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2 **Beyond tipping points: risks, equity and the ethics of intervention**
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21
22 **Abstract**

24 Earth system tipping points pose existential threats to current and future generations, both
25 human and non-human, with those least responsible for causing them facing the greatest risks.
26 'Positive' social tipping points (that we shorten to positive tipping points, or PTPs) are often
27 deliberate interventions into **social** systems with the aim of rapidly mitigating the risks of Earth
28 system tipping. However, the desire to intervene should neither increase risks nor perpetuate
29 unjust or inequitable outcomes through the creation of sacrifice zones. In this paper, we argue
30 that considerations of what needs to change, who is being asked to change and where and by
31 whom the impacts **of change** will be felt, are fundamental and normative questions that require
32 reflexivity and systemic understanding of decision-making across scales. All actors have a role
33 to play in ensuring that justice, equity and ethics are carefully considered before any
34 intervention. Enabling positive tipping points for radical transformations would thus benefit from
35 more diverse perspectives, with a particular emphasis on the inclusion of marginalised voices in
36 offering solutions. We conclude that taking a cautious approach to positive tipping interventions,
37 including careful consideration of distributional and unintended consequences, and stepping
38 back to explore all options, not just those appearing to offer a quick fix, could lead to more
39 equitable and sustainable outcomes.

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42 Earth system tipping points pose existential threats requiring urgent action. However, this
43 imperative should neither increase risks nor perpetuate injustices. We argue that considerations
44 of what needs to change, who is asked to change and where the impacts will be felt and by

45 whom, are fundamental questions that need to be addressed in decision-making. Everyone has
46 a role to play in ensuring that justice and equity are incorporated into actions towards a more
47 sustainable future.

48

49 1. Introduction

50 The world is facing a series of era-defining, existential threats including climate change,
51 biodiversity loss, increased inequality and poverty. In response to these critical challenges,
52 there have been calls for transformative change (IPBES, 2019, 2024). Some of these
53 transformations are proposed as advancing 'positive' tipping points, which we shorten to PTPs.
54 PTPs are defined as changes to a system that become self-perpetuating beyond a threshold,
55 and which lead to substantial, often abrupt impacts that can be predominantly beneficial to
56 humans and the natural systems we rely on (McKay et al., 2022; Milkoreit et al., 2018). As we
57 argue, 'positive' is a value judgement, and not all the changes associated with PTPs are
58 universally welcome; difficult decisions and trade-offs need to be made as we weigh up the
59 distribution of anticipated harms and benefits. Nevertheless, we argue that there is a collective
60 duty to bring about "intentional transformation towards global sustainability" (Lenton et al., 2022:
61 2), and this is clearly a normative enterprise. The moral force in our usage of the 'positive'
62 descriptor is based on the science of Earth system boundaries and the ethics of Earth system
63 justice (Gupta et al., 2023a; Rockström et al., 2023).

64 Undertaking or operationalizing such transformations that attempt to orient complex systems
65 onto more safe and just trajectories, however, is messy and complicated (Olsson and Moore,
66 2024). As history shows, there are dark sides of transformations, with unintended
67 consequences, distributional impacts and the potential for vested interests to co-opt or reap the
68 benefits of such processes (Blythe et al., 2018). Caution and care is thus necessary when
69 considering the use of PTPs, including clarity about what transformations are intended, whom
70 they benefit, and whom they may harm (Pereira et al., 2024).

71 Any moment of societal change will inevitably generate winners and losers (O'Brien and
72 Leichenko, 2003), and this should also be taken into account in the identification and
73 operationalisation of PTPs, where the aim is often to create both rapid and radical change.
74 Indeed, the language of positive tipping needs to be exercised with caution since the very
75 definition of a PTP is likely to be experienced by many actors as a polarising event and can
76 have differential welfare impacts on different segments of the population (Ehret et al., 2022). For
77 example, while some welcome a tipping point away from a fossil fuel-based economy towards
78 one dominated by renewables (IEA, 2022; IRENA, 2022; Systemiq, 2023), others in fossil fuel
79 and related industries may fear the loss of their livelihoods and those of various communities.
80 Similarly, the expansion of cobalt and lithium mining for battery production, driven by the rapid
81 increase in the production of electric vehicles, has led to pollution, habitat destruction and poor
82 working conditions for some communities, even as it has helped to fuel a perceived 'positive'
83 tipping point in developed nations (Hernandez and Newell, 2022).

84 An approach to tipping point governance that centres principles of equity and justice (Okereke
85 and Dooley, 2010) will recognise that tipping points, whether conceived primarily as positive or

86 negative, will leave segments of the population behind without the engagement of
87 complementary redistribution mechanisms that can help mitigate against the worst impacts of
88 change (Rammelt et al., 2023). This paper is not proposing how to govern tipping points, but
89 rather focuses on **surfacing** the equity and justice challenges that are often overlooked in
90 discussions of both Earth system and social tipping points. When identifying or triggering a
91 tipping point through an intervention, it is necessary to ask: What kind of trade-offs are
92 necessary? Who are the winners and losers? And how can a comprehensive understanding of
93 justice be included in a rigorous way when examining PTPs?

94 **1.1. Climate Justice in light of Tipping Points**

95
96 Recent UNFCCC climate summits have seen increasing calls from climate justice campaigners
97 and representatives of the Global South, including small island developing states, for a global
98 recognition of the uneven historical and ongoing responsibility for climate change, articulated in
99 the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and calls for ‘loss and damage’ and
100 elsewhere for reparations (Constantino et al., 2023; Huq et al., 2013). These calls are supported
101 by the work of climate historians, decolonial critics and authors who assert that we cannot hope
102 to advance climate action if we do not address the systems of capitalism and colonialism that
103 have created the current crisis and still shape responses to it (Bhambra and Newell, 2022;
104 Ghosh, 2022; Sultana, 2022; Yusoff, 2018). The future-focus of much scientific, political and
105 popular discourse around climate change can create a disconnect with the past, occluding the
106 fact that climate change and its associated crises ‘are deeply rooted in history’ (Ghosh, 2022:
107 158). In this context, there is a danger that the language of tipping points can be used to
108 reinforce a discourse that abstracts climate change from past inequities and local contexts. The
109 notion of tipping points that are rooted in a biophysical framing, which assumes some ‘threshold’
110 and ‘set of shocks’ that tips a system over, ignores the grinding every-day realities of life that
111 many of the poor and most vulnerable endure as an interconnected set of social, economic and
112 environmental crises (Nixon, 2013). These vulnerabilities will only be compounded by the
113 increased risks associated with unmitigated climate change, biophysical pressures, and tipping
114 points (O’Brien and Leichenko, 2000).

