect – at times non-linear and latent (i.e. not measurable) – pathways, thereby increasing human insecurity and the risk
273 of violent conflict (Scheffran et al., 2012; van Baalen and Mobjörk, 2017; Koubi, 2019; von Uexkull and Buhaug, 2021; Ide
274 et al., 2023). It is difficult to separate mutually enforcing vulnerabilities to both climate and conflict that trigger an escalating
275 spiral of violence and amplify cascading crisis events beyond critical thresholds (Buhaug and von Uexkull, 2021) and
276 connected through telecoupling (Franzke et al., 2022).

277 Many conflicts can be described in terms of social tipping mechanisms, which can be triggered by Earth system destabilisation,
278 where causal mechanisms are inferred using data (Sun et al., 2022) and can be modelled through socially connected tipping
279 dynamics, for instance using the logistic map approach (see Table 1) (Guo et al., 2018, Aquino et al., 2019, Ge et al., 2022,
280 Guo et al., 2023). Using a complex systems lens and connecting the human–environmental–climate security (HECS) nexus
281 framework (Daoudy, 2021; Daoudy et al., 2022; Scheffran et al., 2012) and the social feedback loop (SFL) framework
282 (Kolmes, 2008) can help clarify conflict tipping mechanisms in coupled social-ecological systems. The HECS framework
283 infers that climatic drivers of civil conflicts are best understood as a result of policy decisions and governance that reflect the
284 ideology and preferences of ruling elites or ethnic bias instead of investigating the direct functions of climate extremes. SFL
285 suggests that initial social disruptions directly caused by gradual climate change and climate extreme events can itself generate
286 a distinct positive feedback loop leading to self-accelerating rates of societal disintegration and to civil conflicts (Kolmes,
287 2008). In turn, using a combined HECS-SFL lens, civil conflicts can be perceived as amplified social disintegration and
288 disruption resulting from societal and political responses to the initial disintegration and disruptions caused directly by climate
289 extremes and climate change (Scheffran et al., 2023). Self-reinforcing feedbacks emerge in social-ecological systems as a
290 result of complex interactions among socio-economic, environmental and political events and variables, such as institutional

291 capacity for solving social-ecological problems initially caused by climate change (Daoudy et al., 2022). These complex
292 interactions result in the amplification of social-ecological shocks that climate change and extremes initially caused and
293 potentially disrupt and negatively tip the system in concern to a conflict state. The affected system becomes entrapped in the
294 conflict state until sufficient incentives can move it out. However, there remain gaps in understanding latent mechanisms which
295 introduce variable delay (e.g. slow social transformations), confounding factors, non-linear bifurcations (e.g. some
296 transformations are irreversible) and regional variability.

297 When conflicts escalate, exhibiting a tipping dynamic, they can in turn impact the Earth system, either directly as warfare itself
298 is producing excessive GHG emissions and destroying vital ecosystems such as forests, as is for instance currently the case of
299 Russia's war in Ukraine (de Klerk et al., 2022). For example, the Kakhovka Dam was destroyed in 2023 during the Russia-
300 Ukraine conflict. Early assessments (UKCEH & HRW, 2023; UNEP, 2023) indicated a maximum downstream flood extent
301 of around 83,000 hectares (6 - 9 March 2023) including inundation of downstream urban areas and disruption of irrigation for
302 agriculture, water supply and sanitation systems. Over half a million hectares of habitat of conservation importance was
303 estimated to have been affected by the dam breach, from the upstream Kakhovka Reservoir and its wetland habitats to the
304 downstream Black Sea Biosphere Reserve. This impact area covered the distribution of 567 species that have a listing on the
305 IUCN European Red List, 28 of these species have a threat status of vulnerable or worse. There were also concerns about the
306 supply of cooling water to the upstream Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, i.e. one war-induced ecological disaster could have
307 resulted in another ecological disaster. Illegal logging, deforestation and charcoal production also support militia in many
308 protracted conflicts throughout Africa (Branch et al., 2023). But, even beyond involvement in war activities, everyday military
309 operations directly generate vast emissions of GHGs (Kester and Sovacool, 2017; Crawford, 2019). The feedback impact of
310 conflicts on the Earth system can also occur indirectly through impeding humanity's ability to collaborate to find solutions to
311 global challenges such as climate change. Within societies entangled in a conflict, resources are diverted to winning the conflict
312 rather than to mitigate climate change, also affecting a country's environmental governance mechanisms. Finally, the continued
313 presence of a large number of tactical and nuclear weapons represents a significant threat to global climate and other Earth
314 system processes (Turco et al., 1983; Xia et al., 2022).

315 **2.5 Financial Destabilisation**

316 The impacts of Earth system destabilisation on the financial sector are now receiving increasing attention (Ameli et al., 2023;
317 Chenet, 2024), with studies suggesting that climate-related damages will impact the stability of the global banking system
318 significantly (Lamperti et al., 2019), as can biodiversity loss (Kedward et al., 2023). For instance, stocks of capital at risk due
319 to climate-induced extreme and more frequent weather events such as floods, would adversely affect insurance companies
320 (Lamperti et al., 2019). Reinsurance companies are withdrawing increasingly from areas exposed to high climate change risks,
321 e.g., areas vulnerable to wildfires and floods (Frank, 2023). Earth system destabilisation is likely to result in stranded assets
322 (Caldecott et al., 2021). Escalating climate change can also destroy the capital of firms, reduce their profitability, deteriorate
323 their liquidity, reduce the productivity of their workforce, leading to a higher rate of default, harming the financial sector and
324 the economy in general (Dafermos et al., 2018; Dietz et al., 2021). One issue with the existing empirical evidence and models
325 that try to estimate climate damage for the financial sector is however that they do not account for ESTPs (Keen et al., 2022;
326 Kedward et al., 2023; Trust et al., 2023; Marsden et al., 2024).

327 Still, first advances are being made. Martin et al. (2024) propose an Integrated Dynamic Environment-Economic model on the
328 coupling of an Earth Model of Intermediate Complexity and a non-linear macroeconomic model in continuous time. Using
329 this model, they found that above a warming of about +2.3°C, damages drastically foster the need for additional investments
330 in productive capital for adaptation, which could potentially lead to the emergence of private-debt tipping points and a
331 worldwide cascade of defaults. The inability to repay obligations generates non-performing loans (or bad debt) in the balance

332 sheets of banks and other financial institutions, with possible systemic implications such as those experienced during the 2008
333 global financial crisis. It is estimated that climate change will increase the frequency of banking crises by 26% to 248%
334 depending on the extent of climate change (Lamperti et al., 2019). If the banks' equity deterioration due to economic
335 imbalances reaches a certain threshold, secondary systemic effects can be triggered. Financial institutions exposed to troubled
336 banks would suffer losses in the market value of their assets, potentially triggering contagion phenomena (Kiyotaki and Moore,
337 2002; Yan et al., 2010; Roukny et al., 2013; Chinazzi and Fagiolo, 2015). These contagion phenomena can result in a financial
338 tipping point being reached, when contagion becomes self-perpetuating due to feedback loops in the system that amplify the
339 initial shocks (May et al., 2008; Gai and Kapadia; 2010, Haldane and May, 2011). If ESTPs are triggered, destroying assets
340 and the economic productivity of whole regions, we can expect rapid non-linear tipping effects in the coupled financial sector
341 (Battiston et al., 2017). The financial and economic system would eventually settle into a new state, although this state may
342 be characterized by recession, high unemployment, austerity, and other deteriorating economic conditions. The consequences
343 of such a financial upheaval are often a rapid increase in social instability (i.e. interaction with anomie), increase in
344 radicalisation (i.e. interaction with radicalisation) as more people are forced to compete for basic needs (i.e. interaction with
345 conflict) (Dietz et al., 2021).

346
347 This could also impact societies' abilities to mitigate climate change, thus risking the derailment of sustainability transition
348 (Laybourn et al., 2023). Governments will likely try to stabilise financial markets through bailing-out policy such as providing
349 fresh capital and saving insolvent banks and it is predicted that climate change will likely increase the frequency of bailouts
350 (Lamperti et al., 2019). Recent government bailouts in response to COVID-19 have shown a distinct lack of sustainability
351 focus (Rockström et al., 2023). Bailouts negatively affect the public budget and lead to increasing government debts, leaving
352 decreasing resources for addressing Earth system destabilisation, for instance through effective climate change mitigation
353 measures. Financial destabilisation would also deplete businesses and individuals of resources to invest in post-carbon
354 transition (Laybourn et al., 2023).

355 **3 Cascading Negative Social Tipping Dynamics**

356 The basis for many tipping point behaviours in social-ecological systems is a non-linear relationship between critical pairs of
357 variables. Non-linearities create disproportionate relationships between cause and effect, potentially leading to change that is
358 faster, more intense, or more extensive than expected (and hence, harder to reverse or control). Cascades, as defined by Klose
359 et al. (2021), are sequential occurrences of events in which an initial event triggers a series of subsequent events and are one
360 important attribute of systemic risk (Sillmann et al., 2022). Cascades are more likely when multiple variables within a given
361 system exhibit and transform non-linear relationships to each other, i.e. when coupled, these relationships transform in ways
362 that often cannot be understood. Crossing multiple negative tipping points in diverse systems increases the likelihood of (partial
363 or localised) societal collapse.

364 In the context of migration, this can manifest as a domino effect, where an environmental or socio-political event causes
365 involuntary displacement or voluntary migration as people search for improved living conditions and better economic
366 opportunities. This is well documented in the Lake Chad Basin case where climate change and unsustainable resource
367 management affect the sustainability of natural resources, increasing vulnerability and leading to coping strategies such as
368 migration (McLeman et al., 2021). In Ukraine, the war-induced ecological devastation in the aftermath of the Kakhovka Dam
369 destruction has displaced thousands of people, and a major humanitarian programme was initiated in response (WHO, 2023).

370 A possible tipping cascade can be identified between climate change, food insecurity, and migration. The last five years have
371 seen an increase in food insecurity, representing a problematic reversal of the progress done since the 1990s to reduce world

372 hunger (FAO et al., 2022). Climate tipping points could dramatically impact food security through direct impacts on production
373 (availability) and indirect impacts on access to food when displacement occurs. One of the most direct ways in which tipping
374 points can affect food insecurity is through changes in rainfall distribution, which would render agricultural livelihoods in
375 rainfed regions unfeasible without irrigation (or other) technologies (Giannini et al., 2017; Benton et al., 2017). Indeed, even
376 in the most optimistic climate mitigation scenarios which would lead to a temporary overshoot over 1.5°C, and then return to
377 temperatures below that threshold, a tipping point might occur in precipitation patterns which can result in adverse food
378 security impacts (cf. Ritchie et al., 2020). Additionally, recent studies suggest that escalating climate change could result in
379 concurrent weather extremes driven by a strongly meandering jet stream, which could trigger simultaneous harvest failures
380 across major crop-producing regions, posing a serious threat to global food security (Kornhuber et al., 2023). Food security
381 can change seasonally. As such, food security does not exhibit traditional bifurcation in the sense of irreversibility. However,
382 a permanent change towards a state of food insecurity would be catastrophic, representing a permanent food crisis.
383 Krishnamurthy et al. (2022) offer a framework to identify “transitions” as prolonged periods of food insecurity (Figure 3),
384 using the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), the leading global metric for standardized food security
385 assessment, which combines data on agricultural production, food prices, nutrition rates, weather patterns, and other variables
386 to determine the general food security situation in a given location. With these metrics, a tipping point in a food system can be
387 thought of as a shift between periods with minimal food insecurity (IPC 1 or 2) to periods of sustained food crisis (IPC 3 or
388 higher). An example of a potential tipping point using the IPC categories was found in East Africa in 2015/2016 due to
389 anomalously low rainfall in both the summer and autumn. This trend, combined with insufficient drought preparedness,
390 resulted in crop failures and livestock mortality—and consequently a depletion of livelihood assets, food stocks, and overall
391 food security in northern and eastern regions of Ethiopia (Figure 3).

392

393 [FIGURE 3 HERE]

394 The links between food insecurity and migration are complex, severe food insecurity has been found to trap people locally,
395 who wish to migrate, but are unable to (Sadiddin et al., 2019) but there is also evidence that migration can be driven by food
396 insecurity (Smith and Wesselbaum, 2022). Migration flows are also impacted by climate change directly (i.e. the local
397 environment becomes unsuitable for favourable habitation) and indirectly (i.e. by impacting relative wages through effects on
398 farmers’ crop yields). A climate disaster, for instance triggered by a climate tipping point being breached, may also lead to
399 sudden displacement, whether temporary or permanent. To summarise, a cascading dynamic plays out when various tipping
400 points become coupled, for instance, when the tipping in an Earth system triggers the tipping in food insecurity and potentially
401 simultaneously a tipping in displacement, which may in turn reinforce food insecurity.

402 Other potential cascading links exist as well. For instance, societies may tip into a state of conflict because of competition over
403 dwindling resources as tipping in food insecurity occurs and conflicts in turn may reinforce food insecurity, a cascade made
404 likely when institutions are weak, and governance fails (Martin-Shields and Stojetz, 2019; Anderson et al., 2021; Shemyakina,
405 2022). Radicalisation and polarisation can fuel conflicts (McNeil-Willson et al., 2019; Rousseau et al., 2021), radicalisation
406 and polarisation has been also observed in countries hosting displaced communities (Ravndal, 2018), a link often moderated
407 by socio-economic inequality and perceived insecurity. Radicalisation, polarisation, and anomie can reinforce each other too.
408 Research suggests for instance that in countries with greater polarisation, people trust each other less (Rapp, 2016). On the
409 other hand, people with mental health issues are more susceptible to conspiracy theories, which can fuel radicalisation (Green
410 et al., 2023). Finally, financial destabilisation can be a driver for radicalisation, polarisation, and anomie (Funke et al., 2016;
411 Bygnes, 2017; Doerr et al., 2022). However, these and other potential cascading links and processes are still little researched
412 and understood.