115
116 Moreover, a focus on preventing negative tipping points can distract attention from the deep
117 structural imbalances of capital and the asymmetric power that both drive tipping and the
118 precarity and increased vulnerability to the impacts of tipping events in poorer regions (Roberts
119 and Parks, 2006). The urgency that accompanies the notion of tipping points can overshadow
120 the slow process of rebuilding trust and relationships that have been broken through past
121 harms, referred to by Kyle Whyte as “relational tipping points” (Whyte, 2020). For many
122 Indigenous peoples and local communities who have faced the existential crisis of colonialism
123 and who are now at the forefront of the climate crisis (Gilio-Whitaker, 2019), relational tipping
124 points may have already been breached (Whyte, 2020, 2021). The process of rebuilding
125 consent, trust, accountability, and reciprocity—qualities of relationships necessary to avoid
126 further injustices—**requires** time and commitment (Whyte, 2020). Attempts to avoid tipping
127 points through geoengineering, for example, could merely pass on costs and irreversible effects
128 onto future generations (Biermann et al., 2022). Hence without due care, attempts to address

129 tipping points, while important, can also perpetuate spatial and temporal inequities and
130 injustices (Sovacool et al., 2022).

131
132 In this paper, we discuss **ethical** considerations of equity and justice in relation to the complex
133 interconnection of biophysical and social, 'positive' and 'negative' tipping points. The
134 **destabilizing** of critical Earth systems is already contributing to adverse effects on human well-
135 being and the global ecosystems on which it depends, and will continue to worsen (Rockström
136 et al., 2023). Crossing **Earth system** tipping points will exacerbate current injustices and
137 inequities (Rammelt et al., 2023), as well as increasing potential harms on future generations
138 and limiting their response capacity by triggering potentially irreversible processes. It is thus
139 necessary to approach PTPs with due **caution** and humility in our understanding of how
140 complex social-ecological processes unfold - as such we refer to the need for an ethics of
141 tipping points interventions that **holds** considerations of equity and justice as central tenets.
142

143 **1.2. Discourse matters**

144
145 Within the framework of tipping points, it is crucial to remember that all human and non-human
146 actors (sometimes referred to as more-than-human actors) are, in Donna Haraway's words,
147 'situated.. in complicated histories' (Haraway, 2016), which inform complex and plural visions for
148 the future. The IPCC AR6 report urges immediate action and deep emissions reductions in this
149 decade whilst also calling for climate resilient development that prioritises risk reduction, equity
150 and justice (IPCC, 2023). In seeking to build a majority of people in favour of stronger, faster
151 action, it is vital that values-inclusive forms of discourse are identified to **build** a sense of
152 collective responsibility and **action** (Wiedmann et al., 2020).
153

154 The challenges and tradeoffs inherent in achieving a safe and just operating space for life on
155 Earth need to be understood (Gupta et al., 2023a). Dominant discourses that centre efficiency
156 and technocratic solutions to meet internationally agreed temperature targets, **must also**
157 **reconcile** with the need to address over-consumption and inequalities within and between
158 nations (Constantino and Weber, 2021; Hickel and Kallis, 2019; Lamb et al., 2020; Steinberger
159 et al., 2020; Wiedmann et al., 2020). A growing understanding of tipping points in the
160 Anthropocene challenges 'the peaceful and reassuring project of sustainable development'
161 (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016: 29). We have entered what Bruno Latour calls 'the new climatic
162 regime' (Latour, 2018) in which the geophysical framework that we have always taken for
163 granted, the ground on which our history, politics and economics have played out, has become
164 destabilised. An ethical community of nations that respects the Earth's biophysical limits and
165 minimum social foundations for human flourishing must recognise that the only viable solutions
166 are ones that prioritise strong sustainability and sufficient access to resources for all (Haberl,
167 2015; Kallis et al., 2025; Raworth, 2017; Trebeck and Williams, 2019). This implies different
168 **responsibilities for** different groups of people as we seek to navigate towards more just,
169 equitable and sustainable futures.
170

171 **1.3. What do we mean by equity and justice?**

172

173 Gupta et al. (2023) propose an integrated “Earth system justice” framework to approach
174 questions of climate justice and understand how to reduce risks associated with crossing tipping
175 points while ensuring well-being for all and an equitable distribution of benefits, risks and related
176 responsibilities. Earth system justice is conceptualised through multiple approaches and
177 understandings of justice including, but not limited to, intragenerational, intergenerational and
178 interspecies justice. Intragenerational justice refers to the relationships between humans **in the**
179 **present moment** and includes justice between states and social groups. Intergenerational justice
180 examines relationships across generations, such as the legacy of greenhouse gas emissions or
181 ecosystem destruction by current and past generations on youth and future generations, and
182 assumes that natural resources and environmental quality should be shared across generations
183 (Tremmel, 2009). In this context, interspecies justice **considers** the rights of nature and other
184 species. It draws on a **right** of nature discourse (Harden-Davies et al., 2020) that also counters
185 the idea of human exceptionalism as a lens for thinking through development impacts
186 (Srinivasan and Kasturirangan, 2016) and potential remedies like **defining** ecocide **as a crime**
187 (Setiyono and Natalis, 2021). Drawing on these **justice** frameworks can help us to assess the
188 uneven impacts of nearing Earth system tipping points, but also the differential responsibility for
189 efforts to avoid tipping points and the **potential** distributional and procedural aspects of positive
190 tipping dynamics.

191
192 Within the domains mentioned above, one can discriminate between different dimensions of
193 justice: distributive (or equity across different populations), procedural (how decision or research
194 processes are designed, who is involved), and reparative (e.g. recognition of wrongs,
195 restoration where possible, and compensation for negative impacts and past injustices) (Byskov
196 and Hyams, 2022). Such justice approaches also include recognition and epistemic justice,
197 which consider the value of multiple knowledge systems, especially local, Indigenous, and
198 unrecognised, misrecognized or marginalised groups (de Sousa Santos, 2008). Finally,
199 ‘intersectional’ justice that includes multiple and overlapping social identities and categories
200 underpinning inequality, underrepresentation, marginalisation, and the capacity to respond (i.e.
201 gender, race, age, class, health) must be considered in the context of Earth system justice
202 (Gupta et al., 2023b). These different forms of justice are not mutually exclusive: procedural
203 justice may be used to arrive at restoration or compensatory payments, which can be assessed
204 through the lens of distributive justice. Changes related to tipping points **need to** be analysed
205 with reference to these **different** justice considerations to design **anticipatory** actions that avoid
206 negative impacts.

207
208 **2. Blind Spots of intervention**
209
210 Policymakers often overlook the normative dimensions of climate policy and the possibility of
211 unintended social consequences (Klinsky et al., 2017; Okereke and Dooley, 2010). **All** actors,
212 **however**, in the process – from scientists to world leaders – must take efforts to avoid creating a
213 situation in which today’s solutions become tomorrow’s harms. This is especially true when
214 considering interventions designed to trigger exponential rates of positive social change, or
215 quick ‘fixes’ such as geo-engineering (Sovacool, 2021), which could have substantial negative
216 impacts that could be difficult to mitigate if they are not considered before a social tipping point

217 is reached. It is thus imperative that all actors take responsibility to acknowledge potential risks
218 and centre questions of justice when considering PTPs as solutions to the ongoing climate and
219 other social-ecological crises.

220

221 **2.1. Risks and unintended consequences of interventions to mitigate climate change**

222

223 Interventions aimed at mitigating climate change can have unintended consequences including
224 poorly aligned interventions that can exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and risks. A good
225 example of risks associated with the quest for PTPs is the transformation to a renewable energy
226 economy. The growth in demand for renewable energy worldwide, including for batteries and
227 solar panels, is increasing the demand for lithium, cobalt and other rare earth minerals (Dutta et
228 al., 2016). While this creates economic benefits for mining communities **and the renewable**
229 **energy sector**, it can also produce negative ecological, economic and social impacts in the near,
230 medium and long-term (Hernandez and Newell, 2022; Manzetti and Mariasiu, 2015). A recent
231 study finds that if today's demand for electric vehicles is projected to 2050, the lithium
232 requirements for the US market alone would triple the amount of lithium currently produced for
233 the global market (Rionfrancos et al., 2023). **Lithium** demand, **however**, could be reduced by
234 92% in 2050 relative to the most lithium-intensive scenarios by decreasing car dependency (e.g.
235 through increasing public transit or biking), limiting the size of EV batteries, and creating a
236 robust recycling system (Rionfrancos et al., 2023). Within this context, the industrial mining
237 sector has been accused of supporting state violence and corruption, polluting ecosystems
238 (Banza Lubaba Nkulu et al., 2018), and exacerbating poverty, while the informal mining sector is
239 known for ignoring occupational safety and health standards and human rights concerns
240 (Sovacool, 2019). Other prominent examples of unintended consequences **in climate policy**
241 have been documented for: a) large-scale renewable and bioenergy projects, resulting in
242 significant local opposition (Cavicchi, 2018; Torres Contreras, 2022); b) the displacement of
243 Indigenous peoples, local communities (Zurba and Bullock, 2020) and coastal fishers
244 (Beckensteiner et al., 2023); c) deforestation (Kraxner et al., 2013); d) biodiversity losses
245 (Pedroli et al., 2013); e) competition for land and water resources (Haberl, 2015; Tarhule, 2017);
246 f) and food insecurity (Hasegawa et al., 2018).

247

248 **In an effort to mitigate some of these unintended consequences**, significant policy research has
249 focused on the concept of a 'just transition' (Newell and Mulvaney, 2013; Wang and Lo, 2021),
250 spurred by the negative labour market impacts of decarbonization measures in coal-intensive
251 regions of the Global North (Abraham, 2017). Unless sufficient government investment, regional
252 regeneration, support and skills retraining are provided to those workers and communities
253 facing the greatest risks from a transition away from fossil fuels, severe economic, social and
254 cultural hardships are likely to follow. Furthermore, this could reduce trust in government and
255 strengthen counter-narratives aimed at delaying climate action (Lamb et al., 2020; Patterson et
256 al., 2018). Participatory and deliberative governance approaches that include potential losers,
257 **winners** and other stakeholder groups in designing and implementing policy for sustainability
258 transitions can help to lower the barriers to **a just** transition by building political will and
259 legitimacy, and negotiating effective compromises for **more equitable** outcomes (Fesenfeld et
260 al., 2022). More **generally in the Global North**, climate policy needs to be designed to subsidise

261 lower-income households for the higher costs that may accompany measures such as carbon
262 pricing, emissions trading, new standards for energy-efficient buildings, smart energy systems,
263 and the electrification of transport systems. Failure to do so could increase poverty, inequality,
264 hunger and other health impacts, **popular protests** and political instability (Davies and
265 Oreszczyn, 2012; Newell et al., 2021).

266 In the Global South, the transition to net-zero carbon emissions must happen alongside
267 reductions in poverty and multidimensional vulnerabilities while **also** ensuring decent living
268 standards for all. **Many** countries are confronted with a toxic mix of shrinking carbon budgets,
269 growing inequalities, heightened climate-related risks, and limited capabilities for mitigation and
270 adaptation due, in part, to increasing debt burdens (Steele and Patel, 2020). But the debate on
271 historic responsibilities, development rights, and net-zero efforts is gaining renewed attention
272 (Mishra, 2021). From this perspective, achieving just transitions requires addressing the double
273 inequality of the climate crisis where developing countries bear a disproportionate share of the
274 risks, while industrialised nations are primarily responsible for historical emissions (Gardiner,
275 2004). Therefore, developing countries are demanding fair procedures for distributing the costs
276 and benefits of mitigation and adaptation, such as the Warsaw International Mechanism for
277 Loss and Damage. Whilst concrete financing commitments from rich countries remained absent
278 at COP28 in Dubai in 2023 (Jessop et al., 2023), the Baku Finance Goal at COP29 set a new
279 **global target to channel \$1.3tn of climate finance to developing countries by 2035 and includes**
280 **a new core finance goal of \$300bn that triples the previous \$100bn target.**

281 Unintended consequences can also emerge from a failure to build broad coalitions based on
282 value-inclusive narratives and norms (Constantino and Weber, 2021; Evans, 2017; Klein, 2015;
283 Meadowcroft, 2011; Rowson and Corner, 2014; Sloterdijk, 2012). Procedural justice is key **here**,
284 as small producers and/or vulnerable actors are often excluded from the political processes and
285 negotiations that determine climate policy (Villasante et al., 2022). In centering justice and
286 combining multiple, intersecting social movements under the climate justice umbrella, many
287 campaigners and scholars believe that the strength of their combined movements can be
288 amplified (Mikulewicz et al., 2023). However, there are also concerns that strong social justice
289 framings can increase political polarisation rather than build broader coalitions (Patterson et al.,
290 2018; Smith, 2022) and can sometimes trigger a widespread 'backlash' (Patterson, 2023).
291 **Examples include the response to the Australian carbon pricing scheme (Crowley, 2017) and**
292 **the French fuel tax increase that gave rise to the Gilets Jaunes or Yellow Vests protest**
293 **movement in 2018-2019 (Kinniburgh, 2019).** Research has also shown that some actors
294 recognise the need for greater urgency in climate policy, but are reluctant to champion it to
295 avoid being labelled as 'extremists' (Willis, 2020). As a result, climate policymakers and other
296 actors may prefer to focus on the more technocratic, less politically risky aspects of transition
297 governance (Patterson et al., 2018).