413 4 Emerging research questions and intervention options

414 4.1 Methods and models and emerging data questions

415 Various methods and approaches have been suggested for the study of tipping processes in social and socio-ecological systems,
416 which can be used to study negative social tipping points and the cascading interactions between them. In Table 1 we discuss
417 the most prevalent methods and some new emerging approaches. We would like to emphasise here that we are not suggesting
418 that negative social tipping points are knowable in advance, in terms of determining or predicting the exact threshold or time
419 when a tipping will occur. In fact, the knowability of tipping points is a challenge not only for social tipping points but equally
420 for ESTPs (Boulton et al., 2023). It is usually only possible to determine a tipping point subsequently. However, even then
421 there is often not a single negative social tipping point, the exact threshold may vary for instance from one country to another
422 or from one community to another (e.g. c.f. Spaiser et al. 2018 deriving from data specific segregation tipping points for
423 various schools, located on a curve), as the setup of reinforcing and dampening feedbacks will be different in every context.
424 This is also true for some ecological tipping points; e.g. different lakes will have different tipping points (Hessen et al., 2023)
425 The methods we are suggesting here are useful (1) to study tipping processes, once they have occurred or to generate various
426 model-based scenarios to build our general understanding of tipping processes, so we are better equipped to respond to them
427 and (2) to build early warning systems that could potentially capture a system becoming more unstable, chaotic or exhibiting
428 more unusual behaviour before a tipping point has been reached (Dakos et al., 2023). The purpose is to increase our agency
429 (see 4.2).

430

431 We are also conscious that all models are oversimplifications of many stories and perspectives and detailed mechanisms.
432 Tipping models can be higher dimensional to capture more dimensions. But even a low dimensional tipping model, such as a
433 neural network (see Table 1), can be used to estimate tipping parameters. In effect a simple model provides a projection of
434 more complex mechanisms in a function space. The main questions are how much information we lose in projecting to a
435 tipping model, compared to a projection to a different model, and how useful the projection is in enhancing our understanding
436 of underlying mechanisms and in determining agency pathways. We believe tipping model development is important to
437 advance our understanding and enhance our agency, but we also advocate the comparison of different models to identify the
438 most useful model.

439 [TABLE 1 HERE]

440 Further emerging data questions include:

- 441 • What are the most relevant and appropriate datasets for early warning of negative social tipping points? Social tipping
442 points are more complex than physical tipping points due to the interacting relationships between climate parameters
443 and social responses. Given this complexity, there is a need to identify relevant data sources and methods that can be
444 used to detect and anticipate tipping points. Recent advances in machine learning and increasing digital social data
445 all offer an unprecedented opportunity to understand early warning signals for social tipping points. Once datasets
446 are identified, ensuring that these are accessible and usable for analysis is highly important. Moving forward, it will
447 be important to consider sharing platforms to ensure access.
- 448 • What are the characteristics of datasets that can render them more (or less) useful for detecting social tipping points?
449 A key, practical question for tipping point analysis is whether there are specific characteristics that make datasets
450 more appropriate for detection of critical transitions. Early warning of tipping points ultimately depends on reliable,
451 high-frequency data (Scheffer et al. 2009, Dakos et al. 2015). For example, in an analysis of data requirements for
452 early warning of food security tipping points, Krishnamurthy et al. (2020) highlighted the importance of temporal
453 resolution over spatial resolution to detect autocorrelation or flickering in coupled climate-food systems. However,

454 research has shown that even limited datasets such as Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP) can provide game-
455 changing opportunities for detecting food security transitions (Krishnamurthy et al., 2022).

- 456 • Which early warning signals are more meaningful for different applications? Identifying the most useful metrics and
457 statistics for early warnings of tipping points translates to actionable information, but it requires a clear understanding
458 of underlying system functioning and mechanisms. For instance, in food security applications, autocorrelation is the
459 key metric used to detect a transition in food security states, with the rolling average statistic indicating the direction
460 of the transition (Krishnamurthy et al., 2022). Such insights can help leverage resources in a timely fashion to avert
461 negative effects associated with social systems that exhibit tipping points.
- 462 • Moreover, probabilistic insights from research on collective social dynamics may complement insights from new
463 early warning signals for social tipping. These approaches identify measurable qualities of social systems or networks,
464 such as heterogeneity, connectivity and individual-based thresholds that make social tipping points more likely
465 (Bentley et al., 2014). For maximum efficacy, these modelling efforts should derive from both qualitative and
466 quantitative methods so as to benefit from both data and lived experience.

467 **4.2 Intervention options and emerging policy questions**

468 Given that negative social tipping points are under-researched, there is little knowledge on how they can be prevented or
469 managed. As noted for instance by Milkoreit et al. (2024), social tipping point governance has not really been developed yet.
470 In Table 2 we nevertheless provide a preliminary overview of potential intervention options, linked to the discussed negative
471 social tipping points and their main potential interactions. Future research needs to focus on identifying other potential
472 intervention options and tying these together into a coherent tipping points governance framework. Ultimately, effective
473 governance of negative (social) tipping points will hinge upon the understanding of collective social dynamics and proactive
474 resource-based interventions. The main line of agency we would like to emphasise is the strengthening of societal institutions
475 and polycentric governance mechanisms (Carlisle and Gruby, 2019; Morrison et al. 2023). We also would like to emphasise
476 agency in driving positive social tipping processes that improve long-term sustainability and well-being of people and planet
477 (Gaupp et al., 2023) and prevent societies sliding into negative social tipping dynamics.

478 [TABLE 2 HERE]

479 Further emerging policy questions include:

- 480 • How do multiple climate extremes and other shocks and stressors combine, especially do slow onset climate change
481 processes drive systemic changes and tipping points? Evidence provided here, suggests that severe climate events,
482 such as droughts and hurricanes, can result in highly complex social change, including negative social tipping points.
483 Additional research is required to understand if and how climate and social tipping points interact, and whether one
484 tipping point can result in a plethora of other transitions.
- 485 • As critical transitions unfold, how does the risk landscape shift in response? Societies respond to environmental stress
486 and resource scarcities. However, these responses may lead to new risks. Understanding how critical transitions affect
487 the current (and future) risk landscape can provide essential information for decision-makers to prioritize investments
488 in adaptation and mitigation.
- 489 • What are the processes required to integrate research into policy making? There is growing research on early warning
490 signals for tipping points. However, once suitable datasets and early warning diagnostics are identified, what are the
491 enabling processes and steps required to integrate actionable early warning systems into decision-making? New data
492 analytics, dashboards and communications material may go a long way towards facilitating the transition to early
493 warning systems of tipping points that can translate into action.

494 **5 Conclusion**

495 We mapped selected key potential negative social tipping points and their potential cascading interactions. We have also briefly
496 discussed potential intervention options and provided examples of methods and models that need to be advanced in the future.
497 We do not claim to have captured all possible social negative tipping points in the context of Earth system destabilisation, and
498 we acknowledge that other social subsystems could experience negative tipping points as well, e.g. breakdown of (certain)
499 global supply chains (Marcucci et al., 2022), or breakdown of the public health system (at least in certain areas) triggered for
500 instance by a massive freak heat event or the breakout of a disease due to climate change (Sharma 2023, Skinner et al., 2023).
501 Our goal is to highlight that if societies fail to stabilise the Earth system through decarbonisation, land use reallocation and
502 other measures, societies will not merely stay in the business-as usual state. Through mechanisms of negative social tipping
503 accompanying further Earth system destabilisation, they instead risk transitioning into a new social system state, which may
504 be characterised by greater impoverishment, authoritarianism, hostility, discord, violence, conflict, and alienation. Societies
505 more vulnerable to climate change are likely to experience such negative social tipping sooner, but this will inevitably have
506 knock-on effects globally. It is increasingly likely that in some regions large-scale climate adaptation will need to be
507 undertaken to reduce vulnerabilities to the current and future magnitude of climate change.

508 The acceleration of climate tipping points perpetuates a vicious cycle that weakens societies and their abilities to respond,
509 feeding further Earth system destabilisation. This vicious cycle is also fed by widening socioeconomic inequalities (Millward-
510 Hopkins, 2022). As the consequences of climate change intensify, societal trust, cooperation, and altruism may erode due to
511 increased competition for scarce resources, displacement of populations, and other climate-related challenges. Our knowledge
512 on negative social tipping points is still very patchy and fragmented, with many estimations and models likely to be
513 underestimating the effects of breaching Earth system tipping points. This is particularly true for economic and financial sector
514 models (Marsden et al., 2024). Researchers (Keen et al., 2022) are advocating for developing future loss calculations in close
515 collaboration with climate scientists to ensure adequate representation of climate catastrophes.

516
517 **Competing interests**

518 At least one of the (co-)authors is a member of the editorial board of Earth System Dynamics.

519
520 **Disclaimer** For the EU projects the work reflects only the authors' view; the European Commission and their executive agency
521 are not responsible for any use that may be made of the information the work contains.

522
523 **Acknowledgements**

524 Viktoria Spaiser acknowledges support from the UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship award (MR/V021141/1).
525 Yevgeny Aksenov and Stefanie Rynders acknowledge support from the following projects: COMFORT (grant agreement no.
526 820989) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program; the EC Horizon Europe project
527 OptimESM "Optimal High Resolution Earth System Models for Exploring Future Climate Changes" under grant 101081193
528 and UKRI grant 10039429; EPOC, EU grant 101059547; UKRI grant 10038003; and the UK NERC projects LTS-M
529 BIPOLE (NE/W004933/1), CANARI (NE/W004984/1), and Consequences of Arctic Warming for European Climate and
530 Extreme Weather (ArctiCONNECT, NE/V004875/1). Yevgeny Aksenov and Stefanie Rynders acknowledge the use of the
531 ARCHER UK National Supercomputing and JASMIN.
532 Weisi Guo acknowledges support from EPSRC Complexity Twin for Resilient Ecosystems (EP/R041725/1).
533 Jürgen Scheffran and Jana Sillmann acknowledge support under Germany's Excellence Strategy—EXC 2037: "CLICCS—
534 Climate, Climatic Change, and Society"—Project Number: 390683824 funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
535 Uche Okpara acknowledges support from the UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship Award (MR/V022318/1)

536 John T. Bruun gratefully acknowledges the UK Research Councils funded Models2Decisions grant (M2DPP035:
537 EP/P0167741/1), ReCICLE (NE/M004120/1), and STFC Spark Award (ST/V005898/1), which helped fund his involvement
538 with this work.
539 Graeme S. Cumming was supported by a Western Australia Premier's Science Fellowship awarded through the WA
540 Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation.
541 Jonathan F. Donges acknowledges support from the European Research Council Advanced Grant project ERA (Earth
542 Resilience in the Anthropocene, ERC-2016-ADG-743080) and the European Union's Horizon 2.5 - Climate Energy and
543 Mobility programme under grant agreement No 101081661 (project WorldTrans).

544 **References**

- 545 Aasen, M.: The polarization of public concern about climate change in Norway, *Clim. Policy*, 17, 213-230,
546 <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2015.1094727>, 2017
547
548 Abou-Chadi, T. and Krause, W.: The Causal Effect of Radical Right Success on Mainstream Parties' Policy Positions: A
549 Regression Discontinuity Approach. *Brit. J. Pol. Sci.*, 50, 829-847, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000029>, 2020.
550
551 Abrahams, D.: Conflict in Abundance and Peacebuilding in Scarcity: Challenges and Opportunities in Addressing Climate
552 Change and Conflict. *World Dev.*, 132, 104998. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104998>, 2020.
553
554 Abrutyn, S.: Toward a General Theory of Anomie: The Social Psychology of Disintegration, *Arch. eur. sociol.*, 60, 109-136,
555 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975619000043>, 2019.
556
557 Achenbach, J.: Two mass killings a world apart share a common theme: 'ecofascism', *The Washington Post*, August 18,
558 https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/two-mass-murders-a-world-apart-share-a-common-theme-ecofascism/2019/08/18/0079a676-bec4-11e9-b873-63ace636af08_story.html, 2019.
559
560
561 Agius, C. Bergman Rosamond, A. and Kinnvall, C.: Populism, Ontological Insecurity and Gendered Nationalism:
562 Masculinity, Climate Denial and Covid-19, *Polit. Relig. Ideol.*, 21, 432-450,
563 <https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2020.1851871>, 2020.
564
565 Aïmeur, E., Amri, S. and Brassard, G.: Fake news, disinformation and misinformation in social media: a review, *Soc. Netw.*
566 *Anal. Min.*, 13, 30, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13278-023-01028-5>, 2023.
567
568 Akinbami, C. A. O.: Migration and Climate Change Impacts on Rural Entrepreneurs in Nigeria: A Gender Perspective,
569 *Sustainability*, 13, 8882, <https://doi.org/10.3390/su13168882>, 2021.
570
571 Alexander, M., Forastiere, L., Gupta, S. and Christakis, N. A.: Algorithms for seeding social networks can enhance the
572 adoption of a public health intervention in urban India, *PNAS*, 119, e2120742119, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2120742119>,
573 2022.
574
575 Ameli, N., Chenet, H., Falkenberg, M., Kothari, S., Rickman, J., and Lamperti, F.: Driving sustainability transitions through
576 financial tipping points, *EGUsphere* [preprint], <https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-2023-1750>, 2023.

577
578 Anderson, W., Taylor, C., McDermid, S., Ilboudo-Nébié, E., Seager, R., Schlenker, W., Cottier, F., de Sherbinin, A.,
579 Mendeloff, D. and Markey, K. Violent conflict exacerbated drought-related food insecurity between 2009 and 2019 in sub-
580 Saharan Africa. *Nat. Food*, 2, 603–6151, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-021-00327-4>, 2021.
581
582 Andreoni, J., Nikiforakis, N. and Siegenthaler, S.: Predicting social tipping and norm change in controlled experiments.
583 *PNAS*, 118, e201489311, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2014893118>, 2021.
584
585 Argyle, L. P., Busby, E. C., Fulda, N., Gubler, J. R., Rytting, C. and Wingate, D.: Out of One, Many: Using Language
586 Models to Simulate Human Samples. *Polit. Anal*, 31, 337-351. <https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2023.2>, 2023.
587
588 Armstrong McKay, D. I., Staal, A., Abrams, J. F., Winkelmann, R., Sakschewski, B., Loriani, S., Fetzer, I., Cornell, S. E.,
589 Rockström, J. and Lenton, T. M.: Exceeding 1.5 C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points. *Science*,
590 377, eabn7950, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abn7950>, 2022.
591
592 Ausloos, M. and Dirickx, M. (Eds.): *The Logistic Map and the Route to Chaos. From the Beginnings to Modern*
593 *Applications*. Springer, Berlin, Germany, <https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-32023-7>, 2006.
594
595 Aquino, G., Guo, W. and Wilson A.: Nonlinear Dynamic Models of Conflict via Multiplexed Interaction Networks, preprint
596 on arXiv, <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.12457>, 2019.
597
598 Atwoli, L., Muhia, J. and Merali, Z.: Mental health and climate change in Africa, *BJPsych Int*, 19, 86-89,
599 <https://doi.org/10.1192/bji.2022.14>, 2022.
600
601 van Baalen, S. and Mobjörk, M.: Climate Change and Violent Conflict in East Africa: Integrating Qualitative and
602 Quantitative Research to Probe the Mechanisms, *Int. Stud. Rev*, 20, 547–575. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix043>, 2017.
603
604 Baele, S. Brace, L. and Ging, D.: A Diachronic Cross-Platforms Analysis of Violent Extremist Language in the Incel Online
605 Ecosystem, *Terror. Political Violence*, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2022.2161373>, 2023.
606
607 Battiston, S., Mandel, A., Monasterolo, I., Schütze, F. and Visentin, G.: A climate stress-test of the financial system, *Nature*
608 *Clim Change*, 7, 283–288, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3255>, 2017.
609
610 BenDor, T., and Scheffran, J.: *Agent-Based Modeling of Environmental Conflict and Cooperation*, CRC Press,
611 <https://doi.org/10.1201/9781351106252>, 2019.
612
613 Benegal, S. and Holman, M.R.: Understanding the importance of sexism in shaping climate denial and policy opposition.
614 *Clim. Change*, 167, 48, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-021-03193-y>, 2021.
615
616 Benso, M. R., Gesualdo, G. C., Silva, R. F., Silva, G. J., Castillo Rápalo, L. M., Navarro, F. A. R., Marques, P. A. A.,
617 Marengo, J. A., and Mendiondo, E. M.: Review article: Design and evaluation of weather index insurance for multi-hazard
618 resilience and food insecurity, *Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci*, 23, 1335–1354, <https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-23-1335-2023>,
619 2023.