298
299 If decarbonisation is left mainly to market-based mechanisms that prioritise only profitability, the
300 speed and up-scaling of technological change may threaten the human rights and well-being of
301 some people while allowing other, more powerful, incumbent actors and structures to prevail
302 (Newell et al., 2022). Unique opportunities to redesign entire systems and sectors along more
303 efficient, ethical, sustainable, and equitable lines may be lost where speed and capital

304 accumulation is allowed to trump inclusivity and depth of process (Leach and Scoones, 2006).
305 For example, U.S. solar photovoltaic deployment is forecast to grow non-linearly in the near-
306 term, generating around 12% of all US power by 2027 (SEIA/Wood MacKenzie, 2023). While
307 this is a positive development in terms of the speed of overall decarbonisation, the perpetuation
308 of an energy system dominated by profit-maximising utility companies would be viewed as a
309 missed opportunity for advocates of energy democracy and place-based, decentralized,
310 cooperative and community-owned energy (Hoffman and High-Pippert, 2005; Stone et al.,
311 2022). Likewise, 'plug and play' approaches that seek to electrify cars, but not boost the
312 accessibility of public transport can serve to reinforce private automobility (Rionfrancos et al.,
313 2023).

314

315 Additionally, there is a risk that growing concern regarding Earth system tipping dynamics could
316 propel research into speculative interventions such as widespread carbon dioxide removal,
317 geoengineering or solar radiation modification (a set of hypothetical solutions aimed at reducing
318 incoming sunlight and thus lowering global mean temperatures) (National Academies of
319 Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2021). The most common solar geoengineering proposal
320 involves injecting aerosols into the stratosphere to limit the influx of solar energy, but there are
321 also more regional or local proposals involving different technologies. Proponents often argue
322 for these hypothetical solutions on the grounds that we have made little progress in reducing
323 carbon emissions and that solar geoengineering could be used to buy time or as a failsafe
324 (Keith, 2013; Keith et al., 2017). However, solar geoengineering and other more speculative
325 solutions often come with substantial uncertainty and risks, which are likely to vary across
326 regions, and insufficient governance mechanisms to equitably and effectively manage such
327 risks (Kravitz and MacMartin, 2020; McLaren, 2018; Schneider et al., 2020; Stephens et al.,
328 2021). This has led groups of scholars to call for an "international non-use agreement" and for
329 limits on related research as well (Biermann et al., 2022).

330

331 **2.2. Winners and Losers: The (un)ethics of Sacrifice Zones**

332 To include equity and justice in the discourse of tipping points, it is necessary to consider how
333 resource extraction can drive tipping points through resource dispossession whilst also
334 exacerbating the drivers leading to a transgression of planetary boundaries (Pereira et al.,
335 2024). Resource extraction, be it for fossil fuels or minerals, creates sacrifice zones— places
336 permanently impaired by environmental degradation and divestment- mainly in the Global
337 South, but also in marginalised areas of the Global North, for example, the green energy
338 developments in Sapmi territories in Scandinavia (Kårtveit, 2021), or lithium mining in Portugal
339 (Canelas and Carvalho, 2023). These actions exacerbate the transgression of planetary
340 boundaries (Sultana, 2023b), cutting across North and South, and are reflective of the uneven
341 control of production, technology and the finance that drives extractivism between global
342 ('polluter') elites and more marginalised social groups (Kenner, 2019).

343 Even well-intentioned interventions have the potential to put pressure on lands held by
344 Indigenous and marginalised communities and reshape their ecologies into "green sacrifice
345 zones" by reproducing a form of climate colonialism in the name of the energy transition (Lang,
346 2024; Zografos and Robbins, 2020). Climate colonialism involves "the deepening or expanding

347 of domination of less powerful countries and peoples through initiatives that intensify foreign
348 exploitation of poorer nations' resources or undermine the sovereignty of native and Indigenous
349 communities in the course of responding to the climate crisis" (Zografos and Robbins, 2020:
350 543). **Sacrifice zones are extractive zones created by the advancement of coordinated forms of**
351 **capitalism that see those territories and the communities inhabiting them as commodifiable**
352 **(Gómez-Barris, 2017).** Current examples include 'green grabs' for critical minerals, biofuels and
353 water or the acquisition of land for forestry carbon offset projects (Fairhead et al., 2012;
354 Scoones et al., 2015).

355 **Rob Nixon describes what befalls marginalised communities over a long period of time as 'slow**
356 **violence,' which** has delayed effects and requires justice to take new forms to secure effective
357 legal measures for prevention, restitution, and redress (Nixon, 2013). To include justice and
358 equity in climate mitigation actions, Latin American countries, for example, have developed the
359 first regional agreement *Acuerdo de Escazú* in 2018 (CEPAL, 2018). This agreement proposes
360 three concrete objectives to include climate justice in environmental policies and transition
361 actions: (1) access to environmental information, (ii) public participation in environmental
362 decision-making processes, and (iii) access to justice in environmental matters. Such attempts
363 to involve communities in discussions of climate justice are crucial for an approach to PTPs that
364 aims to centre equity and justice **outcomes**. For the concept of PTPs to address local realities,
365 Julie Sze argues for a "situated sustainability" where environmental justice research "sets the
366 **parameters for why and how vulnerability (environmental or other) is disproportionately**
367 **distributed**" (Sze, 2018: 13). In other words, if the questions we ask aim at transformative
368 change or **PTPs**, they cannot neglect how racial capitalism contributes to inequalities and
369 environmental degradation (Newell, 2005; Sze, 2018).

370 **2.3. Reinforcing current power dynamics and structures**

371 While averting negative biophysical tipping points in the Earth system is a global challenge that
372 will require a coordinated global effort, the research and policymaking surrounding positive
373 tipping must also grapple with historical and contemporary inequalities in the production of
374 environmental harms, and the differentiated and uneven capacity and responsibility to respond
375 or to withstand such impacts. These concerns are enshrined in the UNFCCC **principle** of
376 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' and highlights the greater
377 responsibility to act to reduce emissions and the likelihood of crossing critical thresholds by
378 richer countries and polluter elites, whether through their own direct efforts or through the
379 support of efforts in countries with fewer economic resources (O'Brien and Leichenko, 2000).
380 Refocusing mitigation attention on high-emitting groups, countries and sectors foregrounds the
381 need for interventions and policy measures that attempt to shift the current consumption
382 patterns of the wealthy and the actions of large private corporations (Kenner, 2019; Newell,
383 2021; Rammelt et al., 2023; Wiedmann et al., 2020). **It also highlights the urgency to act to shift**
384 **the infrastructures of high-impact sectors such as food (reducing industrialised meat and dairy**
385 **consumption) and energy production (switching to non-fossil fuel based energy), transport**
386 **(reducing car use and air travel) and housing that, combined, comprise about 75% of total**
387 **carbon footprints (Newell et al., 2021).** Furthermore, this view highlights the need for substantial
388 financial transfers from the Global North to the Global South to help build climate resilience, to
389

390 compensate for irreparable losses due to climate change, and to offset the costs of mitigation
391 efforts (Jackson et al., 2023). Without such measures, efforts to address Earth System tipping
392 points risk reinforcing unequal power dynamics and current inequities.

393

394 3. Illustrative case studies

395

396 3.1 Risks and Justice Implications in Marine Protected Areas

397

398 The ocean economy is expected to grow faster than the global economy in the coming decades,
399 reaching \$3 trillion by 2030 (OECD, 2016), with well-established (e.g. fisheries, aquaculture)
400 and novel ocean sectors (e.g. seabed mining, ocean wave energy) multiplying their activity and
401 footprint in recent years (Jouffray et al., 2020). Yet, opportunities, access and benefits from
402 ocean interventions remain highly unequal. For instance, seafood production is highly
403 concentrated in a few Global North large corporations (Österblom et al., 2015), while in most
404 places of the Global South, local nutritional needs are jeopardised by the activity of distant
405 fishing fleets, seafood trade, and the use of catches for fish oil/fish meal for animal feed (Hicks
406 et al., 2019). The unprecedented race for food, spaces and materials, but also the effects of
407 other drivers such as climate change and pollution, are exacerbating social inequities and
408 threatening marine **ecosystems** functioning and productivity. The race to occupy the oceans
409 and exploit more resources and at greater depths, combined with the impacts of climate
410 change, are leading to an increasing risk of reaching dangerous ocean tipping points (Jouffray
411 et al., 2020; McKay et al., 2022). Thus, there is a pressing **need** for transformative actions that
412 halt and reverse marine biodiversity loss rates, particularly in some Global South biodiversity
413 hotspots (IPBES 2024).

414

415 The recent Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework target 3 (**30X30 target**) seeks to
416 protect 30% of the ocean by 2030 (CBD, 2022). Through the global Convention on Biological
417 Diversity negotiations, conserving 30% of the ocean (and land) is seen as an important
418 threshold for addressing biodiversity loss and maintaining ecosystem function (Baillie and
419 Zhang, 2018; Dinerstein et al., 2019). **However**, if implemented badly, the 30x30 target risks
420 perpetuating historical injustices, colonial legacies and power imbalances by imposing Western
421 conservation models on communities in the Global South (Obura et al., 2023). It is essential to
422 explore the intricate social aspects of the initiative (Sandbrook et al., 2023), offering a more
423 nuanced and equitable discourse on PTPs in ocean governance and conservation and the role
424 of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in achieving them.

425

426 Although the positive ecological impacts of MPAs are relatively well understood (i.e. large, old,
427 well-enforced and 'no-take' MPAs would provide greater ecological benefits within the protected
428 area (Sala and Giakoumi, 2018), less attention is paid to the negative socio-economic impacts
429 that MPA establishment can have on dependent and marginalised communities (Bennett and
430 Dearden, 2014; Rasheed, 2020). **Research has shown that MPA establishment and**
431 **management can exacerbate current equity issues** by further marginalising already vulnerable
432 coastal communities (Hill et al., 2016; Sowman and Sunde, 2018) **and** may exclude local and
433 Indigenous participation, which in turn can also lead to reduced conservation and management

434 gains (Hill et al., 2016). A heightened focus on increasing MPAs may entail undesirable
435 consequences for the well-being of vulnerable communities in a variety of ways, including
436 forced removals and displacement of Indigenous peoples from traditional lands and waters, loss
437 or restricted access rights, as well as negative impacts on food security, health, livelihoods,
438 identity and culture (Bennett and Dearden, 2014; Hill et al., 2016; Oracion et al., 2005; Sowman
439 and Sunde, 2018). Additionally, the current extent and distribution of MPAs do not adequately
440 represent biodiversity. In the Philippines, for example, only 2.8% of coral reefs are protected
441 within no-take MPAs (Weeks et al., 2010); and in the 11.4% of EU waters covered by MPAs,
442 86% showed light, minimal, or no protection from the most harmful human activities, such as
443 dredging, mining, or the most damaging fishing gears (Aminian-Biquet et al., 2024).

444
445 A strong global focus on increasing MPAs as a 'tipping point' towards conserving marine
446 biodiversity, may fail to carefully and comprehensively address historical impacts and ongoing
447 equity issues experienced by coastal communities. In addition, measuring conservation success
448 based solely on a coverage metric can incentivize the establishment of large centrally-governed
449 MPAs (often situated in former colonies) (O'Leary et al., 2018), at the expense of relatively
450 small, but locally managed MPAs (Smallhorn-West et al., 2020). A looming time horizon for
451 30x30 may also discourage participatory and collaborative processes that may take longer to
452 achieve, but are more efficient in the long term (O'Leary et al., 2018). Concerning global
453 planning of MPAs expansion, maps are not apolitical. Global conservation planning exercises
454 informed by biophysical variables and cumulative human impacts placed a significant proportion
455 of priority areas within the Global South (e.g. Coral Triangle, Southwest Indian Ocean,
456 Caribbean Sea) (Jenkins and Van Houtan, 2016; Selig et al., 2014; Zhao et al., 2020),
457 occupying the entire Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of some Global South countries (e.g.
458 Indonesia). This reality can therefore be seen to perpetuate a form of green sacrifice zone
459 where communities in biodiverse countries are denied access to their biodiversity whilst those in
460 already degraded territories face no such impositions.

461
462 The 30x30 initiative and the revitalization and empowerment of local communities toward PTPs
463 may be reconciled by balancing both biodiversity and well-being outcomes of local communities
464 when enhancing existing MPAs and designing new ones, as well as seriously considering the
465 wide range of "other effective area-based conservation measures", including those where small-
466 scale actors, especially IPLCs, are empowered and included from the very beginning of
467 decision-making processes to enhance procedural justice (Atlas et al., 2021). Importantly, the
468 expansion of MPAs, across both large and small areas, should not be seen as a single strategy
469 to balance marine biodiversity and socio-economic needs; it must be part of a broader and more
470 diverse management and governance portfolio to govern our oceans in a sustainable and
471 equitable manner (O'Leary et al., 2018).