620

621 Bentley, R.A., Maddison, E.J., Ranner, P.H., Bissell, J., Caiado, C.C., Bhatanacharoen, P., Clark, T., Botha, M., Akinbami,
622 F., Hollow, M. and Michie, R.: Social tipping points and Earth systems dynamics, *Front. Environ. Sci*, 2, 35,
623 <https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2014.00035>, 2014.

624

625 Benton, T., Fairweather, D., Graves, A., Harris, J., Jones, A., Lenton, T., Norman, R., O'Riordan, T., Pope, E. and Tiffin, R.:
626 Environmental tipping points and food system dynamics: Main Report, The Global Food Security Programme,
627 <https://www.foodsecurity.ac.uk/publications/environmental-tipping-points-food-system-dynamics-executive-summary.pdf>,
628 2017.

629

630 Berberian, A.G., Gonzalez, D.J.X. and Cushing, L.J.: Racial Disparities in Climate Change-Related Health Effects in the
631 United States, *Curr. Envir. Health. Rpt*, 9, 451–464, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40572-022-00360-w>, 2022.

632

633 Berlemann, M. and Tran, T.X.: Climate-Related Hazards and Internal Migration Empirical Evidence for Rural
634 Vietnam. *Econ Dis Cli Cha*, 4, 385–409, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41885-020-00062-3>, 2020.

635

636 Boas, I., Wiegel, H., Farbotko, C, Warner, J. and Sheller, M.: Climate mobilities: migration, im/mobilities and mobility
637 regimes in a changing climate, *J. Ethn. Migr. Stud*, 48, 3365-3379, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2022.2066264>, 2022.

638

639 Boulton, C.A, Buxton, J.E., Arellano-Nava, B. et al.: Early warning signals of Earth system tipping points. In: Lenton et al.
640 (eds.): *Global Tipping Points Report*. [https://global-tipping-points.org/section1/1-earth-system-tipping-points/1-6-early-
641 warning-signals-of-earth-system-tipping-points/](https://global-tipping-points.org/section1/1-earth-system-tipping-points/1-6-early-warning-signals-of-earth-system-tipping-points/), 2023.

642

643 Branch, A., Phillips, J., and Agyei, F. K.: Charcoal politics in Africa: Value chains, resource complexes, and energopolitics.
644 *Progress in Environmental Geography*, 2, 77-96. <https://doi.org/10.1177/27539687231165798>, 2023.

645

646 Brännlund, A. and Peterson, L.: Power politics: How electric grievances shape election outcomes. *Ecol. Econ.*, 217, 108077,
647 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2023.108077>, 2024.

648

649 Brown, A.R.: Environmental anomie and the disruption of physical norms during disaster, *Current Sociology*,
650 <https://doi.org/10.1177/00113921221129316>, 2022.

651

652 Bruun, J., Allen, J.I. and Smyth, T.J.: Heartbeat of the Southern Oscillation explains ENSO climatic resonances. *JGR*
653 *Oceans*, 122, 6746-6772, <https://doi.org/10.1002/2017JC012892>, 2017.

654

655 Buhaug, H.: Climate not to blame for African civil wars. *PNAS*, 107, 16477–16482,
656 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1005739107>, 2010.

657

658 Buhaug, H., Nordkvelle, J., Bernauer, T., Böhmelt, T., Brzoska, M., Busby, J. W., et al.: One effect to rule them all? A
659 comment on climate and conflict. *Clim, Change*, 127, 391–397, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1266-1>, 2014.

660

661 Buhaug, H. and von Uexkull, N.: Vicious Circles: Violence, Vulnerability, and Climate Change. *Annu. Rev. Environ.*
662 *Resour*, 46, 545-568, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-012220-014708> , 2021.

663

664 Burden, B. C., Fletcher, J. M., Herd, P., Jones, B. M., and Moynihan, D. P.: How Different Forms of Health Matter to
665 Political Participation. *J. Polit.*, 79, 166–178, <https://doi.org/10.1086/687536>, 2017.

666

667 Burgess, M.G., Van Boven, L., Wagner, G. et al.: Supply, demand and polarization challenges facing US climate policies.
668 *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, 14, 134–142, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-023-01906-y>, 2024.

669

670 Burke, M. B., Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., Dykema, J. A., and Lobell, D. B.: Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa,
671 *PNAS*, 106, 20670–20674, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0907998106>, 2009.

672

673 Burns, J. K.: Poverty, inequality and a political economy of mental health. *Epidemiol. Psychiatr. Sci.*, 24, 107–113,
674 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045796015000086>, 2015

675

676 Bursztyn, L., Egorov, G., and Fiorin, S.: From Extreme to Mainstream: The Erosion of Social Norms. *Am. Econ. Rev.*, 110,
677 3522–3548. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171175>, 2020.

678

679 Bury, T.M., Sujith, R.I., Pavithran, I. and Bauch, C.T.: Deep learning for early warning signals of tipping points, *PNAS*, 118,
680 e2106140118, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2106140118>, 2021.

681

682 Busching, R. and Krahe, B.: The Contagious Effect of Deviant Behavior in Adolescence: A Longitudinal Multilevel Study,
683 *Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci.*, 9, 815-824, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617725151>, 2018.

684

685 Bustamante, M., Roy, J., Ospina, D., Achakulwisut, P., Aggarwal, A., Bastos, A., Broadgate, W., Canadell, J.G., Carr, E.R.,
686 et al.: Ten new insights in climate science 2023. *Glob. Sustain.*, 7, e19. <https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2023.25>, 2023

687

688 Bygnes, S.: Are They Leaving Because of the Crisis? The Sociological Significance of Anomie as a Motivation for
689 Migration. *Sociology*, 51, 258-273. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038515589300>, 2017.

690

691 Caldecott, B., Clark, A., Koskela, K., Mulholland, E. and Hickey, C.: Stranded Assets: Environmental Drivers, Societal
692 Challenges, and Supervisory Responses, *Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.*, 46, 417-447, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-012220-101430>, 2021.

694

695 Carleton, T.A.: Crop-damaging temperatures increase suicide rates in India, *PNAS*, 114, 8746-8751,
696 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1701354114>, 2017

697

698 Carlisle, K. and Gruby, R.L.: Polycentric Systems of Governance: A Theoretical Model for the Commons. *Policy Stud. J.*, 47,
699 927-952. <https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12212>, 2019.

700

701 Casas-Prat, M. and Wang, X. L.: Projections of extreme ocean waves in the Arctic and potential implications for coastal
702 inundation and erosion, *J. Geophys. Res.-Ocean.*, 125, e2019JC015745, <https://doi.org/10.1029/2019JC015745>, 2020.

703

704 Center for Countering Digital Hate, Quant Lab: The New Climate Denial - How social media platforms and content
705 producers profit by spreading new forms of climate denial. Report, <https://counterhate.com/research/new-climate-denial/>,
706 2023.

707

708 Chenet, H.: Climate change and biodiversity loss: new territories for financial authorities, *Curr. Opin. Env. Sust*, 68,
709 101449, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2024.101449>, 2024.

710

711 Chinazzi, M. and Fagiolo, G.: Chinazzi, M. and Fagiolo, G.: In *Banking Integration and Financial Crisis: Some Recent*
712 *Developments*, in: *Banking Integration and Financial Crisis: Some Recent Developments*, edited by Fernández, I. A. and
713 Tortosa, E., Fundación BBVA, 115-157, ISBN 9788492937608, 2015.

714

715 Clarke, E.J.R., Ling, M., Kothe, E.J., Klas, A. and Richardson, B.: Mitigation system threat partially mediates the effects of
716 right-wing ideologies on climate change beliefs. *J. Appl. Soc. Psychol.*, 49, 349-360, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12585>,
717 2019.

718

719 Clayton, S., Manning, C. M., Krygsman, K. and Speiser, M.: *Mental Health and Our Changing Climate: Impacts,*
720 *Implications, and Guidance*, American Psychological Association and ecoAmerica,
721 <https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2017/03/mental-health-climate.pdf>, 2017.

722

723 Cole, J. C., Gillis, A., Linden, S. V. D., Cohen, M. and Vandenberg, M.: *Social Psychological Perspectives on Political*
724 *Polarization: Insights and Implications for Climate Change*. PsyArXiv [preprint],
725 <https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/xz6w>, 2023.

726

727 Constantino, S. M., Sparkman, G., Kraft-Todd, G. T., Bicchieri, C., Centola, D., Shell-Duncan, B., Vogt, S., and Weber, E.
728 U.: *Scaling Up Change: A Critical Review and Practical Guide to Harnessing Social Norms for Climate Action*. *Psychol.*
729 *Sci. Public Interest*, 23, 50–97, <https://doi.org/10.1177/15291006221105279>, 2022.

730

731 Crawford N.: *Pentagon fuel use: climate change and the costs of war*, Watson Institute International & Public Affairs, Brown
732 University, <https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/ClimateChangeandCostofWar>, 2019.

733

734 Czarnek, G., Kossowska, M. and Szwed, P.: Right-wing ideology reduces the effects of education on climate change beliefs
735 in more developed countries. *Nat. Clim. Chang*, 11, 9–13, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-00930-6>, 2021.

736

737 Dafermos, Y., Nikolaidi, M. and Galanis, G.: Climate change, financial stability and monetary policy, *Ecol. Econ*, 152, 219-
738 234, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.05.011>, 2018.

739

740 Daggett, C.: Petro-masculinity: Fossil fuels and authoritarian desire. *Millennium*, 47, 25-
741 44, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829818775817>, 2018.

742

743 Dakos, V., Carpenter, S.R., van Nes, E.H. and Scheffer, M.: Resilience indicators: prospects and limitations for early
744 warnings of regime shifts, *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B: Biol. Sci*, 370, 20130263, <https://doi.org/10.1098%2Frstb.2013.0263>,
745 2015.

746

747 Dakos, V., Boulton, C. A., Buxton, J. E., Abrams, J. F., Armstrong McKay, D. I., Bathiany, S., Blaschke, L., Boers, N.,
748 Dylewsky, D., López-Martínez, C., Parry, I., Ritchie, P., van der Bolt, B., van der Laan, L., Weinans, E., and Kéfi, S.:
749 Tipping Point Detection and Early-Warnings in climate, ecological, and human systems, EGU sphere [preprint],
750 <https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-2023-1773>, 2023.

751

752 Daoudy, M.: Rethinking the Climate–Conflict Nexus: A Human–Environmental–Climate Security Approach,
753 *Glob. Environ. Politics*, 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00609, 2021.

754

755 Daoudy, M., Sowers, J., & Weinthal, E.: What is climate security? Framing risks around water, food, and migration in the
756 Middle East and North Africa. *WIREs Water*. <https://doi.org/10.1002/wat2.1582>, 2022.

757

758 Darian-Smith, E.: Entangled Futures: Big Oil, Political Will, and the Global Environmental Movement, *Perspect. Glob. Dev*,
759 21, 403–425, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341640>, 2023.

760

761 De La Sablonnière, R. and Taylor, D. M.: A social change framework for addressing collective action: introducing collective
762 inertia. *Curr. Opin. Psychol*, 35, 65–70. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.03.006>, 2020.

763

764 Denton, F: Climate change vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation: Why does gender matter?, *Gend. Dev*, 10, 10-20,
765 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13552070215903>, 2002.

766

767 Devaney, L., Torney, D., Brereton, P. and Coleman, M.: Ireland’s citizens’ assembly on climate change: Lessons for
768 deliberative public engagement and communication, *Environ. Commun*, 14, 141-146,
769 <https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2019.1708429>, 2020.

770

771 Dietz, S., Rising, J., Stoerk, T. and Wagner, G.: Economic impacts of tipping points in the climate system, *PNAS*, 118,
772 e2103081118, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2103081118>, 2021

773

774 Dodds, P. S., and Watts, D. J.: Universal behavior in a generalized model of contagion, *Phys. Rev. Lett*, 92, 218701,
775 <https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.92.218701>, 2004.

776

777 Doerr, S., Gissler, S., Peydró, J.-L. and Voth, H.-J.: Financial Crises and Political Radicalization: How Failing Banks Paved
778 Hitler’s Path to Power. *J Finance*, 77, 3339-3372. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13166>, 2022

779

780 Donaghy, T.Q., Healy, N., Jiang, C.Y. and Battle, C.P.: Fossil fuel racism in the United States: How phasing out coal, oil,
781 and gas can protect communities, *Energy Res. Soc. Sci*, 100, 103104, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103104>, 2023.

782

783 Douglas, P.M.J., Demarest, A.A., Brenner, M., Canuto, M.A.: Impacts of Climate Change on the Collapse of Lowland Maya
784 Civilization, *Annu. Rev. Earth Planet. Sci.*, 44, 613-645, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-earth-060115-012512>, 2016.