472
473 **3.2 Positive financial tipping points: actors and mechanisms**
474

475 The growing financialisation of the world's economy poses a significant threat to the fabric of
476 society and the environment because of its reductionism of human and more than human life to
477 financial metrics. At the core of this paradigm lies the dogma that prioritises wealth

478 accumulation, power, and unchecked economic growth, at the expense of common well-being
479 and ecological sustainability (Fullerton, 2018). Several recent policy and private initiatives have
480 been launched with the ambition to redirect financial flows towards activities that protect natural
481 capital, influence ecosystems and generate equitable outcomes to people in a positive way
482 (Ameli et al., 2023; Galaz et al., 2015, 2018), but many blind spots remain. Voluntary initiatives
483 remain weak and many key financial actors have been abandoning even these arrangements.
484 For example, major banks such as JPMorgan Chase Morgan Stanley, Citi, Bank of America,
485 Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs have recently announced that they are leaving the Net Zero
486 Banking Alliance (NZBA), a voluntary initiative launched in 2021 that has hundreds of member
487 banks across dozens of countries. The limits of such initiatives to deliver meaningful change
488 become clear once greater ambition is demanded and the actors back off, such as with GFANZ
489 (Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero) where many financial institutions were reluctant to
490 countenance stricter requirements to divest from fossil fuels (Reclaim Finance, 2023). Likewise,
491 their often-fleeting nature is underscored by the example of the Net-Zero Insurance Alliance that
492 was discontinued as of April 2024. Very few banks and investors have portfolios, lending
493 policies or goals aligned with sustainability goals. Carbon Tracker found that 98% of 134
494 companies, collectively responsible for up to 80% of emissions, did not provide sufficient
495 evidence that they had considered the impact of climate matters when preparing their 2021
496 financial statements (Carbon Tracker, 2022). A different approach is required to accelerate what
497 UNEP refers to as a 'quiet revolution' in finance (UNEP, 2015).

498
499 A positive tipping point to create a more sustainable financial system means simultaneously
500 activating a range of often neglected levers and overlooked areas of finance such as taxation
501 and debt. Proposals include taxation of the richest 1.5% of the world's population to lever funds
502 to meet the 1.5 climate goal (Chancel et al., 2023) and debt for climate swaps (Green Climate
503 Fund, 2024). Zucman (2016) suggests that there are several ways that would help limit tax
504 evasion and avoidance in the global economy. For example, the creation of a global financial
505 registry that tracks wealth regardless of where it is located, reforming the corporate tax system
506 so that the global profits of multinational companies are distributed where the resources are
507 extracted, and more strictly regulating banks that help evade taxes with lax regulations.
508 Although the secrecy practices afforded by tax havens hinder a precise quantification, Fortune
509 500 companies are estimated to have US\$2.3 trillion in offshore accounts and capital positions.
510 (Shaxson, 2019). In comparison, financing needed to preserve global biodiversity is estimated
511 at US\$ 722-967 billion per year until 2030 (Deutz et al., 2020). In addition, the average global
512 statutory corporate tax rate has gone from 40% in 1980 to 24% in 2020, with an actual tax rate
513 much lower in many jurisdictions (Dempsey et al., 2022). This reduction in the tax rate for large
514 companies has already been shown to lead to increased inequality in different countries around
515 the world, with a higher risk in developing countries that are highly dependent on natural
516 resource-based exports (Banerjee and Duflo, 2020). This becomes directly related to the debt
517 that these countries then incur in response to insufficient tax bases to deliver the services that
518 their people need.

519
520 Reconfiguring flows of finance towards climate mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage
521 compensation, biodiversity conservation, addressing vulnerability etc. requires reimagining the

522 governance of public and private finance (Rammelt et al., 2023). This includes changing the
523 mandates of multilateral development banks, reforming central banks and regulating private
524 company law and disclosure policies as part of a more transformative approach to climate
525 finance (Newell, 2024). Another way to unlock the funding needed to reverse nature loss by
526 2030 as well as the cost of reaching net zero carbon emissions by 2050 is to remove harmful
527 subsidies that harm biodiversity, such as in agriculture, fisheries and fossil fuel production
528 (Dasgupta, 2021). According to Koplow and Steenblik (2022), the world is spending at least
529 \$1.8 trillion a year, equivalent to 2% of global GDP on subsidies that are driving ecosystem
530 destruction and species extinction (Dasgupta, 2021). To address this problem **in global**
531 **fisheries**, Costello et al. (2016) recently showed that global governments could repurpose some
532 or all of the roughly US\$22 billion they annually allocate as harmful fisheries subsidies to directly
533 support fishers' incomes without incentivizing overfishing. Likewise, there have been proposals
534 to redirect a significant percentage of the USD \$11 million a minute **that** governments currently
535 spend on fossil fuel subsidies to a Global Transition Fund to support low carbon energy
536 pathways in poorer regions of the world (Newell and Simms, 2020).

537
538 Positive tipping points in finance to achieve a net-zero carbon economy have been articulated
539 by Ameli et al. (2023). Beyond these options, however, is a call to change the core cause of
540 failure of the financial system (Deutz et al., 2020; Pinney et al., 2019; UNEP, 2023). Finance
541 cannot be understood in a vacuum; it is embedded in the real economy, which in turn must be
542 understood as embedded in and inseparable from the Earth system. Recent proposals to
543 envision a more sustainable and just financial system (Deutz et al. 2020; UNEP, 2022) include
544 ideas like regenerative 'capitalism,' which provides a new paradigm for finance where true
545 wealth is not merely money in the bank as well as proponents of a post-growth economy (Kallis
546 et al., 2025). Rather, it must be defined and managed in terms of the well-being of the whole,
547 achieved through the inclusion of multiple types of wealth or capital, including social, cultural,
548 living, and experiential (Fullerton, 2018).

549 550 4. Implications for practice

551
552 Above we have laid out a series of risks and potential injustices associated with the need to
553 **intervene** quickly to address the **increasing** threat of climate change and related sustainability
554 concerns. We argue that interventions, especially concerning narratives of **PTPs**, cannot be
555 divorced from current injustices and inequities in the global Earth system and should be
556 approached ethically. Below, we set out some key messages for different actors to internalise
557 as we all seek to shift the planet onto a more sustainable and equitable trajectory.

558 559 4.1. Research

560 561 4.1.1. Employ inclusive and plural approaches

562 Biophysical and social system tipping points are interconnected, and do not exist in isolation
563 (Sultana, 2023a). Avoiding an increase of harms requires a broad set of expertise, approaches
564 and acknowledgment that we need multiple and plural approaches not only within academic
565 disciplines, but also of diverse knowledge systems beyond academia (e.g. Indigenous and local

566 knowledge) and that these need to be taken seriously (Tàbara et al., 2022). Interactions
567 between global change science with other knowledge systems are only slowly developing, and
568 participatory approaches that involve stakeholders can still be very superficial and indeed do not
569 go beyond mere consultation into more deeply embedded modes of knowledge co-production
570 (Chambers et al., 2021; Osinski, 2021). By being more mindful about inclusiveness, researchers
571 can increase justice in research through participatory co-design, action research and increased
572 humility on the part of researchers as to the limits of their understanding (Huybrechts et al.,
573 2017).

574

575 **4.1.2. Diversify expertise across multiple places**

576 Science has an agenda-setting function that could benefit from accounting for the heterogeneity
577 of the expertise that is needed to solve complex problems like tipping points. Place- and
578 context-specific information and experience are often lacking as traditional research is
579 concentrated in high-income countries. A more inclusive global research programme to reflect
580 on the justice and risk aspects of the Earth system, and that understands the full breadth of
581 impacts of positive and negative tipping points, needs to be undertaken. Funding institutions
582 and universities therefore need to enable greater diversity in research and curriculum
583 development - in terms of cultural, religious, ethnic, gender or background of the researcher, but
584 also in the disciplines that are engaged. For example, considering humanities and social
585 sciences in the intention, design, implementation and evaluation of interventions can help to
586 avoid harms and associated costs, with potential to achieve both positive social and ecological
587 impacts on people (Latulippe and Klenk, 2020).

588

589 By mandating the inclusion of diverse groups, perspectives, and knowledge systems in the
590 quest for research into addressing global tipping points, this can enhance resilience and
591 success for social tipping and will broaden the type and scope of research undertaken (Stirling,
592 2010). To harness relevant social tipping opportunities we need to learn about and understand
593 diverse lived realities and interact with actors 'outside of science' (Bentley et al., 2014). Diversity
594 and inclusivity of research teams—within and beyond academia— are needed to help find
595 solutions to tipping points that do not exacerbate existing injustices and inequalities (Latulippe
596 and Klenk, 2020; de Souza, 2021).

597

598 **4.1.3. Address research gaps in how to govern non-linear dynamics**

599 Existing governance institutions may be poorly adapted to the challenges associated with the
600 governance of Earth system tipping points, which can have non-linear, cascading or systemic
601 effects, and span long time horizons (Milkoreit et al., 2024; Pereira and Viola, 2018). Additional
602 research is needed to identify adequate governance principles and institutional structures to
603 manage Earth System tipping points, including ensuring equity and justice that are centred in
604 efforts to prevent tipping points and efforts to respond to their impacts (Milkoreit et al., 2024).
605 Researchers also need to further develop an understanding of tipping-point governance that
606 includes lessons learnt from multi-scale, anticipatory governance (Boyd et al., 2015), grounded
607 in systemic risk approaches (Centeno et al., 2015).

608

609 **4.2. Business and finance**

610

611 **4.2.1. Transform financial systems**

612 Finance and business are a part of social and ecological systems and not apart from them.
613 Active steering and regulation are therefore required to divest, de-finance and divert financial
614 resources away from the drivers of unsustainability towards sectors and regions where they are
615 most required and where positive tipping points can be found (Newell, 2024). Transformation of
616 financial systems must extend to providing mechanisms to transform sufficient financial assets
617 back into biodiversity and climate assets held in secure commons instruments that can ensure
618 equitable access to all, in particular in developing countries (IPBES, 2022). **Governments and**
619 **their relevant finance bodies need to strengthen the** architecture of global financial governance
620 that prioritises sustainability and social justice (UNEP, 2015). Reaching a financial sector tipping
621 point implies changing the mandates of multilateral development banks, reforming central banks
622 and regulating the need to change company law and disclosure policies. But as part of a global
623 just transition and social compact, issues of debt relief and reform of taxation have to be on the
624 **negotiation** table to ensure positive tipping points in the financial system that **reduce** rather than
625 **entrench** poverty.

626

627 **4.2.2. Introduce investment restrictions for non-compliant companies**

628 Financial actors, such as international development banks, institutional and private investors,
629 venture capital, credit rating agencies and international commercial banks, are increasingly
630 interested in the financial risks of climate change and associated changes in ecosystems (Galaz
631 et al., 2018). It is crucial that **the** capital investments made by these actors steer the sector
632 toward improved sustainability and PTPs, as opposed to overexploitation of labour and
633 resources (Hickel et al., 2021) by integrating sustainability and equity into traditional finance
634 mechanisms (Jouffray et al., 2019), through ESG approaches or measures like the social cost of
635 carbon (Prellezo et al., 2023). Cutting off investment for companies that are seen to be complicit
636 in transgressing planetary boundaries, such as some oil majors and powerful cattle lobby
637 groups in the Brazilian Amazon (Piotrowski, 2019), has the potential to reshape the business
638 environment towards more ethical practices. Another area where investments could leverage
639 positive tipping points, for instance, would be to finance a structural shift from car dependency
640 as this could potentially ease pressure in the mining sector, reinforcing reduced social and
641 environmental harms and a densification of metropolitan areas, which would experience myriad
642 benefits from improved air quality to pedestrian safety (Rionfrancos et al., 2023).

643

644 **4.2.3. Develop more supportive and inclusive investments**

645 Redirecting public and private money to innovative tools and instruments can enable new
646 entrants while reducing the degradation of biodiversity. With **governments enabling this new and**
647 improved direction of finance mechanisms, businesses should then be able to both meet
648 standards and operate in vulnerable areas that need finance to become more resilient. This
649 includes moving money to key areas where it is needed (adaptation, biodiversity, social
650 common goods) rather than just for profit (Crona et al., 2021). For example, the IIX
651 Sustainability Bonds are debt securities that can be listed on a social stock exchange, and they
652 explicitly address the inclusion of women in economic activities. There are also initiatives to

653 supplement gaps in the national currency systems such as Community Inclusion Currencies²
654 that empower communities to create their own financial systems based on local goods and
655 services (Ruddick, 2023). The Netherlands, for example, provides special green investment
656 funds that are exempt from income taxation, thus allowing investors in green projects (e.g.
657 green shipping, renewable energy development), to contract loans at reduced interest rates
658 (usually ~2% below commercial rates). Another example is the Raven Indigenous Impact Fund³,
659 a new innovative financial product committed to Indigenous-led equity investments in mission-
660 driven and innovative Indigenous enterprises to help build a renewed and sustainable
661 Indigenous economy in Canada and the US. The Climate Bonds Initiative⁴ has also **several**
662 sector criteria (e.g. for marine energy and water utilities); while other relevant initiatives include
663 the Blue Natural Capital Positive Impacts Framework⁵ and the technical guideline for blue
664 bonds. Mainstreaming these examples as best practice is critical for leveraging the financial
665 system to enable PTPs.

666

667 **4.3. Public sector**

668

669 **4.3.1. Design fiscal policies that are cognizant of extant configurations**

670 Fiscal policy needs to be designed to subsidise lower-income households for the higher costs
671 that may accompany climate policies such as carbon pricing, emissions trading, new standards
672 for energy-efficient buildings, smart energy systems, and the electrification of transport. Failure
673 to do so could set off a cascade of unintended consequences and increase poverty, inequality,
674 hunger and other health impacts, popular protest and political instability. Hypothecation by
675 **policymakers**, for example redirecting funds from fossil fuel subsidies to affordable public
676 transport or from windfall taxes on oil companies for home insulation schemes, can build
677 support among poorer groups for measures that might otherwise be opposed. Policy and
678 governance actors attracted to tipping interventions need not only to design targeted, sector-
679 and actor-specific approaches, but also to combine disciplines and sectors for a coordinated,
680 complex systems thinking approach and capabilities. Including potential losers in the design
681 process can also reduce opposition and ensure more equitable outcomes.