785

786 Dunlap, R. E., McCright, A. M., and Yarosh, J. H.: The Political Divide on Climate Change: Partisan Polarization Widens in
787 the U.S. *Environment*, 58, 4–23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00139157.2016.1208995>, 2016.

788

789 Durkheim, E.: *De La Division du Travail Social*, Presse Universitaires de France, 1893.

790
791 Durkheim, E.: *Le Suicide. Étude de sociologie*, F. Alcan, 1897.
792
793 Ehret, S., Constantino, S. M., Weber, E. U., Efferson, C., and Vogt, S.: Group identities can undermine social tipping after
794 intervention. *Nat. Hum. Behav.*, 6, 1669–1679, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01440-5>, 2022.
795
796 Ekberg, K., Forchtner, B., Hultman, M. and Julhä, K.: *Climate Obstruction. How Denial, Delay and Inaction are Heating the*
797 *Planet*, Routledge, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003181132>, 2023.
798
799 Falkenberg, M., Galeazzi, A., Torricelli, M. et al.: Growing polarization around climate change on social media. *Nat. Clim.*
800 *Chang.*, 12, 1114–112, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-022-01527-x>, 2022.
801
802 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO: *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022. Repurposing food and*
803 *agricultural policies to make healthy diets more affordable*. Rome, FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc0639en>, 2022.
804
805 Farrell, J.: Corporate funding and ideological polarization about climate change. *PNAS*, 113, 92-97,
806 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1509433112>, 2016.
807
808 Feigenbaum, M.J.: *Universal Behaviour in Nonlinear Systems*, in: *Universality in Chaos*, 2nd ed., edited by Cvitanović, P.,
809 Taylor & Francis Group, ISBN 100852742606, 1980.
810
811 Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U. and Gächter, S.: Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms.
812 *Hum. Nat.*, 13, 1–25, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-002-1012-7>, 2002.
813
814 Ferrara, E.: Contagion dynamics of extremist propaganda in social networks. *Inf. Sci.*, 418-419, 1-12,
815 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2017.07.030>, 2017.
816
817 Ferreira, M.A.M., Leite, Y.L.R., Junior, C.C., Vicente, C.R.: Impact of climate change on public health in Brazil, *Public*
818 *Health Challenges*, 2, e62, <https://doi.org/10.1002/puh2.62>, 2023.
819
820 Ferris, E. and Weerasinghe, S.: Promoting human security: Planned relocation as a protection tool in a time of climate
821 change, *JMHS*, 8, 134-149, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2331502420909305>, 2020.
822
823 Filatova, T., Verburg, P.H., Parker, D.C. and Stannard, C.A.: Spatial agent-based models for socio-ecological systems:
824 Challenges and prospects, *Environ. Model. Softw.*, 45, 1-7, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2013.03.017>, 2013.
825
826 Fink, C., Schmidt, A., Barash, V., Kelly, J., Cameron, C., and Macy, M.: Investigating the Observability of Complex
827 Contagion in Empirical Social Networks. *Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media*, 10,
828 121-130, <https://doi.org/10.1609/icwsm.v10i1.14751>, 2021.
829
830 Flache, A., Mäs, M., Feliciani, T., Chattoe-Brown, E., Deffuant, G., Huet, S. and Lorenz, J.: Models of social influence:
831 Towards the next frontiers. *JASSS*, 20, <https://doi.org/10.18564/jasss.3521>, 2017.
832

833 Flores, A., Cole, J.C., Dickert, S., Eom, K., Jiga-Boy, G.M., Kogut, T., Loria, R., Mayorga, M., Pedersen, E.J., Pereira, B.
834 and Rubaltelli, E.: Politicians polarize and experts depolarize public support for COVID-19 management policies across
835 countries. *PNAS*, 119, e2117543119, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2117543119>, 2022.

836

837 Ford, J. D., Pearce, T., Canosa, I. V. and Harper, S.: The rapidly changing Arctic and its societal implications. *Wiley*
838 *Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Change*, 12, e735. <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.735>, 2021.

839

840 Ford, J. D., Clark, D. G., Copland, L., Peace, T., IHACC Research Team and Harper, S.L.: Projected decrease in trail access
841 in the Arctic. *Commun. Earth Environ*, 4, 23, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-023-00685-w>, 2023.

842

843 Frank, T.: Climate Change Is Destabilizing Insurance Industry. *Scientific American*, E&E News,
844 <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/climate-change-is-destabilizing-insurance-industry/>, 2023.

845

846 Franzke, C. L. E., Ciullo, A., Gilmore, E. A., Matias, D.M., Nagabhatla, N., Orlov, A., Paterson, S. K., Scheffran, J.
847 and Sillmann, J.: Perspectives on tipping points in integrated models of the natural and human Earth system: cascading
848 effects and telecoupling, *Environ. Res. Lett*, 17, 15004, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac42fd>, 2022.

849

850 Fritsche, I., Cohrs, J. C., Kessler, T. and Bauer, J.: Global warming is breeding social conflict: The subtle impact of climate
851 change threat on authoritarian tendencies. *J. Environ. Psychol*, 32, 1-10, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2011.10.002>, 2012.

852

853 Funke, M., Schularick, M. and Trebesch, C.: Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014, *Eur. Econ. Rev*,
854 88, 227-260, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurocorev.2016.03.006>, 2016.

855

856 Gadarian, S. K.: The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign Policy Attitudes. *J. Politics*, 72, 469-483,
857 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990910>, 2010.

858

859 Gai, P. and Kapadia, S.: Contagion in Financial Networks. Bank of England Working Paper No. 383,
860 <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1577043>, 2010.

861

862 Gaikwad, M., Ahirrao S., Kotecha, K. and Abraham, A.: Multi-Ideology Multi-Class Extremism Classification Using Deep
863 Learning Techniques. *IEEE Access*, 10, 104829-104843, <https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3205744>, 2022.

864

865 Gaupp, F., Constantino, S. and Pereira, L.: The role of agency in social tipping processes. *EGUsphere* [preprint],
866 <https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-2023-1533>, 2023.

867

868 Ge, Q., Hao, M., Ding, F., Jiang, D., Scheffran, J., Helman, D. and Ide, T.: Modelling armed conflict risk under climate
869 change with machine learning and time-series data. *Nat. Commun*, 13, 2839, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-30356-x>,
870 2022.

871

872 Giannini, A., Krishnamurthy, P. K., Cousin, R., Labidi, N. and Choularton, R. J.: Climate risk and food security in Mali: A
873 historical perspective on adaptation, *Earth's Future*, 5, 144-157, <https://doi.org/10.1002/2016EF000404>, 2017.

874

875 Gioli, G., Hugo, G., Máñez Costa, M and Scheffran, J.: Human mobility, climate adaptation, and development. *Migr. Dev.*, 5,
876 165-170, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2015.1096590>, 2016.

877

878 Goldberg, R. F. and Vandenberg, L. N.: Distract, delay, disrupt: examples of manufactured doubt from five industries,
879 *Rev. Environ. Health*, 34, 349-363, <https://doi.org/10.1515/reveh-2019-0004>, 2019.

880

881 Green, J., Druckman, J. N., Baum, M. A., Lazer, D., Ognyanova, K., and Perlis, R. H.: Depressive symptoms and conspiracy
882 beliefs. *Appl. Cogn. Psychol.*, 37, 332–359. <https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.4011>, 2023.

883

884 Grimm, S. and Schneider, G.: Predicting Social Tipping Points. Current Research and the way forward. Discussion Paper,
885 German Development Institute, <https://www.idos-research.de/en/discussion-paper/article/predicting-social-tipping-points-current-research-and-the-way-forward/>, 2011.

886

887

888 Groundstroem, F. and Juhola, S.: Using systems thinking and causal loop diagrams to identify cascading climate change
889 impacts on bioenergy supply systems. *Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob. Change*, 26, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-021-09967-0>,
890 2021.

891

892 Guastello, S. J.: Chaos and conflict: Recognizing patterns. *Emerg.: Complex. Organ.*,
893 <https://doi.org/10.17357.6ae8d7db5f86e2eb23b33be802f911f4>, 2008

894

895 Guégan, D.: Chaos in Economics and Finance. *Annu. Rev. Control*, 33, 89-93,
896 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.arcontrol.2009.01.002>, 2009

897

898 Guilbeault, D., Becker, J., and Centola, D.: Complex Contagions: A Decade in Review, in: *Complex Spreading Phenomena*
899 *in Social Systems*, edited by: Lehmann, S. and Ahn, Y., Springer Nature, 3-25, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77332-2>,
900 2018.

901

902 Guilbeault, D., and Centola, D.: Topological measures for identifying and predicting the spread of complex contagions. *Nat.*
903 *Commun.*, 12, 4430, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-24704-6>, 2021.

904

905 Guo, W., Gleditsch, K. and Wilson, A.: Retool AI to Forecast and Limit Wars, *Nature*, 562, 331-333,
906 <https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-07026-4>, 2018.

907

908 Guo, W., Sun, S. and Wilson, A.: Exploring Potential Causal Models for Climate-Society-Conflict Interaction, *Proceedings*
909 *of the 8th International Conference on Complexity, Future Information Systems and Risk – COMPLEXIS*, 69-76,
910 <https://doi.org/10.5220/0011968400003485>, 2023.

911

912 Gustafson, A., Rosenthal, S. A., Ballew, M. T. et al.: The development of partisan polarization over the Green New Deal.
913 *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, 9, 940–944, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0621-7>, 2019.

914

915 Haldane, A. and May, R.: Systemic risk in banking ecosystems, *Nature*, 469, 351–355, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nature09659>,
916 2011.

917

918 Halikiopoulou, D.: A Right-wing Populist Momentum: A Review of 2017 Elections across Europe. *J. Common Mark. Stud.*,
919 56, 63-73, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12769>, 2018.

920

921 Hamideh, S., Sen, P. and Fischer, E.: Wildfire impacts on education and healthcare: Paradise, California, after the Camp
922 Fire, *Nat Hazards*, 111, 353-387, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-021-05057-1>, 2022.

923

924 Hangartner, D., Gennaro, G., Alasiri, S., Bahrich, N., Bornhoft, A., Boucher, J., Demirci, B. B., Derksen, L., Hall, A.,
925 Jochum, M. and Munoz, M.M.: Empathy-based counterspeech can reduce racist hate speech in a social media field
926 experiment. *PNAS*, 118, e2116310118, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2116310118>, 2021.

927

928 Hanson, T.: Biodiversity conservation and armed conflict: a warfare ecology perspective. *Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci.*, 1429, 50-
929 65, <https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.13689>, 2018

930

931 Haraldsson, H. V.: Introduction to System Thinking and Causal Loop Diagrams, Lund University, Reports in Ecology and
932 Environmental Engineering, 2004.

933

934 Hauer, M. E., Fussell, E., Mueller, V., Burkett, M., Call, M., Abel, K., McLeman, R. and Wrathall, D.: Sea-level rise and
935 human migration, *Nat. Rev. Earth Environ*, 1, 28–39, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43017-019-0002-9>, 2020.

936

937 Hawkins, R. L. and Maurer, K.: ‘You fix my community, you have fixed my life’: the disruption and rebuilding of
938 ontological security in New Orleans, *Disasters*, 35, 143-159, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01197.x>, 2011.

939

940 Hessen, D. O., Andersen, T., Armstrong McKay, D., Kosten, S., Meerhoff, M., Pickard, A., and Spears, B.: Lake ecosystem
941 tipping points and climate feedbacks, *Earth Syst. Dynam. EGUsphere* [preprint], <https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-2023-22>, 2023

942

943 Hetherington, M.J. and Suhay, E.: Authoritarianism, Threat, and Americans' Support for the War on Terror, *Am. J. Pol. Sci.*,
944 55, 546-560, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00514.x>, 2011.

945

946 Hickman, C., Marks, E., Pihkala, P., Clayton, S., Lewandowski, R. E., Mayall, E. E., Wray, B., Mellor, C. and Van Susteren,
947 L.: Climate anxiety in children and young people and their beliefs about government responses to climate change: a global
948 survey, *Lancet Planet. Health*, 5, e863-e873, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196\(21\)00278-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(21)00278-3), 2021.

949

950 Hirsch, M.: Becoming authoritarian for the greater good? Authoritarian attitudes in context of the societal crises of COVID-
951 19 and climate change. *Front. polit. sci.*, 4, 929991, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.929991>, 2022.

952

953 Hirsch, M. W., Smale, S. and Devaney, R. L.: *Differential Equations, Dynamical Systems, and an Introduction to Chaos*, 3rd
954 Edition, Elsevier, <https://doi.org/10.1016/C2009-0-61160-0>, 2012.

955

956 Hoffarth, M. R. and Hodson, G.: Green on the outside, red on the inside: Perceived environmentalist threat as a factor
957 explaining political polarization of climate change. *J. Environ. Psychol*, 45, 40–49.
958 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2015.11.002>, 2016.

959

960 Hoffmann, R., Šedová, B. and Vinke, K.: Improving the evidence base: A methodological review of the quantitative climate
961 migration literature. *Glob. Environ. Change*, 71, 102367, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2021.102367>, 2021.

962

963 Hornsey, M., Harris, E., Bain, P. and Fielding, K.S.: Meta-analyses of the determinants and outcomes of belief in climate
964 change. *Nature Clim. Change*, 6, 622–626, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2943>, 2016.

965

966 Hübscher, E., Sattler, T. and Wagner, M.: Does Austerity Cause Polarization? *Brit. J. Pol. Sci.*, 53, 1170-1188.
967 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123422000734>, 2023.

968

969 Huddy, L. and Feldmann, S.: Americans respond politically to 9/11: Understanding the impact of the terrorist attacks and
970 their aftermath, *Am. Psychol*, 66, 455-467, <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024894>, 2011.

971

972 Huggel, C., Bouwer, L.M., Juhola, S., Mechler, R., Muccione, V., Orlove, B. and Wallimann-Helmer, I.: The existential risk
973 space of climate change, *Clim. Change*, 174, 8, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03430-y>, 2022.

974

975 Ide, T., Johnson, M.F., Barnett, J., Krampe, F., Le Billon, P., Maertens, L., von Uexkull, N. and Vélez-Torres, I.: The Future
976 of Environmental Peace and Conflict Research, *Environ. Politics*, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2022.2156174>, 2023.

977

978 IPCC: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth
979 Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, <https://doi.org/10.1017/97810093258442022>, 2022.

980

981 Irrgang, A. M., Bendixen, M., Farquharson, L. M., Baranskaya, A. V., Erikson, L. H., Gibbs, A. E., Ogorodov, S. A.,
982 Overduin, P. P., Lantuit, H., Grigoriev, M. N., and Jones, B. M.: Drivers, dynamics and impacts of changing Arctic coasts,
983 *Nat. Rev. Earth Environ.*, 3, 39-54, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43017-021-00232-1>, 2022.

984

985 Islam, R., Schech, S. and Saikia, U.: Climate change events in the Bengali migration to the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in
986 Bangladesh, *Clim. Dev*, 13, 375–385, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2020.1780191>, 2021.

987

988 Jackson, J. C., van Egmond, M., Choi, V. K., Ember, C. R., Halberstadt, J. Balanovic, J., et al.: Ecological and cultural
989 factors underlying the global distribution of prejudice. *PLoS ONE*, 14, e0221953,
990 <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221953>, 2019.

991

992 Jermacane, D., Waite, T. D., Beck, C. R., Bone, A., Amlôt, R., Reacher, M., Kovats, S., Armstrong, B., Leonardi, G., James
993 Rubin, G. and Oliver, I.: The English National Cohort Study of Flooding and Health: the change in the prevalence of
994 psychological morbidity at year two, *BMC Public Health*, 18, 330, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-018-5236-9>, 2018.

995

996 Juhola, S., Filatova, T., Hochrainer-Stigler, S., Mechler, R., Scheffran, J. and Schweizer, P.-J.: Social Tipping Points and
997 Adaptation Limits in the Context of Systemic Risk: Concepts, Models and Governance. *Frontiers in Climate*, 4, 1009234,
998 <https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2022.1009234>, 2022.

999

1000 Julhä, K.M. and Hellmer, K.: Right-wing populism and climate change denial: The roles of exclusionary and anti-egalitarian
1001 preferences, conservative ideology, and antiestablishment attitudes, *Anal. Soc. Issues Public Policy*, 20, 315-335,
1002 <https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12203>, 2020.

1003
1004 Karsai, M., Iñiguez, G., Kaski, K. and Kertész, J.: Complex contagion process in spreading of online innovation. *J. R.*
1005 *Soc. Interface*, 11, 20140694, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2014.0694>, 2014.
1006
1007 Kaczan D.J. and Orgill-Meyer J.: The impact of climate change on migration: a synthesis of recent empirical insights, *Clim.*
1008 *Change*, 158, 281–300, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02560-0>, 2020.
1009
1010 Kedward, K., Ryan-Collins, J. and Chenet, H.: Biodiversity loss and climate change interactions: financial stability
1011 implications for central banks and financial supervisors, *Clim. Policy*, 23, 763-781,
1012 <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2022.2107475>, 2023.
1013
1014 Keen, S., Lenton, T. M., Garrett, T. J. and Grasselli, M.: Estimates of economic and environmental damages from tipping
1015 points cannot be reconciled with the scientific literature. *PNAS*, 119, e2117308119,
1016 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2117308119>, 2022.
1017
1018 Kelley, C. P., Mohtadi, S., Cane, M. A., Seager, R., and Kushnir, Y.: Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications
1019 of the recent Syrian drought, *PNAS*, 112, 3241–3246. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1421533112>, 2015.
1020
1021 Kester, J. and Sovacool, B. K.: Torn between war and peace: Critiquing the use of war to mobilize peaceful climate action,
1022 *Energy Policy*, 104, 50-55, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.01.026>, 2017
1023
1024 Kimmel, M.: *Healing from Hate: How Young Men Get Into - and Out of – Violent Extremism*, University of California
1025 Press, ISBN 0520292634, 2018.
1026
1027 Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J.: Balance-sheet contagion, *Am. Econ. Rev.*, 92, 46–50,
1028 <https://doi.org/10.1257/000282802320188989>, 2002.
1029
1030 de Klerk, L., Shmurak, A., Gassan-Zade, O., Shlapak, M., Tomliak, K. and Korhuis, A.: Climate Damage Caused by
1031 Russia’s War in Ukraine, Report, Climatefocus, [https://climatefocus.com/wp-](https://climatefocus.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/ClimateDamageinUkraine.pdf)
1032 [content/uploads/2022/11/ClimateDamageinUkraine.pdf](https://climatefocus.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/ClimateDamageinUkraine.pdf), 2022.
1033
1034 Klose, A. K., Wunderling, N., Winkelmann, R., and Donges, J. F.: What do we mean, ‘tipping cascade’?, *Environ. Res. Lett.*,
1035 16, 125011, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac3955>, 2021.
1036
1037 Kolmes, S. A.: The Social Feedback Loop, *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*, 50, 57–58.
1038 <https://doi.org/10.3200/ENVT.50.2.57-58>, 2008.
1039
1040 Kornhuber, K., Lesk, C., Schleussner, C. F., Jägermeyr, J., Pfliegerer, P. and Horton, R. M.: Risks of synchronized low
1041 yields are underestimated in climate and crop model projections. *Nat. Commun.*, 14, 3528, [https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-38906-7)
1042 [023-38906-7](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-38906-7), 2023
1043
1044 Koubi, V.: Climate Change and Conflict, *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 22, 343–360. [https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070830)
1045 [050317-070830](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070830), 2019.

1046
1047 Kousser, T. and Tranter, B.: The influence of political leaders on climate change attitudes. *Glob. Environ. Change*, 50, 100–
1048 109. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.03.005>, 2018.

1049
1050 Krishnamurthy, R.P.K., Fisher, J. B., Schimel, D. S., and Kareiva, P. M.: Applying tipping point theory to remote sensing
1051 science to improve early warning drought signals for food security, *Earth's Future*, 8, e2019EF001456,
1052 <https://doi.org/10.1029/2019EF001456>, 2020

1053
1054 Krishnamurthy, R. P. K., Fisher, J. B., Choularton, R. J. and Kareiva, P. M.: Anticipating drought-related food security
1055 changes, *Nat. Sustain*, 5, 956–964, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-022-00962-0>, 2022.

1056
1057 Krönke, J., Wunderling, N., Winkelmann, R., Staal, A., Stumpf, B., Tuinenburg, O. A., and Donges, J. F.: Dynamics of
1058 tipping cascades on complex networks. *Phys. Rev. E*, 101, 042311, <https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.101.042311>, 2020.

1059
1060 Lama, P., Homza, M. and Wester, M.: Gendered dimensions of migration in relation to climate change, *Clim. Dev*, 13, 326–
1061 336, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2020.1772708>, 2021.

1062
1063 Lamb, W. F., Mattioli, G., Levi, S., Roberts, J. T., Capstick, S., Creutzig, F., Minx, J. C., Müller-Hansen, F., Culhane, T. and
1064 Steinberger, J. K.: Discourses of climate delay. *Glob. Sustain.*, 3, e17, <https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2020.13>, 2020.

1065
1066 Lamperti, F., Bosetti, V., Roventini, A. and Tavoni, M.: The public costs of climate-induced financial instability. *Nat. Clim.*
1067 *Chang*, 9, 829–833, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0607-5>, 2019.

1068
1069 Lawrence, E., Thompson, R., Fontana, G. and Jennings, N.: The impact of climate change on mental health and emotional
1070 wellbeing: current evidence and implications for policy and practice, *Graham Institute & Institute for Global Health*
1071 *Innovation*,
1072 <https://spiral.imperial.ac.uk/bitstream/10044/1/88568/9/3343%20Climate%20change%20and%20mental%20health%20BP3>
1073 [6_v6.pdf](https://spiral.imperial.ac.uk/bitstream/10044/1/88568/9/3343%20Climate%20change%20and%20mental%20health%20BP3), 2021.

1074
1075 Laybourn, L., Evans, J. and Dyke, J.: Derailment risk: A systems analysis that identifies risks which could derail the
1076 sustainability transition, *Earth Syst. Dynam*, 14, 1171–1182, <https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-14-1171-2023>, 2023.

1077
1078 Layton, M. L., Smith, A. E., Moseley, M. W., and Cohen, M. J.: Demographic polarization and the rise of the far right:
1079 Brazil's 2018 presidential election. *Res. Politics*, 8, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168021990204>, 2021.

1080
1081 Lenton, T. M. Tipping positive change, *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B: Biol. Sci*, 375, 20190123,
1082 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0123>, 2020.

1083
1084 Lenton, T. M., Benson, S., Smith, T., Ewer, T., Lanel, V., Petykowski, E., Powell, T. W. R., Abrams, J. F., Blomsma, F. and
1085 Sharpe, S.: Operationalising positive tipping points towards global sustainability, *Glob. Sustain*, 5, e1,
1086 <https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2021.30>, 2022.

1087

1088 Lenton, T. M., Xu, C., Abrams, J. F., Ghadiali, A., Loriani, S., Sakschewski, B., Zimm, C., Ebi, K. L., Dunn, R. R.,
1089 Svenning, J.-C. and Scheffer, M.: Quantifying the human cost of global warming, *Nat.*
1090 *Sustain*, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-023-01132-6>, 2023.
1091
1092 Leonard, N. E., Lipsitz, K., Bizyaeva, A., Franci, A. and Lelkes, Y.: The non-linear feedback dynamics of asymmetric
1093 political polarization. *PNAS*, 118, e2102149118, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2102149118>, 2021.
1094
1095 Lettinga, N., Jacquet, P. O., André, J. B., Baumand, N. and Chevallier, C.: Environmental adversity is associated with lower
1096 investment in collective actions, *PLoS One*, 15, e0236715, <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236715>, 2020.
1097
1098 Levitsky, S. and Ziblatt, D.: *How Democracies Die*. Penguin Random House, ISBN 9781524762940, 2018.
1099
1100 Liu, T., Chen, D., Yang, L., Meng, J., Wang, Z., Ludescher, J., Fan, J., Yang, S., Chen, D., Kurths, J., Chen, X., Havlin, S.
1101 and Schellnhuber, H. J.: Teleconnections among tipping elements in the Earth system, *Nat. Clim. Chang*, 13, 67-74,
1102 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-022-01558-4>, 2023.
1103
1104 Lockwood, M.: Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: exploring the linkages. *Environ. Polit.*, 27, 712-732,
1105 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1458411>, 2018.
1106
1107 Lu, Y.-C. and Romps, D.M.: Is a wet-bulb temperature of 35 °C the correct threshold for human survivability? *Environ. Res.*
1108 *Lett*, 18, 094021, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ace83c>, 2023.
1109
1110 Mach, K. J., Kraan, C. M., Adger, N. W., Buhaug, H., Burke, M., Fearon, J. D., Field, C. B. et al.: Climate as a Risk Factor
1111 for Armed Conflict, *Nature*, 571, 193–197, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1300-6>, 2019.
1112
1113 Macy, M. W., Manqing, M., Tabin, D. R., Gao, J.: Polarization and tipping points, *PNAS*, 118, e2102144118,
1114 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2102144118>, 2021.
1115
1116 Malerba, D.: The Effects of Social Protection and Social Cohesion on the Acceptability of Climate Change Mitigation
1117 Policies: What Do We (Not) Know in the Context of Low- and Middle-Income Countries?, *Eur. J. Dev. Res*, 34, 1358–1382,
1118 <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-022-00537-x>, 2022.
1119
1120 Manchin, M. and Orazbayev, S.: Social networks and the intention to migrate, *World Dev*, 109, 360-374,
1121 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.05.011>, 2018.
1122
1123 Mann, M.E.: *The New Climate War: The Fight to Take Back Our Planet*, PublicAffairs, ISBN 9781541758223, 2021.
1124
1125 Marcucci, G., Mazzuto, G., Bevilacqua, M., Ciarapica, F.E. and Urciuoli, L.: Conceptual model for breaking ripple effect
1126 and cycles within supply chain resilience, *Supply Chain Forum: An International Journal*, 23, 252-
1127 271, <https://doi.org/10.1080/16258312.2022.2031275>, 2022.
1128

1129 Marsden, L., Ryan-Collins, J., Abrams, J., and Lenton, T.: Ecosystem tipping points: Understanding risks to the economy
1130 and financial system, UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, Policy Report 2024/03,
1131 <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/2024/apr/ecosystem-tipping-points>, 2024.
1132
1133 Martin, H. O., Quiquet, A., Nicolas, T., Giraud, G., Charbit, S. and Roche, D. M.: Climate-Induced Economic Damages Can
1134 Lead to Private-Debt Tipping Points. HAL, <https://hal.science/hal-04224077v2>, 2024.
1135
1136 Martin-Shields, C. P. and Stojetz, W.: Food security and conflict: Empirical challenges and future opportunities for research
1137 and policy making on food security and conflict. *World Dev*, 110, 150-164, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.07.011>,
1138 2019.
1139
1140 Mastrorillo, M., Licker, R., Bohra-Mishra, P., Fagiolo, G., Estes, L. D. and Oppenheimer, M.: The influence of climate
1141 variability on internal migration flows in South Africa. *Glob. Environ. Change*, 39, 155-169,
1142 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.04.014>, 2016.
1143
1144 May, R., Levin, S. and Sugihara, G.: Ecology for bankers, *Nature*, 451, 893–894, <https://doi.org/10.1038/451893a>, 2008.
1145
1146 McAdam, J.: Climate change, forced migration, and international law. Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780199587087,
1147 2012.
1148
1149 McLeman, R.: Thresholds in climate migration, *Popul. Environ*, 39, 319–338, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-017-0290-2>,
1150 2018.
1151
1152 McLeman, R., Wrathall, D., Gilmore, E., Thornton, P., Adams, H. and Gemenne, F.: Conceptual framing to link climate risk
1153 assessments and climate-migration scholarship, *Clim. Change*, 165, 24, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-021-03056-6>, 2021.
1154
1155 McNeil-Willson, R., Gerrand, V., Scrinzi, F. and Triandafyllidou, A.: Polarisation, violent extremism and resilience in
1156 Europe today: an analytical framework, BRaVE, 2019/D2.1, <https://hdl.handle.net/1814/65664>, 2019.
1157
1158 Méjean, A., Collins-Sowah P., Guivarch, C., Piontek, F., Soergel, B. and Taconet, N.: Climate change impacts increase
1159 economic inequality: evidence from a systematic literature review. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, [https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ad376e)
1160 [9326/ad376e](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ad376e), 2024.
1161
1162 Miller, D. M. S.: Public trust in the aftermath of natural and na-technological disasters: Hurricane Katrina and the
1163 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear incident, *Int. J. Sociol. Soc. Policy*, 36, 410-431, <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSSP-02-2015-0030>,
1164 2016.
1165
1166 Millward-Hopkins, J.: Why the impacts of climate change may make us less likely to reduce emissions, *Glob. Sustain*, 5,
1167 E21, <https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2022.20>, 2022.
1168
1169 Milkoreit, M.: Social tipping points everywhere? - Patterns and risks of overuse, *Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim*, 14, e813,
1170 <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.813>, 2023.
1171

1172 Milkoreit, M. Boyd, E., Constantino, S.M., Hausner, V.H., Hessen, D.O., Kääb, A., McLaren, D., Nadeau, C., O'Brien, K.,
1173 Parmentier, F.-J., Rotbarth, R., Rødven, R., Treichler, D., Wilson-Rowe, E., Yamineva, Y.: Governance for Earth system
1174 tipping points – A research agenda, *Earth Syst. Gov*, 21, 100216, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg.2024.100216>, 2024.