682

683 **4.3.2. Foster anticipatory governance to account for unanticipated consequences**

684 While “positive” tipping interventions are appealing for policymakers by promising to initiate
685 rapid, significant and potentially irreversible change towards a desired state, careful deliberation
686 and participatory processes should be used to reach an agreement on what the desired change
687 is, what the associated trade-offs are, and which populations it is likely to benefit or harm. Given
688 the high levels of uncertainty associated with tipping point dynamics in complex systems, and
689 the multiplicity of possible post-tipping states, **decision-makers must give** careful consideration
690 before initiating a deliberate “positive” tipping intervention, **focussing** on anticipatory governance
691 that seeks to imagine the potential futures that could arise and act accordingly (Olsson and
692 Moore, 2024; Vervoort and Gupta, 2018). **Policy actors should carefully monitor interventions** for

² <https://grassrootseconomics.org/>

³ <https://ravencapitalpartners.ca/investments/impact-funds>

⁴ www.climatebonds.net

⁵ <https://bluenaturalcapital.org>

693 transformation to avoid unintended negative consequences and to address distributional harms
694 that might ensue (Olsson and Moore, 2024; Tàbara, 2024). The risk of unintended
695 consequences that might ensue after a tipping process has been initiated may require new
696 governance mechanisms or a stronger commitment to adaptive management practices and
697 capacities, including a specific focus on monitoring the change process so that corrective
698 measures can be introduced. Accountability structures for 'tipping gone wrong' should be
699 included in legal frameworks in order to hold actors accountable for the impacts of their actions.
700

701 **4.4. Media and communications**

702 **4.4.1. Be aware of the politics of language and power dynamics in science**
703 Communicators, in particular the media, are key actors who interpret the world and are also
704 capable of constructing new social realities and inspiring action (Kegan and Lahey, 2001). They
705 must be alert to the ideologies, values and systems of power that affect which messages are
706 communicated and how they are encoded. For example, how a tipping point is identified (Juhola
707 et al., 2022), what specific language is used to define and communicate it (Milkoreit et al.,
708 2018), and when it may be used inappropriately in discussing solutions (Milkoreit, 2023).
709 Journalists in particular should be cautious in how they use the language of 'positive' and
710 'negative' tipping points, which can imply a universality of effect that can be insensitive to the
711 diverse experiences (and responsibilities) of different communities illustrated above.
712

713 **4.4.2. Recognize contested framings of key messages in the scientific landscape**

714 In an equity and justice context, media and communicators must be alert to the competing
715 ideologies and value systems that affect how a message is 'decoded' or interpreted by different
716 communities (Holmes, 2020). The meaning of a message is not necessarily determined by the
717 messenger or the message, but 'a complex interplay of how this meaning is framed through
718 ideological values and beliefs' (Hall, 1980: 7). Thus, it is important to view communication not as
719 a neutral process of information transmission, but as a complex, non-linear system that is
720 entangled with competing knowledge and powers. Studies have shown that increased
721 knowledge does not automatically lead to enlightened action (Norgaard, 2011) and, indeed, that
722 more factual information may serve to further entrench dismissive perceptions of climate change
723 (Bain et al., 2012). There is, therefore, a need for communicators (particularly those trying to
724 prompt behaviour change) to go beyond the linear 'information deficit' models of
725 communication, moving instead towards 'non-linear' models of communication that prioritise
726 open, reflective dialogue between different stakeholders. For example, case studies of
727 communication strategies involving Indigenous people and local communities on the frontline of
728 climate change have found that messages rooted in empirical research and using simple
729 language are insufficient and that researchers should investigate different stakeholders'
730 understandings of what good climate change communication is, and through this determine
731 the needs of different audiences from their unique cultural standpoints (Barau and Tanko,
732 2018; Gotangco and Leon, 2017). With this in mind, it is important that communication
733 strategies are co-produced with the communities they are seeking to engage (Moser, 2016).
734

737 **4.4.3. Embrace creative co-production practices**
738 Different initiatives have been arising from the Arizona State University Imagination and Climate
739 Futures Initiative, the University of Exeter-led 'Climate Stories' and 'We Still Have a Chance'
740 projects, the Rapid Transition Alliance's curation of 'evidence-based hope' and the 'Seeds of
741 Good Anthropocenes' project. These have shown that the arts and humanities offer models for
742 empowering communities to create their own narratives and contextualise climate change in
743 relation to their own systems of value, which is an important step towards the design and
744 implementation of just and equitable transitions (Milcoreit et al., 2016; Roberts et al., 2023;
745 Woodley et al., 2022). The effectiveness of literature, film, theatre and art in promoting ethical
746 responses to climate change is increasingly being recognised in empirical studies (Houser,
747 2014; James, 2015; von Mossner, 2017). As David Holmes states, 'the arts have an ability to
748 communicate the vulnerability and sensitivity of climate issues that other channels may lack'
749 (Holmes, 2020: 10). Therefore, in the context of tipping points, researchers and practitioners
750 should aim to engage a wide range of creative approaches in co-production processes. This
751 would offer an open-ended, non-instrumental approach to communication, which could be key
752 to achieving more ethical solutions in this complex field.

753

754

755 **5. Conclusion**

756

757 Biophysical tipping points pose existential threats to current and future generations, both human
758 and non-human, with those currently underserved being the most vulnerable. It is therefore
759 imperative to act. We also know PTPs are possible, but that any intervention must take care not
760 to perpetuate past and current injustices and inequities. Considerations of what needs to
761 transform, who is being asked to change and where the change or its impacts will be felt and by
762 whom, require a deep level of reflexivity and systemic understanding. There are multiple
763 potential points of intervention and strategies that can be adopted within a complex ecosystem
764 of transformation to help address the power inequalities, social exclusions and governance gaps
765 that are currently driving us towards Earth system tipping points. All actors have a role to play in
766 ensuring that justice, equity and ethics are centred in these interventions, with a particular
767 emphasis on the inclusion of those most affected by disruptive environmental change and the
768 least responsible for causing it. Finally, enabling PTPs towards radical transformations will
769 benefit from more diverse perspectives to open up the solution space, leveraging a shift in
770 worldviews and paradigms rather than just reconfiguring materials and feedback sensu
771 (Meadows, 1999). Trying to fix a system using the same tools that created it is not the way to
772 address our planetary poly-crisis. Taking a step back to explore all options, not just those that
773 seem to offer a quick fix or 'low-hanging' fruit, could offer a more substantial route into thinking
774 through which positive tipping points could create a more equitable as well as a more
775 sustainable future.

776

777 **Author contribution**

778 LP conceptualised the paper and prepared the initial draft together with SRS, LG, PN, BS and
779 SV. TA, AC, SC, TS, AG, CV, TP and CZ edited and reviewed the draft.

780

781 **Competing interests**

782 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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