1175

1176 Min, B. and Miguel, M. S.: Competing contagion processes: Complex contagion triggered by simple contagion. *Sci. Rep*, 8,
1177 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-28615-3>, 2018.

1178

1179 Morrison, T. H., Bodin, O., Cumming, G. S., Lubell, M., Seppelt, R., Seppelt, T. and Weible, C. M.: Building blocks of
1180 polycentric governance. *Policy Stud. J*, 51, 475–499. <https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12492>, 2023.

1181

1182 Newell, P., Srivastava, S., Naess, L. O., Torres Contreras, G. A. and Price, R.: Toward transformative climate justice: An
1183 emerging research agenda, *WIREs Clim. Change*, 12, e733, <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.733>, 2021.

1184

1185 Ngaruiya, G.W. and Scheffran, J.: Actors and networks in resource conflict resolution under climate change in rural
1186 Kenya, *Earth Sys. Dyn*, 7, 441-452, <https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-7-441-2016>, 2016.

1187

1188 Nielsen, D. M., Pieper, P., Barkhordarian, A., Overduin, P., Ilyina, T., Brovkin, V., Baehr, J., and Dobrynin, M.: Increase in
1189 Arctic coastal erosion and its sensitivity to warming in the twenty-first century. *Nature Climate Change*, 12, 263–270.
1190 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-022-01281-0>, 2022.

1191

1192 Ogunbode, C. A., Doran, R., Hanss, D., Ojala, M., Salmela-Aro, K., van den Broek, K. L., Bhullar, N., Aquino, S. D., Marot,
1193 T., Schermer, J. A. and Wlodarczyk, A.: Climate anxiety, wellbeing and pro-environmental action: Correlates of negative
1194 emotional responses to climate change in 32 countries, *J. Environ. Psychol*, 84, 101887,
1195 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2022.101887>, 2022.

1196

1197 Orazani, S. Nima, Katherine J. Reynolds, and Osborne, H.: What works and why in interventions to strengthen social
1198 cohesion: A systematic review, *J. Appl. Soc. Psychol*, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12990>, 2023.

1199

1200 Otto, I. M., Donges, J. F., Cremades, R., Bhowmik, A., Hewitt, R. J., Lucht, W., Rockström, J., Allerberger, F., McCaffrey,
1201 M., Doe, S. S. P., Lenferna, A., Morán, N., van Vuuren, D. P. and Schellnhuber, H. J.: Social tipping dynamics for
1202 stabilizing Earth's climate by 2050, *PNAS*, 117, 2354-2365, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1900577117>, 2020.

1203

1204 Park, J. S., O'Brien, J. C., Cai, C. J., Ringel Morris, M., Liang, P. and Bernstein, M. S.: Generative Agents: Interactive
1205 Simulacra of Human Behavior. arXiv preprint. <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2304.03442>, 2023.

1206

1207 Paz, L. V., Viola, T. W., Milanesi, B. B., Sulzbach, J. H., Mestriner, R. G., Wieck, A. and Xavier, L. L.: Contagious
1208 depression: Automatic mimicry and the mirror neuron system - A review, *Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev*, 134, 104509,
1209 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.12.032>, 2022.

1210

1211 Pearce, L., Murphy, B. and Chrétien, A.: From Displacement to Hope: A Guide for Displaced Indigenous Communities and
1212 Host Communities, *Contemporary Studies*, 10, Wilfrid Laurier University, http://scholars.wlu.ca/brantford_ct/10, 2017.

1213

1214 Pearson, J., Jackson, G., and McNamara, K. E.: Climate-driven losses to knowledge systems and cultural heritage: A
1215 literature review exploring the impacts on Indigenous and local cultures. *Anthropocene Rev*, 10, 343-366.
1216 <https://doi.org/10.1177/20530196211005482>, 2023

1217

1218 Pereira, L.M., Gianelli, I., Achieng, T., Amon, D., Archibald, S., Arif, S., Castro, A., Prosper Chimbadzwa, T., Coetzer, K.,
1219 et al.: Equity and justice should underpin the discourse on tipping points. *Earth Syst. Dynam.*, 15, 341–366,
1220 <https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-15-341-2024> , 2024

1221

1222 Piff, P. K., Stancato, D. M., Côté, S., Mendoza-Denton, R., and Keltner, D.: Higher social class predicts increased unethical
1223 behavior. *PNAS*, 109, 4086–4091. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1118373109>, 2012

1224

1225 Rai A.: Chasing the ghosts: stories of people left behind on the frontline of climate and ecological crisis. *S. Afr. J. Psychol.*,
1226 52, 460-471, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00812463221130902>, 2022.

1227

1228 Rantanen, M., Karpechko, A. Y., Lipponen, A. et al. The Arctic has warmed nearly four times faster than the globe since
1229 1979. *Commun Earth Environ* 3, 168: <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-022-00498-3>, 2022.

1230

1231 Rapp, C.: Moral opinion polarization and the erosion of trust. *Soc. Sci. Res.*, 58, 34-45,
1232 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2016.02.008>, 2016

1233

1234 Ravndal, J. A.: Explaining right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Grievances, opportunities and polarisation.
1235 *Eur. J. Polit. Res.*, 57, 845-866. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12254>, 2018.

1236

1237 Richards, C. E., Lupton, R. C. and Allwood, J. M.: Re-framing the threat of global warming: an empirical causal loop
1238 diagram of climate change, food insecurity and societal collapse, *Clim. Change* 164, 49, [https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-021-](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-021-02957-w)
1239 [02957-w](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-021-02957-w), 2021

1240

1241 Ritchie, P. D., Smith, G. S., Davis, K. J., Fezzi, C., Halleck-Vega, S., Harper, A.B., Boulton, C. A., Binner, A. R., Day, B.
1242 H., Gallego-Sala, A. V. and Mecking, J. V.: Shifts in national land use and food production in Great Britain after a climate
1243 tipping point. *Nat. Food*, 1,76-83, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-019-0011-3>, 2020.

1244

1245 Rockström, J., Gupta, J., Qin, D., Lade, S. J., Abrams, J. F., Andersen, L. S., et al.: Safe and just Earth system boundaries.
1246 *Nature*, 619, 102–111. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06083-8>, 2023

1247

1248 Ross, A. R., Modi, M., Paresky, P., Jussim, L., Harrell, B., Goldenberg, A., Goldenberg, P., Finkelstein, D., Farmer, J.,
1249 Holden, K., Riggleman, D., Shapiro, J. and Finkelstein, J.: A Contagion of Institutional Distrust: Viral Disinformation of the
1250 COVID Vaccine and the Road to Reconciliation, Network Contagion Research Institute, Rutgers University,
1251 https://networkcontagion.us/wp-content/uploads/NCRI_Anti-Vaccination_v4.pdf, 2022.

1252

1253 Roukny, T., Bersini, H., Pirotte, H., Caldarelli, G. and Battiston, S.: Default cascades in complex networks: topology and
1254 systemic risk, *Sci. Rep.*, 3, 2759, <https://doi.org/10.1038/srep02759>, 2013

1255 Rousseau C., Aggarwal N. K. and Kirmayer L. J.: Radicalization to Violence: A View from Cultural Psychiatry. *Transcult.*
1256 *Psychiatry*, 58, 603-615. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13634615211048010>, 2021.

1257

1258 Russo, S., Mirisola, A., Dallago, F. and Roccato, M.: Facing natural disasters through the endorsement of authoritarian
1259 attitudes, *J. Environ. Psychol*, 68, 101412, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2020.101412>, 2020.

1260

1261 Sadiddin, A., Cattaneo, A., Cirillo, M. and Miller, M.: Food insecurity as a determinant of international migration: evidence
1262 from Sub-Saharan Africa, *Food Secur*, 11, 515-530, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-019-00927-w>, 2019.

1263

1264 Sakaguchi, K., Varughese, A. and Auld, G.: Climate Wars? A Systematic Review of Empirical Analyses on the Links
1265 between Climate Change and Violent Conflict, *Int. Stud. Rev*, 19, 622–645, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix022>, 2017

1266

1267 Samitas, A., Kampouris, E. and Kenourgios, D.: Machine learning as an early warning system to predict financial crisis. *Int.*
1268 *Rev. Financial Anal*, 71, 101507, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101507>, 2020.

1269

1270 Sanches-Pereira, A. and Gómez M. F.: The dynamics of the Swedish biofuel system toward a vehicle fleet independent of
1271 fossil fuels, *J. Clean. Prod*, 96, 452–466, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2014.03.019>, 2015.

1272

1273 Scartozzi, C.: Reframing climate-induced socio-environmental conflicts. A systematic review, *Int. Stud. Rev*, 23, 696–725,
1274 <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viaa064>, 2020.

1275

1276 Scatà, M., Di Stefano, A., La Corte, A. and Liò, P.: Quantifying the propagation of distress and mental disorders in social
1277 networks, *Sci. Rep*, 8, 5005, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-23260-2>, 2018.

1278

1279 Scheffer, M.: *Critical Transitions in Nature and Society*, Princeton Studies in Complexity, Princeton University Press, ISBN
1280 9780691122045, 2009.

1281

1282 Scheffer, M., Bascompte, J., Brock, W.A., Brovkin, V., Carpenter, S.R., Dakos, V., Held, H., Van Nes, E.H., Rietkerk, M.
1283 and Sugihara, G.: Early-warning signals for critical transitions, *Nature*, 461, 53-59, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nature08227>,
1284 2009.

1285

1286 Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Kominek, J., Link, P. M. and Schilling, J.: Climate Change and Violent Conflict. *Science*, 336,
1287 869-871, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1221339>, 2012.

1288

1289 Scheffran, J. and Hannon, B.: From Complex Conflicts to Stable Cooperation: Cases in Environment and Security.
1290 *Complexity* 13, 78-91, <https://doi.org/10.1002/cplx.20201>, 2007.

1291

1292 Scheffran, J., Guo, W., Krampe, F., and Okpara, U.: Tipping cascades between conflict and cooperation in climate change,
1293 *EGUsphere* [preprint], <https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-2023-1766>, 2023.

1294

1295 Schelling, T.: *Micromotives and Macrobehavior*, W.W. Norton & Company, ISBN 9780393329469, 1978.

1296

1297 Schneider, C. R. and van der Linden, S.: Social norms as a powerful lever for motivating pro-climate actions. *One Earth*, 6,
1298 346-351, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2023.03.014>, 2023.

1299

1300 Selby, J., Dahi, O. S., Fröhlich, C., and Hulme, M.: Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited, *Polit. Geogr.*, 60, 232–
1301 244, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.05.007>, 2017.

1302

1303 Sharma, D. C.: Climate disasters challenge health infrastructures in India. *Lancet*, 402, 279-280,
1304 [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(23\)01512-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(23)01512-X), 2023

1305

1306 Shemyakina, O.: War, Conflict, and Food Insecurity. *Annu. Rev. Res. Econ.*, 14, 313-332, [https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-111920-021918)
1307 [resource-111920-021918](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-111920-021918), 2022.

1308

1309 Sillmann, J., Christensen, I., Hochrainer-Stigler, S., Huang-Lachmann, J., Juhola, S., Kornhuber, K., Mahecha, M., Mechler,
1310 R., Reichstein, M., Ruane, A.C., Schweizer, P.-J. and Williams, S.: ISC-UNDRR-RISK KAN Briefing note on systemic risk,
1311 International Science Council, Paris, Report, <https://doi.org/10.24948/2022.01>, 2022.

1312

1313 Singh, C., van der Ent, R., Fetzer, I., and Wang-Erlandsson, L.: Multi-fold increase in rainforests tipping risk beyond 1.5–
1314 °C warming, *EGUsphere* [preprint], <https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-2023-1486> , 2023.

1315

1316 Skinner, E.B., Glidden, C.K., MacDonald, A.J. and Mordecai, E.A.: Human footprint is associated with shifts in the
1317 assemblages of major vector-borne diseases, *Nat. Sustain.*, 6, 652–661, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-023-01080-1>, 2023.

1318

1319 Smirnov, O., Lahav, G., Orbell, J., Zhang, M. and Xiao, T.: Climate Change, Drought, and Potential Environmental Migration
1320 Flows Under Different Policy Scenarios. *Int. Migr. Rev.*, 57, 36-67. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183221079850>, 2023.

1321

1322 Smith, M.D. and Wesselbaum, D., 2022. Food insecurity and international migration flows. *Int. Migr. Rev.*, 56, 615-635,
1323 <https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183211042820>, 2022.

1324

1325 Smith, E.K., Bogner, M.J. and Mayer, A.P.: Polarisation of Climate and Environmental Attitudes in the United States, 1973-
1326 2022. *npj Clim. Action* 3, 2, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s44168-023-00074-1>, 2024.

1327

1328 Solow, A. R.: A call for peace on climate and conflict, *Nature*, 497, 179–180, <https://doi.org/10.1038/497179a>, 2013.

1329

1330 Spaiser, V., Hedström, P., Ranganathan, S., Jansson, K., Nordvik, M. K. and Sumpter, D. J. T.: Identifying Complex
1331 Dynamics in Social Systems: A New Methodological Approach Applied to Study School Segregation, *Sociol. Methods Res.*,
1332 47, 103–135, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124116626174>, 2018.

1333

1334 Spaiser, V., Dunn, K., Milner, P. and Moore, J.: The effects of communicating climate change threat: mobilizing anger and
1335 authoritarian affect displacement. *Environ. Sociol.*, online first, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23251042.2024.2369739>, 2024

1336

1337 Stanley, S. K., Wilson, M. S. and Milfont, T. L.: Exploring short-term longitudinal effects of right-wing authoritarianism and
1338 social dominance orientation on environmentalism, *Pers. Individ. Differ.*, 108, 174-177,
1339 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.11.059>, 2017.

1340
1341 Stanley, S. K. and Wilson, M. S.: Meta-analysing the association between social dominance orientation, authoritarianism,
1342 and attitudes on the environment and climate change. *J. Environ. Psychol*, 61, 46-56,
1343 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2018.12.002>, 2019.
1344
1345 Stechemesser, A., Levermann, A., Welz, L.: Temperature impacts on hate speech online: evidence from 4 billion geolocated
1346 tweets from the USA, *Lancet Planet. Health*, 6, e714 - e725. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196\(22\)00173-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(22)00173-5), 2022.
1347
1348 Stewart, A. J., McCarty, N. and Bryson, J. J.: Polarization under rising inequality and economic decline. *Sci. Adv*, 6,
1349 eabd4201. <https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abd4201>, 2020.
1350
1351 Streletskiy, D. A., Clemens, S., Lanckman, J. P., and Shiklomanov, N. I.: The costs of Arctic infrastructure damages due to
1352 permafrost degradation. *Environmental Research Letters*, 18(1), 015006. <http://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acab18>, 2023.
1353
1354 Strogatz, S.: *Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos: With Applications to Physics, Biology, Chemistry, and Engineering*. CRC
1355 Press, ISBN 9780738204536, 2000.
1356
1357 Sultana, F.: The unbearable heaviness of climate coloniality. *Polit. Geogr*, 99, 102638.
1358 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2022.102638>, 2022.
1359
1360 Summer, M.: Financial Contagion and Network Analysis, *Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ*, 5, 277-297,
1361 <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110112-120948>, 2013.
1362
1363 Sun, S., Jin, B., Wei, Z. and Guo, W.: Revealing the Excitation Causality between Climate and Political Violence via a
1364 Neural Forward-Intensity Poisson Process, *Proceedings of the 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*
1365 *AI for Good*, 5171-5177, <https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/718>, 2022.
1366
1367 Tàbara, J. D., Frantzeskaki, N., Hölscher, K., Pedde, S., Kok, K., Lamperti, F., Christensen, J.H., Jäger, J. and Berry, P.:
1368 Positive tipping points in a rapidly warming world, *Curr. Opin, Environ. Sustain*, 31, 120-129,
1369 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2018.01.012>, 2018.
1370
1371 Tafere, M.: Forced displacements and the environment: Its place in national and international climate
1372 agenda, *J. Environ. Manage*, 224, 191-201, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2018.07.063>, 2018.
1373
1374 Taylor, B.: Alt-right ecology: Ecofascism and far-right environmentalism in the United States, in: *The far right and the*
1375 *environment*, edited by Forchtner, B., Routledge, 275-292, ISBN 9781351104043, 2019.
1376
1377 Teen, K. M. d'l, William, H. T. P and O'Neill, S. J.: Online misinformation about climate change. *Wiley*
1378 *Interdiscip. Rev. Clim*, 11, e665, <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.665>, 2020.
1379
1380 Tench, S., Fry, H., and Gill, P.: Spatio-temporal patterns of IED usage by the Provisional Irish Republican Army. *Eur. J.*
1381 *Appl. Math*, 27, 377-402, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956792515000686>, 2016.
1382

1383 Teymouri, A., Bastian, B. and Jetten, J.: Towards a Psychological Analysis of Anomie: Towards a Psychological Analysis of
1384 Anomie, *Polit. Psychol*, 38, 1009-1023, <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12377>, 2017.

1385

1386 Thiery, W., Lange, S., Rogelj, J., Schleussner, C.-F., et al.: Intergenerational inequities in exposure to climate extremes,
1387 *Science*, 374, 158-160, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abi7339>, 2021.

1388

1389 Thøgersen, J.: Social norms and cooperation in real-life social dilemmas. *J. Econ. Psychol*, 29, 458-472,
1390 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2007.12.004>, 2008.

1391

1392 Thomas, K., Hardy, R. D., Lazrus, H., Mendez, M., Orlove, B., Rivera-Collazo, I., Roberts, J. T., Rockman, M., Warner, B.
1393 P. and Winthrop, R.: Explaining differential vulnerability to climate change: A social science review, *Wiley*
1394 *Interdiscip. Rev. Clim*, 10, e565, <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.565>, 2019.

1395

1396 Thomas, C. and Gosink, E.: At the Intersection of Eco-Crises, Eco-Anxiety, and Political Turbulence: A Primer on Twenty-
1397 First Century Ecofascism. *Perspect. Global Dev. Technol.*, 20, 30-54, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341581>, 2021.

1398

1399 Thorn, J. P. R., Nangolo, P., Biancardi, R. A., Shackleton, S., Marchat, R.A., Ajala, O., Degado, G., Mfuno, J. K. E., Cinderby,
1400 S. and Hejnowicz, A. P.: Exploring the benefits and dis-benefits of climate migration as an adaptive strategy along the rural-
1401 peri-urban continuum in Namibia. *Reg. Environ. Change*, 23, 10, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-022-01973-5>, 2023.

1402

1403 Törnberg, P.: Echo chambers and viral misinformation: Modeling fake news as complex contagion. *PLOS ONE* 13,
1404 e0203958, <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203958>, 2018.

1405

1406 Törnberg, P., Valeeva, D., Uitermark, J. and Bail, C.: Simulating Social Media Using Large Language Models to Evaluate
1407 Alternative News Feed Algorithms. *arXiv preprint*. <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2310.05984>, 2023

1408

1409 Townshend, I., Awosoga, O., Kulig, J., and Fan, H.: Social cohesion and resilience across communities that have
1410 experienced a disaster. *Nat. Hazards*, 76, 913–938. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-014-1526-4>, 2015

1411

1412 Trust, S., Joshi, S., Lenton, T. and Oliver, J. The Emperor’s New Climate Scenarios. (2023).
1413 <https://actuaries.org.uk/media/qeydewmk/the-emperor-s-new-climate-scenarios.pdf>. Accessed 29th January 2024.

1414

1415 Tubi, A. and Israeli, Y.: From risk reduction to a landscape of (un)desired outcomes: Climate migrants’ perceptions of
1416 migration success and failure, *Popul. Environ*, 45, 9, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-023-00421-8>, 2023.

1417

1418 Turco, R. P., Toon, O. B., Ackerman, T. P., Pollack, J. B. and Sagan, C., Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple
1419 nuclear explosions. *Science*, 222, 1283-1292, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.222.4630.1283>, 1983.

1420

1421 Twyman-Ghoshal, A.: Global Anomie Theory, in: *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice*,
1422 edited by Twyman-Ghoshal, A., Oxford University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.013.545>, 2021.

1423

1424 Uenal, F., Sidanius, J., Roozenbeek, J., van der Linden, S.: Climate change threats increase modern racism as a function of
1425 social dominance orientation and ingroup identification. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol*, 97, 101783,
1426 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104228>, 2021.

1427

1428 von Uexkull, N. and Buhaug, H.: Security Implications of Climate Change: A Decade of Scientific Progress, *J. Peace Res*,
1429 58, 3–17. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320984210>, 2021.

1430

1431 UKCEH & HRW. A rapid assessment of the immediate environmental impacts of the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka
1432 Dam, Ukraine. Report prepared by UK Centre for Ecology & Hydrology and HR Wallingford for the UK Foreign,
1433 Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) Expert Advisory Call Down Service 2 Lot 4 Rapid Assessment of the
1434 Environmental Impacts of the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka Dam, Ukraine. 29 June 2023.
1435 <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10462809>, 2023.

1436

1437 UNDRR & ISC. Hazard definition and classification review – Technical Report published by the United Nations Office for
1438 Disaster Risk Reduction, 9-11 Rue de Varembe, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland. [https://www.undrr.org/publication/hazard-](https://www.undrr.org/publication/hazard-definition-and-classification-review-technical-report)
1439 [definition-and-classification-review-technical-report](https://www.undrr.org/publication/hazard-definition-and-classification-review-technical-report), 2020.

1440

1441 UNEP. Rapid Environmental Assessment of Kakhovka Dam Breach; Ukraine, 2023. Nairobi, Kenya, 25 October 2023.
1442 <https://www.unep.org/resources/report/rapid-environmental-assessment-kakhovka-dam-breach-ukraine-2023>, 2023

1443

1444 UNICEF: The Climate Crisis is a Child Rights Crisis: Introducing the Children’s Climate Risk Index, Report,
1445 <https://data.unicef.org/resources/childrens-climate-risk-index-report/>, 2021.

1446

1447 Van der Linden, S., Leiserowitz, A., Rosenthal, S. and Maibach, E.: Inoculating the public against misinformation about
1448 climate change. *Global Chall*, 1, 1600008, <https://doi.org/10.1002/gch2.201600008>, 2017.

1449

1450 Vasconcelos V. V., Levin S. A. and Pinheiro F. L.: Consensus and polarization in competing complex contagion processes.
1451 *J. R. Soc. Interface*, 16, 20190196, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2019.0196>, 2019.

1452

1453 Vihma, A., Reischl, G., and Nonbo Andersen, A.: A Climate Backlash: Comparing Populist Parties’ Climate Policies in
1454 Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. *J. Environ. Dev*, 30, 219–239. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10704965211027748>, 2021.

1455

1456 Ward, P. J., Blauhut, V., Bloemendaal, N., Daniell, J. E., de Ruiter, M. C., Duncan, M. J., et al.: Review article: Natural
1457 hazard risk assessments at the global scale, *Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci.*, 20, 1069–1096, [https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-20-](https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-20-1069-2020)
1458 [1069-2020](https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-20-1069-2020), 2020.

1459

1460 Weber, D., Nasim, M., Falzon, L., Mitchell, L.: #ArsonEmergency and Australia's "Black Summer": Polarisation and
1461 misinformation on social media. *LNAI*, 12259, 159-173, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61841-4_11, 2020.

1462

1463 Weber, E. U., Constantino, S. M., and Schlüter, M.: Embedding Cognition: Judgment and Choice in an Interdependent and
1464 Dynamic World, *Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci.*, <https://doi.org/10.1177/09637214231159282>, 2023.

1465

1466 WHO: WHO steps up its humanitarian response in southern Ukraine following the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, 13
1467 June 2023, [https://www.who.int/europe/news/item/13-06-2023-who-steps-up-its-humanitarian-response-in-southern-ukraine-](https://www.who.int/europe/news/item/13-06-2023-who-steps-up-its-humanitarian-response-in-southern-ukraine-following-the-destruction-of-the-kakhovka-dam)
1468 [following-the-destruction-of-the-kakhovka-dam](https://www.who.int/europe/news/item/13-06-2023-who-steps-up-its-humanitarian-response-in-southern-ukraine-following-the-destruction-of-the-kakhovka-dam), 2023.

1469

1470 Wiedermann, M., Smith E. K., Heitzig, J. and Donges, J. F.: A network-based microfoundation of Granovetter's threshold
1471 model for social tipping. *Sci. Rep*, 10, 11202, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-67102-6>, 2020.

1472

1473 Wilson, T. D.: Climate Change, Neoliberalism, and Migration: Mexican Sons of Peasants on the Beach, *Lat. Am. Perspect*,
1474 47, 20–35, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X20951800>, 2020

1475

1476 Winkelmann, R., Donges, J. F., Smith, E. K., Milkoreit, M., Eder, C., Heitzig, J., Katsanidou, A., Wiedermann, M.,
1477 Wunderling, N. and Lenton, T. M.: Social tipping processes towards climate action: A conceptual framework, *Ecol. Econ*,
1478 192, 107242, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107242>, 2022.

1479

1480 Winkler, H.: The effect of income inequality on political polarization: Evidence from European regions, 2002–2014.
1481 *Econ. Pol*, 31, 137–162, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12129>, 2019.

1482

1483 Wood, B., and Kallestrup, P.: Benefits and challenges of using a participatory approach with community-based mental health
1484 and psychosocial support interventions in displaced populations, *Transcult. Psychiatry*, 58, 283-292,
1485 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1363461520983626>, 2021.

1486

1487 Wunderling, N., Krönke, J., Wohlfarth, V., Kohler, J., Heitzig, J., et al.: Modelling nonlinear dynamics of interacting tipping
1488 elements on complex networks: the PyCascades package, *Eur. Phys. J. Spec. Top*, 230, 3163-3176,
1489 <https://doi.org/10.1140/epjs/s11734-021-00155-4>, 2021.

1490

1491 Wunderling, N., Winkelmann, R., Rockström, J., Loriani, S., Armstrong McKay, D. I., Ritchie, P. D. et al.: Global warming
1492 overshoots increase risks of climate tipping cascades in a network model, *Nat. Clim. Chang*, 13, 75-82,
1493 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-022-01545-9>, 2023.

1494

1495 Wunderling, N., von der Heydt, A. S., Aksenov, Y., Barker, S., Bastiaansen, R., Brovkin, V., Brunetti, M., et al.: Climate
1496 tipping point interactions and cascades: a review, *Earth Syst. Dynam.*, 15, 41–74, <https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-15-41-2024>,
1497 2024.

1498

1499 Xia, L., Robock, A., Scherrer, K., Harrison, C.S., Bodirsky, B.L., Weindl, I., et al.: Global food insecurity and famine from
1500 reduced crop, marine fishery and livestock production due to climate disruption from nuclear war soot injection. *Nat. Food*
1501 3, 586–596. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-022-00573-0>, 2022.

1502


1503 Xie, J., Meng, F., Sun, J., Ma, X., Yan, G. and Hu, Y.: Detecting and modelling real percolation and phase transitions of
1504 information on social media. *Nat. Hum. Behav*, 5, 1161-1168, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01090-z>, 2021.

1505


1506 Yan, W., Woodard, R. and Sornette, D.: Diagnosis and prediction of tipping points in financial markets: Crashes and
1507 rebounds, *Physics Procedia*, 3, 1641-1657, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.phpro.2010.07.004>, 2010.

1508

1509 Yletyinen, J., Perry, G. L. W., Stahlmann-Brown, P., Pech, R. and Tylianakis, J. M.: Multiple social network influences can
 1510 generate unexpected environmental outcomes. *Sci. Rep.*, 11, 9768, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-89143-1>, 2021.
 1511
 1512 Youngblood, M.: Extremist ideology as a complex contagion: the spread of far-right radicalization in the United States
 1513 between 2005 and 2017, *Humanit. Soc. Sci.*, 7, 49, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00546-3>, 2020.
 1514
 1515 Young, H. and Jacobsen, K.: No way back? Adaptation and urbanization of IDP livelihoods in the Darfur Region of Sudan,
 1516 *Dev. Change*, 44, 125-145, <https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12003>, 2013.
 1517
 1518 Zammit-Mangion, A., Dewar, M., Kadiramanathan, V. and Sanguinetti, G.: Point process modelling of the Afghan War
 1519 Diary, *PNAS*, 109, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1203177109>, 2012.
 1520




1521
 1522 **Figure 1: Tipping elements (TEs) and associated negative social tipping processes (TPs) with the potential to further destabilise the**
 1523 **World–Earth system. The identified interactions between the various negative tipping processes mean that they can potentially**
 1524 **reinforce one another, making destabilisation more likely. Earth image source: <https://pngimg.com/image/25350>**
 1525 **(License: Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0))**
 1526



1527
1528
1529
1530
1531
1532
1533

Figure 2: Examples of the impact of extreme weather events on mental health across the world, based on Carleton (2017); Clayton et al. (2017); Jermacane et al. (2018); Atwoli et al. (2022); Hamideh et al. (2022); Lawrence et al. (2021), and Ferreira et al. (2023).



1534
1535
1536
1537
1538

Figure 3. Example of a “tipping point” in the context of food security, showing the transition from stable food security conditions to a food crisis resulting from drought in Ethiopia (Source: Krishnamurthy et al., 2020)

Table 1. Models and Methodological Approaches for Studying Negative Social Tipping Points and Cascades

Model/ Approach	Rationale	Modelled phenomena	Examples	Further Questions
(Complex) Contagion Processes on (Social) Networks	In a simple contagion direct exposure to a viral entity (beliefs, behaviours, emotions, price signals) is sufficient for a node to get “infected”. In a complex contagion a node gets “infected” if a certain number (can be heterogeneous) of its neighbour nodes are infected (Guilbeault et al., 2018; Wiedermann et al., 2020; Andreoni et al., 2021). Models of contagion on networks can be used to study radicalisation, anomie, and financial tipping.	In a contagion a viral entity spreads initially gradually until a critical threshold (critical number of “infected” nodes) is reached at which stage the social system tips through saddle-node bifurcations and hysteresis. Hysteresis ensures that the contagion spreads further and leads to the phase transition, even if the original seeders of the viral entity are removed from the network, i.e., the contagion processes become self-reinforcing (Dodds and Watts, 2004; Wiedermann et al., 2020; Xie et al., 2021). Network structure (e.g. clustering) can facilitate or prevent various contagion processes (Guilbeault and Centola, 2021).	Research shows that beliefs (incl. misinformation), mental states, behaviours and practices (e.g. technology adoption) can spread through complex contagion across social networks (Karsai et al., 2014; Törnberg, 2018; Fink et al., 2021; Xie et al., 2021; Alexander et al., 2022). Research on financial contagion also shows that volatility can spread across a network of financial institutions (Summer, 2013; Wunderling et al., 2021).	There are gaps in our understanding of the mechanisms underlying complex contagion in the real world, where at any given time multiple, conflicting diffusion processes are taking place (Min and Miguel, 2018; Vasconcelos et al., 2019; Yletyinen et al., 2021).
Logistic Maps Models	The logistic map is a mathematical function that models the population change of an ecosystem over time and it is a useful tool for policy and climate analysis as it represents a wide range of regular and chaotic features (Feigenbaum, 1980; Bruun et al., 2017). Logistic Maps can be used to study anomie social tipping and cascading dynamics for instance in financial and political systems (incl. conflicts).	The logistic map provides the capability to investigate non-abrupt and/or reversible tipping point changes that are features of the system. It represents the socio-economic system through the population level, at time t , as X_t , and its future population state at time $t+1$ is specified by the non-linear relationship $X_{t+1} = r X_t (1 - X_t)$. It enables us to identify and explore tipping point transitions and complexity cascades properties across a set of different system types.	Logistic maps have been used to model financial and economic cycles and crises (Ausloos and Dirickx, 2006; Guégan, 2009). Logistic maps have also been employed to study conflicts (Guastello, 2008; Scheffran and Hannon, 2007).	The model could be useful to study phenomena such as anomie, where the ecological and social system are closely coupled and the tipping in the ecological system would have direct repercussions for the social system with one possible outcome being disintegration of the social system, i.e. chaotic, random and irregular behaviour of the social system.
Causal Loop Diagrams (CLD) and Causal Inference	Causal loop diagrams (CLD) are a structural approach for systemic risk assessment on different scales and to identify whether a society is at risk of reaching a negative social tipping point (Groundstroem and Juhola, 2021; Sillmann et al., 2022). Causal inference is the attempt to empirically test causal assumptions. CLDs and causal inference can be used to study displacement, conflicts, and cascading dynamics.	CLDs map out the structure of a system and its networks and reveal causalities and feedbacks within the system (Haraldson, 2004; Sanches-Pereira and Gómez, 2015). Variables are connected with arrows that indicate positive or negative causal links between them. Links between variables may have temporal delays (Sanches-Pereira and Gómez, 2015). Feedback effects arise when variables affect each other in a cascading manner, ultimately leading back to a previous variable, creating a feedback loop. This loop can be either reinforcing (R), leading to unbounded growth or decline, or balancing (B), if some variables create counteracting changes, resulting in equilibrium.	CLDs have been used to model socio-ecological system dynamics, for instance the coupling of climate change, food insecurity and societal collapse (Richards et al., 2021). Causal inference has been used to model for instance climate induced conflict as an excitation causal process (Sun et al., 2022). Machine learning methods have also been used for causal inference, i.e. to self-discover causal trees between Earth system and social systems, including climate conflict (Ge et al., 2022).	Improving causal understanding of how changes in the Earth system affect social systems is challenging when many of the latent mechanisms and pathways lack data, and when different regions experience diverse mechanisms. End-to-end causal inference has limited success (Guo et al., 2023).

Multi-Stable Differential Equation Models	Approaches building on mathematical dynamical systems theory (Hirsch et al., 2012), analyse time series data to identify possible phase transitions from stability to instability until a new equilibrium is found. Differential equation models can have multiple equilibrium points, where the rate of change of a variable (e.g. degree of cooperation) does not change further. These models can be used to study negative social tipping phenomena, where sufficient time-series data is available, e.g. conflicts and financial systems tipping.	The specific functional form of the models can vary depending on the studied phenomenon. A tipping model can be for instance a 3 rd -order polynomial in the form of a bi-stable ordinary differential equation (ODE): $dx/dt = x(x-C)(x-K)$. Here, we can see that the rate of change ($dx/dt = 0$) has three equilibrium points: $x=0$, $x=C$, $x=K$. Two of the three equilibria are stable, i.e. a small perturbation will cause the system to return to the closest point 0 (conflict) or $K>C$ (cooperation). One of the three is unstable, i.e. a small perturbation will cause the system to deviate away completely (this is the tipping criticality point C).	Multi-Stable Differential Equation Models have been also used for assessing the risks of emerging tipping cascades in interconnected climate tipping elements (Krönke et al., 2020; Wunderling et al., 2023) and financial systems (Wunderling et al., 2021) using Monte Carlo approaches to propagate parametric and structural uncertainties. They have also been used to study conflict dynamics (Aquino et al., 2019).	The models rely on rich and dense multiple time-series data. They are also constrained in terms of complexity representation. This results partly from their aggregate nature, as they are mainly concerned with macro-level dynamics; as such they might be less suitable where micro-level interactions are of interest.
Agent-Based Modelling (ABM)	Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) represents the rule-based behaviour and interaction of individual agents which ranges from simple homogenous to complex heterogeneous agents characterised by diverse response functions regarding their motivation and reasoning, capability to act and adaptive learning, perception, and anticipation of changing environmental situations (BenDor and Scheffran, 2019). ABM can be used to study conflicts and cascading dynamics.	Multiple agents show collective behaviour via opinion dynamics, coalition formation, network building, inducing social feedback, structural shifts, social norms, and transformative policies, including the transition between conflict and cooperation (Juhola et al., 2022). ABM captures macro-scale phenomena from micro-scale interactions among many heterogeneous adaptive and learning agents with bounded rationality (Filatova et al., 2013; Weber et al., 2023).	ABM is applied to study agents' adaptation behaviour and the possible limits to adaptation (Juhola et al., 2022). ABM approaches are well suited to model game-theoretical approaches to predict agent-induced tipping points when collaboration for instance breaks down (Grimm and Schneider, 2011). They can simulate self-reinforcing chain reactions and cascading effects in dynamic social networks (BenDor and Scheffran, 2019).	Where ABM lacks empirical foundation (i.e. insufficient data for a large number of agents), it is difficult to verify the predictions they are making. They can be useful to generate hypotheses and explore theoretical mechanisms, which should be tested empirically.
Machine Learning (ML)/AI	Machine Learning (ML) approaches have been already mentioned in the context of previous sections (causal inference). But ML methods can also be used to explicitly detect tipping points (Bury et al., 2021). ML can be used to study negative social tipping phenomena, where sufficient time-series data is available, e.g. conflict, financial systems tipping etc. (Ge et al., 2022). Generative AI is also discussed for the purpose of generating in-silico data (fine-tuned by human data) (Argyle et al., 2023; Park et al., 2023; Törnberg et al., 2023), e.g. high-dimensional, dynamic social network data for in-silico large-scale experiments, mimicking real life and real people, to study otherwise difficult to study phenomena, such as negative social tipping processes.	ML models have been used for instance to model bifurcations, i.e. the divergence of an outcome trajectory. These are often mechanism-informed ML models. Hawkes excitation model has been used for instance to model the coupling between successive improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and security retaliation (Tench et al., 2016). Point process modelling has been used to identify complex underlying processes in conflicts, such as diffusion, relocation, heterogeneous escalation, and volatility (Zammit-Mangion et al., 2012).	ML approaches can be useful to forecast tipping in conflicts for instance (Guo et al., 2018). With increasing availability of rich digital data, negative social tipping processes (e.g. radicalisation or social disintegration) could be detected using for instance Deep Learning models in combination with social network analyses (Gaikwad et al., 2022). ML-based tools are also emerging to predict tipping in financial systems (Samitas et al., 2020)	Pure data driven prediction models (e.g. using Gaussian Processes, Deep Recurrent Neural Networks), typically lack the ability to model irreversible transformations, such as tipping and understand causal relation strength. But if sufficient data is available and if the ML models are informed by theory and deep understanding of the underlying mechanisms (Guo et al., 2018) they can be a useful method.

Table 2 Negative (social) tipping points and options for prevention and impact management

Negative (Social) Tipping Points	Prevention Options	Impact Management Options
Earth System Tipping Impacts (e.g. food insecurity)	Early warning systems to detect escalating food insecurity and anticipatory action mechanisms, incl. investment in irrigation, crop diversification and investment in long-term adaptation options to improve climate-smart agriculture (Krishnamurthy et al., 2020)	Risk finance (e.g., weather index insurance) (Benso et al., 2023) and emergency response (e.g., food assistance), managed relocation from areas that become uninhabitable/uncultivable (Ferris and Weerasinghe, 2020).
Anomie	Strengthening resilience of individuals and communities (Ogunbode et al., 2022). Strengthening social cohesion (Orazani et al., 2023). Ensuring authorities can respond to ecological hazard effectively through capacity building and resilient infrastructure (Miller, 2016; Brown, 2020)	Mental health support to individuals and communities affected by extreme weather events and displacement (Wood and Kallestrup, 2021). Working with affected communities to re-build and integrate displaced communities in host communities (Hawkins and Maurer, 2011)
Radicalisation & Polarisation	Preventing the spread of misinformation/disinformation (Aïmeur et al., 2023). Psychological inoculation against misinformation/disinformation (Van der Linden et al., 2017). Monitoring radicalisation. Radicalisation prevention programmes. Public engagement in democratic, deliberative decision making (Devaney et al., 2020).	Deradicalization and dialogue building programmes (Kimmel, 2018; Hangartner et al., 2021). Containing the influence of radical groups (Flache et al., 2017). Early warning systems for detecting the potential for violence (Guo et al., 2018).
Displacement	Early warning systems and anticipatory action mechanisms, e.g. managed relocation. Investing in resilience of displaced communities, through stability, education, and employment opportunities (Ferris and Weerasinghe, 2020).	Host community and refugee support (e.g., humanitarian support, food aid, housing, mental health support) (Pearce et al., 2017). Financial compensation for host communities. Legal frameworks and policies to support mixed movements (McAdam, 2012)
Conflict	Conflict early warning systems (CEWS) (Guo et al., 2018). Conflict prevention processes, through conflict management and democratic procedures. Agreements on scarce resource management and distribution. Climate change adaptation support. Resilience building of societies at risk of violent conflict (Abrahams, 2020). Conduct conflict risk assessment of critical infrastructure identifying impact cascades across rural, urban and natural environments to inform redevelopment or security measures to mitigate risks.	Conflict resolution process (Ngaruiya and Scheffran, 2016). Humanitarian support to citizens trapped in conflicts. Managed relocation from active fighting zones. Provision of evidence to support post-conflict reconstruction and recovery building. Provision of clean water, sanitation, hospitals, and schools. Biodiversity recovery planning to restore critical habitats and species, including those of high economic value to support social recovery.
Financial Destabilisation	Early and stable transition away from fossil fuel assets (i.e. divestment). Implementation of a green corporate quantitative easing programme to reduce climate-induced financial instability and restrict global warming (Lamperti et al., 2019)	Macroprudential regulation in climate risk management. A counter-cyclical capital buffer (as proposed in the Basel III framework) could help address climate physical risks, even though it may be insufficient when damages surge (Lamperti et al., 2019)
Cascading dynamics	A big potential lies in recovery and reconstruction efforts that have the goal to build resilience to prevent future negative social tipping points cascading (Hanson, 2018). During recovery and reconstruction planning, options for climate change adaptation and biodiversity recovery may provide a level of risk management for future conflict and natural disasters (e.g. adapting to future flood risk in the lower Dniro basin caused by climate change in Ukraine). An approach to assessing impact cascades may be transferable to risk assessment and mitigation of natural disasters globally (Ward et al., 2020). The United Nations Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) Programme Framework may provide a starting point for such an approach (UNDRR & ISC 2020).	Overall, management options for cascading impacts have been studied relatively little. Management options depend greatly on the type of cascading impact and the systems between which it occurs. In general, collaborative governance, bilaterally or multilaterally, between governing entities can yield better outcomes.